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1
. . . scientific method, like science itself, defies
definition. It is made up of a number of operations,
some mental, some manual. Each of these, in its time,
has been found useful, first in the formulation of
questions that seem u rg e n t. . . and then in the finding,
testing, and using the answers to them.
J. D. BERNAL

Tax Research in
Perspective
This study is designed to provide a working knowledge of tax
research methodology for the certified public accountant who is not
already a tax specialist. It introduces its readers to the research proc
ess utilized in the tax-related work commonly performed by ac
countants in public practice and it notes, in passing, the kind of
research used to determine tax policy recommendations.1 After a
careful reading of this study and many hours of experience in im
plementing the procedures suggested here, the reader should be
capable of solving most of the tax problems encountered in a public
accounting practice.1
1Accountants generally have not ventured far into the realm of tax policy.
Because of their practical experience in tax matters, accountants could play
an important role in improving our tax system. If they were to assume an
active role in policy deliberations in the future, many of the research pro
cedures simply noted in passing later in this chapter would have to be in
vestigated at length.
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This study also introduces the reference volumes necessary for a
tax library. It suggests both minimal library requirements and meth
ods of utilizing the more important tax reference works. This study
is not primarily intended to increase knowledge of specific substan
tive tax provisions per se, but, as a secondary benefit, it may teach
readers more than they previously knew about some tax provisions
as they study the examples offered as problem-solving illustrations.
When solving a similar problem of their own, however, readers
should not rely upon the conclusions reached in these examples
without updating them. Although some of the AICPA tax studies
are periodically revised, they were never intended as a substitute
for a current tax-reference service.
Meaning of Research in General
Ideally, a book devoted to tax research would begin with an un
ambiguous definition of the word research. Unfortunately, no such
definition has come to the authors’ attention; therefore, we will have
to be satisfied with a general description rather than a precise defi
nition. This general description should adequately reveal the nature
of the process envisioned within the phrase tax research as it is
used here.
The word research is used to describe a wide variety of diverse
activities. For example, at one extreme it can include the search for
anything not presently known by the person making the search. In
that context, looking up an unknown telephone number in a direc
tory would constitute research. At the other extreme, a scientist
might restrict his use of the word research to exhaustive experimen
tation under tightly controlled conditions solely for the purpose of
revising previously accepted conclusions in light of recently deter
mined facts. Between the extremes he infinite alternative definitions.
Thus, this tax study does not purport to deal with all forms of
tax research; except for a few introductory comments in this chap
ter, this study is restricted to a description of the procedures com
monly utilized by a diverse group of professionals—including cer
tified public accountants, lawyers, enrolled agents, and Internal
Revenue Service personnel—to determine a defensibly “correct”
(and in some instances an optimal) conclusion to a tax question.
Totally different kinds of work undertaken by these individuals or
by other persons might be properly included within the meaning of
2

the phrase tax research, but our objective is neither to define nor
to reconcile conflicting definitions. We desire only to place the gen
eral characteristics of the different types of tax research in perspec
tive. Very few persons become expert in each of the research method
ologies noted. Nevertheless, anyone deeply engaged in any facet of
tax work should at least be generally aware of what other individuals
working in the same field are doing. With increasing frequency,
those expert in one facet of taxation are asked to express an in
formed opinion on a wholly different aspect of taxation. In these
circumstances it is especially desirable that the expert be aware of
what others have done so that he might move with appropriate cau
tion in dealing with tax matters with which he is not intimately
familiar.
Perhaps the easiest and most desirable way to place the different
types of tax research in meaningful perspective is to create a gen
eral classification system based on the purpose of the inquiry. Al
though other possible classification systems are evident—for ex
ample, one could easily construct a classification scheme based on
the character of the methodology employed—one based upon the
purpose behind the research effort seems to be most useful for this
statement of perspective. At least three distinct purposes for tax
research come immediately to mind: implementation of rules, policy
determination, and advancement of knowledge.
Research for Implementation of Rules

Much tax research is undertaken to determine the applicability
of general tax laws to specific fact situations. After a tax law is
enacted, implementation of the law is the responsibility of the tax
payer. Although we have what purports to be a self-assessment tax
system in this country, both tax rules and business practices have
become so complex that many taxpayers seek the assistance of
specially trained individuals to assure not only their compliance with
the tax rules, but also their achievement of that compliance at mini
mal tax cost.
Five elementary steps constitute a total research effort: (1) estab
lishing the facts, (2) from the facts, determining the question, (3)
searching for an authoritative solution to that question, (4) deter
mining the import of the frequently incomplete and sometimes con
flicting tax authorities located, and (5) communicating the conclu
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sion to the interested party. Although a thorough examination of
what each of these five steps involves must be deferred to later
chapters, we can briefly describe each step at this juncture.
Establishing the Facts. Most tax laws and related administrative
regulations are necessarily written in general terms. Effective rules
must be stated in terms that adequately describe the vast majority
of factual circumstances envisioned by those who determine the
rules. Rules stated too broadly invite conflicting interpretation;
those stated too narrowly often fail to achieve their intended objec
tive. However, no matter how carefully the words of a statute are
selected, general rules cannot possibly describe every conceivable
factual variation that might be subject to the intended rules. Con
sequently, the first step in implementation-oriented research neces
sarily involves the process of obtaining all of the facts so that the
researcher can determine which tax rule or rules might apply to
those particular events.
Determining the Questions. Questions arise when specific fact
situations are examined in light of general rules or laws. Complex
tax questions frequently evolve through several stages of develop
ment. Based on his prior knowledge of tax rules, a researcher usu
ally can state the pertinent questions in terms of very general rules.
For example, he may ask whether the facts necessitate the recog
nition of gross income by the taxpayer. Or he may ask whether the
facts permit the taxpayer to claim a deduction in his determination
of taxable income. Or he may ask whether a gain should be reported
as ordinary income or as capital gain. After making an initial search
of the authorities to answer his general question, the researcher
often discovers that he must answer one or more specific technical
questions of interpretation before he can answer his general ques
tion. These secondary questions frequently involve the need to de
termine the exact meaning of certain words and/or phrases as they
are used in particular tax rules. For example, the tax researcher
may have to determine if the fact situation he has under considera
tion is “ordinary,” “necessary,” or “reasonable” as those words are
used in various sections of the code. Alternatively he may have to
determine the meaning of the word “primarily” or, perhaps, the
meaning of the phrase “trade or business.” Once he has restated his
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general question in this more specific way, the researcher often
must return briefly to the process of collecting more facts. From his
study of the authorities, he learns that facts he initially did not con
sider important may be critical to the resolution of his now revised
question. After obtaining all necessary facts and resolving the more
technical questions, the tax researcher may discover that he has
also resolved his general question. If, however, the answer to his
general question is negative, he very often must seek an answer to
a related question before he can proceed to a conclusion. For ex
ample, even if the tax researcher determines that a particular ex
penditure is not tax deductible, he may have to determine whether
or not the expenditure can be capitalized ( that is, added to the tax
basis of an asset) or whether it must simply be ignored in the tax
determination procedure.2 In effect, raising collateral questions re
turns the researcher to the beginning of the second step in the re
search process. This procedure continues until all pertinent ques
tions have been satisfactorily answered.
Searching for Authority. Authority in tax matters is legion. It
nearly always begins with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, but it quickly expands to include Treasury regulations,
judicial decisions, administrative pronouncements, and sometimes,
congressional committee reports. Judicial decisions in federal tax
disputes are rendered by U.S. district courts, the Tax Court, the
Court of Claims, the several circuit courts of appeals, and the Su
preme Court. Administrative pronouncements are issued as revenue
rulings, revenue procedures, technical information releases, and
general counsel memoranda. Reports of the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the Joint Commit
tee may be pertinent to the resolution of a tax question. Obviously
the task of locating all of the potential authority before reaching a
conclusion can be a very demanding and time-consuming task. As
previously explained, the search for authority often raises additional
questions that can only be answered after the determination of ad
ditional facts. Thus the research process often moves back from
2In a tax-planning situation, of course, the tax adviser may recommend an
alternative way of structuring the transaction so as to achieve the most desir
able tax result.
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step three to step one before it proceeds to a resolution of the gen
eral question.
Resolving the Question. After locating, reading, and interpreting
all of the pertinent authority, a tax adviser must be prepared to
resolve the many questions he has raised. His client (the taxpayer)
must make the final decision on what course of action to take, but,
in most circumstances, the taxpayer’s decision is guided by and
even dependent upon the conclusions reached by the adviser. The
taxpayer looks to his adviser for guidance. Even when working
with questions to which there appear to be no ready answers, a tax
adviser must be prepared to say to his client, “If I were you, I
would do this.” Thus a tax adviser really must resolve the questions
to his own satisfaction before he can recommend action to anyone
else.
Communicating the Conclusion. Having thoroughly researched
the tax problem and having reached a conclusion, a tax adviser
must communicate all pertinent factors to the interested parties.
Drafting tax communications is unusually difficult. Very often,
highly technical questions must be phrased in layman’s language.
Positions sometimes must be carefully hedged without omitting or
misstating any critical fact or any applicable rule. At the same time,
a tax adviser must take sufficient care to protect his own rights and
professional integrity. These considerations sometimes are conflict
ing constraints in drafting an appropriate communication; therefore,
great care must be exercised in this final step of the implementationoriented research procedure.
The arrangement of the material in this tax study follows the se
quence of steps suggested above. That is, chapter 2 is concerned
with the search for facts; chapter 3 is a discussion of the process
by which a tax researcher prepares his statement of the pertinent
questions. Chapter 4 explains how a researcher can systematically
go about locating possible authority; chapter 5 suggests what he
might do if the authority he finds is incomplete or conflicting. Chap
ter 6 describes the many factors that must be considered in draft
ing the communication that will convey the results of the research
effort to the concerned persons. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 each give
a detailed example of this tax research process under two different
6

circumstances: chapter 7 illustrates the research process in a com
pliance setting, chapter 8, in a planning situation.
Research for Policy Determination

Our tax laws are enacted by Congress to produce federal revenues
and to achieve designated economic and social objectives. For ex
ample, the general objectives of the investment credit and the rapid
depreciation provisions include stimulating investment spending
and economic growth. The domestic international sales corporation
provisions are intended to stimulate foreign sales of domestically
produced goods and thus to aid in the solution of U.S. balance of
payments (currency) problems. These and many other tax provi
sions should be investigated thoroughly to determine whether they
are efficiently achieving the intended objectives. The research meth
odology common to such investigations draws heavily from the
discipline of economics. Econometric models must be constructed
and much data obtained to formulate tax policy.
Similarly, our government representatives should have factual in
formation about voter preferences. They should know, for example,
whether a majority of the voters prefer to deal with problems of
pollution through fines and penalty taxes, through incentive pro
visions in the tax laws, or through wholly non-tax legislation. Simi
larly, those who enact laws should know how the voters feel about
funding public medical care, employee retirement programs, mass
transit systems, interstate highways, and a host of other govern
ment projects. The research methodology common to determining
voter preferences draws heavily on survey techniques best under
stood by sociologists, demographers, and other social scientists.
Every change in tax law has a direct impact on the federal budget
and on monetary policies, the magnitude and direction of which
should be determined as accurately as possible before the law is
finalized. Operations research techniques and computer technology
are most useful in making such determinations. Some of the research
techniques used to make these predictions are similar to those used
by the econometrician in building models that tell us whether or
not a law can achieve its intended objectives; in other ways the
techniques utilized are quite different. The point is simply that, even
within the confines of the work which must be undertaken to pro
vide tax policy prescriptions, the procedures that must be utilized
7

to make those determinations vary substantially. Yet all of these
diverse procedures are commonly referred to as tax research.
Research for Advancement of Knowledge

Another purpose for undertaking tax research is the advancement
of knowledge in general. Research undertaken to determine a pref
erable tax policy, as well as that undertaken to implement tax rules,
has a pragmatic objective. The researcher in each instance has a
very practical reason for wanting to know the answer he seeks. Some
research, on the other hand, is undertaken solely for the purpose
of disseminating general knowledge. There is, however, no single
common methodology for such research. Rather, the methodology
selected depends entirely upon the nature of the investigation being
undertaken. If it involves economic predictions, economic modeling
is necessary. If it involves taxpayer attitudes and/or preferences,
surveys based on carefully selected statistical samples are equally
mandatory. And if it involves compliance consideration, a studied
opinion of pertinent authority is just as essential.
Tax practitioners, as well as academicians, government employ
ees, and foundation personnel, often engage in tax research work
intended solely for the advancement of knowledge. The results are
published in journals and presented in proceedings that appeal to
two fundamentally different audiences. Policy-oriented journals and
proceedings primarily attract persons who are economists by edu
cation and training. Implementation-oriented journals and proceed
ings primarily attract those who are either accountants or lawyers
by education and training. Academicians are found in both camps.
Examples of Tax Research

Chapter 7 is an example of implementation-oriented tax research.
The objective of chapter 7 is simply to illustrate how a tax re
searcher might determine the “correct” tax treatment of the act of
incorporating a sole proprietorship under stated fact conditions.
Chapter 8 demonstrates how tax planning can be utilized to mini
mize the tax dangers and maximize the tax opportunities implicit in
a different fact setting. Before we turn all of our attention to the
details of this form of research in subsequent chapters, however, let
us pause very briefly to note a few examples of policy-oriented tax
8

research. Some knowledge of this literature should be helpful to
any certified public accountant undertaking a policy-oriented re
search project. Although individual CPA firms tend to do little of
this work, a few accountants may be in for a new adventure be
cause of the expansion of the AICPA’s role in tax policy, approved
by the executive committee in the fall of 1969. Several task forces
have been appointed and research begun. The first Statement of
Tax Policy was issued by the AICPA in 1974.3
A relatively recent example of a policy-oriented tax study is the
report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
entitled Financing Schools and Property Tax Relief—A State Respon
sibility.4 Their report is an interesting compilation of statistical data,
position papers, and a survey of taxpayer attitudes. It demonstrates
well the multidimensional quality common to most tax policy issues.
An example of a more theoretical study is found in the recent
work of Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner entitled Who Bears
the Tax Burden?5 This effort is one of a long and distinguished se
ries of studies in government finance. It attempts to determine the
distribution of all taxes combined by income classes. It demonstrates
nicely the complexity of tax policy studies by presenting its results
under eight different assumptions of tax incidence. Further, the
authors do not express a preference for any one result, in recogni
tion of the fact that no conclusive empirical evidence has been
found which would justify making a single selection.
A third example of policy-oriented research can be found in
Stanley Surrey’s recent book, Pathways to Tax Reform, which intro
duces the notion of a “tax expenditures” budget.6 In it the author
attempts to demonstrate, in terms of lost revenues, the cost of many
3See Taxation of Capital Gains (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1974), 28 pages. Further policy statements by the AICPA
are expected in the areas of estate and gift tax reform and the value-added
tax, in the near future.
4The 261-page report (No. A-40, January 1973) is available from the Ad
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C. 20575,
for $2.50.
5This 119-page booklet, published in 1974, is available from The Brookings
Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036, for $2.50
in paperback and $5.95 in clothbound editions.
6Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1973).
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exemption, exclusion, and deduction provisions in the income tax
law. Based on these estimates, the author points to what he sees
as the preferred route to tax reform.
A thorough review of an important segment of tax research was
made by Carl Shoup in “Quantitative Research in Taxation and
Government Expenditure.”7 In this work, Shoup appraises the need
for further quantitative research and suggests outlets for such work.
Literally hundreds of other excellent examples of tax research could
be cited here, although to do so would lead far afield from the ob
jectives of this study.
In summary, the phrase tax research is commonly used to refer
to widely divergent processes. All are legitimate, socially produc
tive endeavors that may be included in a definition of tax research.
A broad outline of the different processes are mentioned in this per
spectives chapter for two reasons: first, to give the reader some
idea of what is and what is not to be described in the study and
second, to suggest to accountants and others, who by their own
inclination are implementation-oriented, the kinds of efforts that
should be included in policy-oriented projects they might under
take.
In closing this chapter, the authors join many others who have
called for a broader participation of tax-interested persons in the
determination of tax policy. In the past, the tax research efforts of
theoreticians have all too often wholly ignored all practical conse
quences, including the behavioral adaptation of those most directly
affected by their recommendations. On the other hand, the policy
prescriptions rendered by the implementation-oriented groups have
often overlooked important empirical evidence accumulated in the
more theoretical studies. Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law professor
interested in taxation and a former assistant secretary of the treas
ury for tax policy, made these observations in 1966:
We must be aware that the apparent certitude offered by the mass
of numbers computers can generate or the conclusions that the
ranks of econometric equations can produce do not lull us into a
false security. There is still room, as the computer technology de
velops, for a constructive two-way dialogue between the computer
7Shoup’s paper was published as “Public Expenditures and Taxation” (Col
loquium IV), (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972),
16 pages.
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technologists and those whose insights come from experience and
accumulated wisdom. Working together they can offer great hope
and promise for an improved tax system capable of fully bearing
its share of responsibility for achieving the Great Society we are
seeking.8

An important first step in this hoped-for working together is the
acquaintance of each with the aims and the methodologies of the
other. This volume should help to describe the tax research method
ology commonly utilized by the more implementation-oriented
group.

8 Stanley S. Surrey, “Computer Technology and Federal Tax Policy,” Na
tional Tax Journal, September 1966, pp. 257-58.
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The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on; nor a ll your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
OMAR KHAYYAM

The Critical Role of Facts
A tax result is dependent upon three variables: facts, applicable
law, and an administrative (and occasionally judicial) process. An
accountant not trained in the practice of law is apt to underestimate
the significance of facts to the resolution of a tax question. Most lay
man’s study of law, including an accountant’s study of business law,
tends to concentrate on general rules. For the accountant turned tax
adviser, however, general rules will not suffice. It is essential that
every tax adviser understand why a thorough knowledge of all the
facts is critical to the resolution of any tax question.
The Importance of Facts to Tax Questions
As used here, the word fact means an actual occurrence or an
event, a thing having real existence; facts are the who, what, when,
why, where, and how of daily existence. From the facts, questions
arise. A tax adviser must be able to distinguish a conclusion from
a fact. For example, a statement that an individual is married really
is a conclusion rather than a fact. The facts that support such a con
clusion may include such real-world events as these:
13

• On June 9, 1956, that person appeared with a member of the
opposite sex before a third person duly authorized to perform mar
riages.
• That person exchanged certain oral vows with the specified
member of the opposite sex.
• The person authorized to perform marriages made certain dec
laratory statements to those persons present.
• The exchange of vows and the declaratory statements were
made in the presence of a designated number of witnesses.
• Certain documents were signed by designated parties to this
ceremony and those documents were filed in a specified repository.
• No events which might change this relationship have subse
quently transpired.
Change any one of the above facts and the conclusion—that is, that
a person is married—may no longer be valid. A statement of perti
nent facts is virtually always much longer and clumsier than is a
simple statement of the conclusion drawn from them. Consequently
most of the time we tend to converse in words, sentences, and
thoughts based on conclusions rather than on elementary facts.
In tax work it often is necessary to pursue facts at length to be
certain of the validity of a particular tax conclusion. To continue the
foregoing illustration, a person cannot file a “joint income tax re
turn” unless he or she is married. Obviously, most people know if
they are married or not, and most tax advisers accept their client’s
word on this important conclusion. If, in the course of a conversa
tion or in an investigation related to the preparation of a tax return,
it becomes apparent that there is reason to doubt the validity of the
client’s conclusion, then a full-scale investigation of all of the facts
is necessary. For example, a client may state that he has recently
gotten a divorce. This simple statement should be sufficient to cause
an alert tax adviser to make further investigations, because a per
son may be deemed to be married for tax purposes even after he
believes that he once again is single. By the same token, the tax ad
viser must know that persons who never in their life have exchanged
marriage vows may be deemed to be married for tax and other pur
poses by virtue of their actions (that is, by virtue of “the facts”)
and th e law of the state in which they reside. The tax adviser also
knows that persons married to nonresident aliens are not eligible to
file joint income tax returns even though they are obviously married.
14

One of the things that makes tax work both difficult and risky is
the fact that the taxpayer often does not understand the significance
of the pertinent facts, and a tax adviser often cannot take the time to
determine each of these facts or to investigate their significance if
he is to perform his consultative role without charging an exorbi
tant fee. When the tax adviser is alerted to the possibility that a
further investigation of the facts may lead to a significantly different
conclusion in a tax determination, however, it is his professional
obligation to investigate those facts in sufficient depth to permit a
correct determination of their tax import. In situations involving
aspects of the law beyond the confines of taxation—as in the mar
riage example—the accountant will find it necessary for his client to
obtain a related legal opinion from a qualified attorney before he
can proceed with his client’s tax problem.
No one engaged in tax practice should ever underestimate the
importance of factual detail. Virtually every authoritative reference
on tax practice stresses this important conclusion. Bickford says,
“It would be impossible . . . to overemphasize the importance of
knowing all the facts of a case, down to the last detail, figure and
date.”1 Freeman and Freeman put it this way: “Facts determine the
law. Law is really facts. Shape the facts and you have planned the
law. Facts have to be found. Be a detective. Find not some of the
facts but all of the facts.”12 Implied in the latter quotation is the im
portant distinction between events that have already taken place
and those that are yet to occur. Tax planning is based on this criti
cal distinction.
Facts— Established and Anticipated
Taxpayer compliance and tax planning constitute two major por
tions of any successful tax adviser’s work. The initial and critical dif
ference between these two phases of tax practice is simply a differ
ence in the state of the facts. In compliance work, all of the facts
have already transpired and the tax adviser’s only task—assuming
that he already knows what the facts are—is the determination of
1 Hugh C. Bickford, Successful Tax Practice, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 14.
2 Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman, The Tax Practice Deskbook
(Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1973), p. 2-1.
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the tax result implicit in those facts. In planning work, the tax ad
viser researches alternative ways of achieving established goals and
recommends to his client those actions that will—considering all
operational constraints, personal and financial objectives, and per
sonal and business history—minimize the resulting tax liability. In
other words, the tax planner must determine an optimal set of facts
from the standpoint of tax results, given certain personal and finan
cial constraints. The operational procedures applied in these two
phases of tax practice are quite different.
After-the-Facts Compliance

The first step in taxpayer compliance work is a determination of
the facts that have already taken place. The procedures used to de
termine facts differ significantly depending upon the relationship
existing between the tax adviser and the taxpayer. The less personal
the relationship, the greater the amount of time that must be de
voted to a discovery of facts. In most instances, the fact discovery
process can be divided into at least four distinct steps: initial in
quiry, independent investigation, additional inquiry, and substanti
ation.
Initial Inquiry. At one extreme, the tax adviser will not have
known the taxpayer prior to the request for services. In that event,
if the initial request is for tax return preparation services, it is com
mon for the tax adviser to complete a predetermined checklist of
facts during (or immediately following) an initial interview. Many
firms have devised their own forms to facilitate this information
gathering process; others utilize standard forms prepared by tax
return computer services or other agencies. If the initial request is
for assistance in an administrative proceeding, a less structured in
terview is typically used. In every instance the objective of the in
quiry is the same: To establish all of the facts essential to an accu
rate determination of the tax liability.
Tax advisers who are intimately familiar with their client’s affairs
often are able to extract sufficient factual information from existing
files and personal knowledge to allow them to avoid extended per
sonal contact with the taxpayer while making an investigation com
parable to the initial inquiry. For example, the certified public ac
countant who regularly maintains and/or audits all of a client’s fi
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nancial records will require only minimal additional contact with
the client to establish the information necessary to determine the
correct tax liability.
Independent Investigation. Regardless of the extent of personal
contact involved in the initial inquiry, all but the simplest taxpayer
compliance engagements require some independent investigation on
the part of the tax adviser. The specific reason for undertaking such
an independent investigation varies from one situation to another,
but all stem from the need for additional facts to determine a tax
result. Sometimes the impetus for getting more facts comes from
something the client said; at other times, from what he did not say.
At still other times, the need for further facts becomes apparent
when the tax adviser begins to examine the client’s financial records.
For example, a canceled check made payable to an unknown Dr.
Jones may or may not be tax deductible. The return preparer must
determine what kind of doctor Jones is and what service was ren
dered to the taxpayer before he can determine whether or not the
payment can be deducted.
Whatever the cause, the tax adviser frequently engages in what
might be described as detective work to determine necessary facts.
An independent investigation may involve a detailed review of fi
nancial records, old files, correspondence, corporate minutes, sales
agreements, bank statements, and so forth; it may involve interviews
with friends, family, employees, business associates, or others; and,
in some cases, that search may extend to reviews of general business
conditions and practices. Because of the relatively high cost of some
investigations, it is common to defer incurring those costs until such
time as they are absolutely necessary. Usually this means deferring
them from the time of the initial act of taxpayer compliance to the
time of a dispute, that is, from the time of filing the tax return to the
time at which the Internal Revenue Service challenges a tax conclu
sion previously reported by the taxpayer on the basis of rather tenu
ous facts. Because less than 3 percent of all tax returns filed are
challenged in an average year, the reason for delaying a costly indepth investigation is obvious. Nevertheless, the competent tax ad
viser should always be alert for situations that are apt to require
further investigation later. Often it is easier and cheaper to ob
tain facts and to assemble related evidence at the time events trans
pire than it is to construct them at a later date; occasionally facts may
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become impossible to determine if too much time has elapsed be
tween the events and the inquiry. A tax adviser’s services are often
more efficient and less costly if the client himself collects much of
the necessary evidence to support the facts. Again, the probability
of the client’s doing this successfully is much greater if facts relate
to recent events. Deferring an investigation of pertinent facts nearly
always increases the costs. The trade-off is clear: Incur a smaller
cost now at the risk of its being unnecessary, or incur greater cost
later in the unlikely event that it is needed.
Additional Inquiry. Even in those situations in which an in-depth
investigation of the facts has been completed, the tax adviser fre
quently will need to make further factual inquiries after he begins
his search of the law. A search for the tax law applicable to a given
set of facts often uncovers the need for information not originally
deemed relevant by the taxpayer or the tax adviser. By reading
revenue rulings and judicial decisions in situations similar to that of
his client, the adviser may become aware of fact considerations he
or his client originally failed to consider. Being alerted to their pos
sible importance, the tax adviser must return to the fact determina
tion process once again. In highly complex situations, this process
of moving between fact finding and law determination may repeat
itself several times before the tax question is finally resolved.
Substantiation of Facts. Determining what the facts are and prov
ing those facts are two entirely different things. The nature and
quality of proof required varies significantly depending upon who is
receiving proof. In tax matters, the person who must be convinced
of the authenticity of the facts can be anyone from an Internal Rev
enue Service agent to a Supreme Court justice. The methods used
to substantiate facts vary tremendously. Generally, fact substanti
ation procedures are much less formal in dealings with an admin
istrative agency such as the IRS than in dealings with a court, and
even within the judicial system, the rules of evidence vary from one
court to another. Obviously, the closer one moves to formal litiga
tion the greater the need for the opinion and the assistance of a
qualified trial attorney. Only such a professional can adequately
assess the hazards of the litigation procedure, including the rules of
evidence and the burden-of-proof problems.
The certified public accountant engaged in tax practice should
not lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of all tax disputes
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are settled at the administrative level.3 Therefore it is necessary for
him to be fully prepared to determine, present, and substantiate all
of the facts critical to the resolution of a tax dispute in any admin
istrative proceeding. In doing this, the CPA must exercise due cau
tion to avoid stipulation of any fact that might prove to be detri
mental to his client in the unlikely event that the dispute should
move beyond administrative hearings and into the courts. Because
of this ever-present danger, the CPA should consult with a trial at
torney at the first sign of significant litigation potential.
Before-the-Facts Planning

If events have not yet transpired, the facts have not yet been es
tablished and there is opportunity to plan anticipated facts care
fully. As noted earlier, tax planning is nothing more than determin
ing an optimal set of facts from the standpoint of tax results. The
procedures followed in making such a determination differ signifi
cantly from the procedures utilized in taxpayer compliance work.
Determination of the Preferred Alternative. The first step in the
determination of the tax-preferred alternative involves a client inter
view. In this instance, however, the purpose of the interview is not
to determine exactly what has happened in the past but, rather, to
determine (1) the future economic objectives of the client and (2)
any operative constraints in achieving those objectives. If he is to
perform his task successfully, the tax planner must be privy to all
of his client’s hopes, dreams, ambitions, and prejudices, his present
circumstances, and his history. That kind of information can seldom
be obtained in a single interview. Ideally, it is derived through a
long, open, and trusting relationship between client and tax adviser.
When tax planning is based on such an on-going relationship, any
particular client interview may be brief and directly to the point.
Even relatively major plans can sometimes be developed, at least
initially, with no more than a simple telephone conversation.
When the tax adviser fully understands his client’s objectives and
constraints, he should spend a considerable amount of time simply
thinking about alternative ways of achieving the objectives speci
fied by the client before beginning his research. Generally there are
3Government publications fail to provide precise data on the percentage of
settlements at different levels. However, according to the 1973 Annual Re
port of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, approximately 99 percent of
all proposed adjustments are settled outside the courtroom.
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diverse ways to achieve a single goal; failure to spend enough time
and effort in creative thinking about that goal usually results in tak
ing the most obvious route to the solution. In many instances the
most obvious route is not the preferred alternative. A vivid imagi
nation and creative ability have their greatest payoff in this “think
ing step.”
Although in all probability no one can do much to increase his
native imagination or creative ability, many people simply do not
take advantage of that which they already possess. By far the most
common cause of unimaginative tax planning is the failure of the
adviser to spend sufficient time thinking about alternative ways to
achieve a client’s objectives. A common tendency is to rush far too
quickly from the initial inquiry to a search of the law for an an
swer. By rushing to a solution, we very often completely overlook
the preferred alternative.
An example of creative imagination appears in John J. Sexton,
42 TC 1094 (1964), where the taxpayer successfully defended his
right to depreciate a hole in the ground. The facts of the case are
both interesting and instructive. The taxpayer was an operator of
refuse dumps. He acquired land with major excavations primarily
to use in his dumping business, and he allocated a substantial por
tion of his purchase price of the land to the holes. As the holes were
filled, he depreciated the value so allocated. Because the taxpayer
carefully documented all the pertinent facts in his case, the court
allowed his deduction. Many less imaginative persons might have
totally overlooked this major tax advantage simply because it is un
usual and because they did not spend enough time just thinking
about the facts of the case.
After a tax adviser has determined a client’s objectives, and after
he has thought about alternative ways of achieving those objectives,
he should systematically go about researching the tax rules and
calculating the tax result of each viable alternative. The preparation
of a “decision tree” often is very helpful in determining which of
several alternatives is the tax-preferred one (see chapter 8, page
217). It forces the adviser to think through each alternative care
fully, and it demonstrates vividly the dollar significance of the tax
savings in the preferred set of facts. Obviously, however, it is up to
the client to implement the plan successfully.
Substantiation of Subsequent Events. The client and the tax
adviser, working together, must take every precaution to accumu
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late and preserve sufficient documentation of the facts to support
the tax plan selected. In relatively extreme circumstances, a court
will not hesitate to apply any one of several judicial doctrines—
most notably the doctrine of substance-over-form—to find that an
overly ambitious tax plan is not a valid interpretation of the law.
If, however, the tax adviser exercises reasonable caution against
plans that lack substance, and if he takes sufficient care to docu
ment each step of the plans, the chance of succeeding is consider
ably improved. Of course, the process of substantiating carefully
selected facts is primarily the responsibility of the taxpayer. The
tax adviser, however, should supervise the process of implementa
tion to make certain that the intended events actually transpire in
the sequence intended, and that the proof of these events will be
available when and if it is needed.

Some Common Fact Questions
Most tax disputes involve questions of fact, not questions of law.
In working with fact questions, a tax adviser’s job is to assemble,
clarify, and present the facts in such a way that any reasonable
person would conclude that they conform to the requirements out
lined in the tax law. Demonstrating that degree of fact clarity is
often next to impossible. Some fact questions are necessarily much
more involved and difficult to prove than others. Following are brief
examples of common but difficult questions of fact.
Fair Market Value. The determination of the fair market value
of a property is probably the most commonly encountered fact ques
tion in all of taxation. It arises in connection with income, estate,
and gift taxes. The applicable law common to many of these situ
ations is relatively simple if we could but determine the fair market
value of the properties involved. For example, Section 61 of the
code provides that “. . . gross income means all income from what
ever source derived,” and Treasury Regulations Section 1.61-2(d) ( 1)
goes on to state th at

. . the fair m arket value of the pro p erty or

services taken in payment (for services rendered) must be included
in income.” Generally, the application of this law is simple enough
once the valuation question is settled.
The legal definition of fair market value stated concisely in Estate
Tax Regulations Section 20.2031-1(b) follows.
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The fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.

Fact problems are involved in making that brief definition opera
tional. What is a willing buyer? A willing seller? A compulsion to
buy? A compulsion to sell? Reasonable knowledge? A relevant fact?
Only in the case of comparatively small blocks of listed securities
and in the case of selected commodities do we have access to an
organized market which will supply us with ready answers to those
questions. In all other instances we must look to all of the surround
ing facts and circumstances to find an answer.
Books have been written in attempts to delineate the fact circum
stances which must be considered in determining fair market value.
Unfortunately, even a cursory review of those books must remain
outside the scope of this tax study.4 Suffice it to observe here that
valuation is a fact question and that, ordinarily, the party to any
tax valuation dispute who does the best job of determining, clari
fying, and presenting all of the pertinent facts is the party who wins
that dispute.
Reasonable Salaries. The fact determination of what constitutes a
reasonable salary has long been a troublesome tax problem. W ith
the recent introduction of the maximum tax on earned income, this
question promises to become of even more critical significance in
the immediate future.5 Once again, in many cases the applicable
law is relatively simple if we could but determine what is reasonable
within a particular fact setting.
In determining reasonableness, the Internal Revenue Service agent
and the judge often look, for comparison, to such obvious facts as
salaries paid to other employees performing similar tasks for other
4See G. D. McCarthy and R. E. Healy, Valuing a Company (New York:
Ronald Press, 1971) and J. R. Krahmer and T. D. Henderer, Valuation of
Shares of Closely Held Corporations, 221 Tax Management Portfolio, 1973.
5 The increase in the effective marginal tax rate to 48 percent on owner-man
aged corporations, previously conducted in multiple corporate entities, should
serve to encourage the owner-managers to distribute a larger proportion of
the corporate income in the form of salaries, paid to the owner-managers,
because there is very little extra tax cost associated with such a distribution
and it provides the owner with a maximum degree of financial flexibility.
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employers, any unique attributes of a particular employee, the em
ployee’s education, the availability of other persons with similar
skills, and prior compensation paid to the employee. In addition, tax
authorities trying to determine the reasonableness of salaries also
look to the dividend history of the employer corporation, the rela
tion between salaries and equity ownership, the time and method
of making the compensation decision, the state of the economy, and
many other facts. Again, we cannot examine here all of the detailed
facts which have been important to reasonable salary decisions in
the past.6 We need only observe that the question of reasonableness
is a fact question. The taxpayer who marshals all of the pertinent
facts and presents them in a favorable light stands a better chance
of winning an IRS challenge of unreasonable salaries than does the
taxpayer who ignores any one or more critical facts. The best reason
for carefully studying regulations, rulings, and cases in such a cir
cumstance is to make certain not to overlook the opportunity to
determine and prove a fact that could be important to the desired
conclusion.
Casualty and Theft Losses. Noncorporate taxpayers frequently
lose their right to claim a casualty or theft loss deduction for in
come tax purposes because they did not take sufficient care to estab
lish the facts surrounding that loss. The law authorizes a tax deduc
tion for losses sustained on property held for personal use only if
such property is damaged or destroyed by a casualty or theft. Thus,
the loss sustained because of the disappearance of a diamond ring
will not give rise to a tax deduction unless the taxpayer can prove
that the disappearance is attributable to a casualty or theft, rather
than to carelessness on the part of the owner. If the taxpayer has
photographs, newspaper accounts, police reports, testimony of im
partial persons, and/or other evidence that a casualty or theft has
occurred, he will have relatively little trouble in convincing a skep
tical Internal Revenue agent or a judge of his right to that deduc6 See C. C. Halsey and M. E. Peloubet, Federal Taxation and Unreasonable
Compensation (New York: Ronald Press, 1964) for an excellent survey of
nearly 200 cases on this topic. See also H. Steutzer, Jr., “Reasonable Compen
sation,” New York University Twenty-Fifth Annual Institute on Federal Taxa
tion (New York: N.Y.U., 1967), pp. 49-508; E. L. Kellett, “Reasonableness of
Compensation Paid to Officers or Employees, so as to Warrant Reduction
Thereof in Computing Employer’s Income Tax,” 10 ALR 3d 125 (1966).
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tion. It is the facts that count, and the taxpayer generally has the
burden of proving the facts in a tax dispute.
Gifts. Section 102 provides that receipt of a gift does not consti
tute taxable income. In many situations, however, it is difficult to
determine whether a particular property transfer really is a gift or
compensation for either a past or a contemplated future event.
Once again it is the facts surrounding the transfer that will control
that determination. Facts that demonstrate the intent of the trans
feror to make a gratuitous transfer—that is, one without any expec
tation of something in return—are necessary to the determination
that the transfer was a gift. Relationships existing between the
transferor and the transferee may be important; for example, it gen
erally will be easier to establish the fact that a gift was made if the
two involved persons are closely related individuals (for example,
father and son). On the other hand, if the two are related in an
employer-employee relationship, it will be especially difficult to
establish the presence of a gift. Although the broad outline of many
other abstract but common fact questions could be noted here, let
us consider in somewhat greater detail a few examples of some realworld tax disputes that were based on fact questions.
Illustrative Fact Cases
In an attempt to better illustrate the critical role of facts in the
resolution of tax questions, an examination of four previously liti
gated tax cases follow. The four cases can be divided into two sets
of two cases each. One set deals with the question of distinguishing
between a gift and income for services rendered; the other set deals
with the propriety of deducting payments made by a taxpayer to his
parent. None of the four cases is particularly important in its own
right, but together they serve to illustrate several important conclu
sions common to tax research and fact questions. The court deci
sions in these cases are relatively brief, an d th e facts involved are

easy to comprehend.
Gift or Income?

Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes include a rule
providing that gifts do not constitute an element of taxable income.
The present rule is stated in Section 102 of the 1954 code as fol
lows: “(a) General Rule.—Gross income does not include the value
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of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.” The
first two cases to be examined consist largely of a judicial review
of the facts necessary to determine whether or not particular trans
fers or property constitute gifts or taxable income for services
rendered.
The first case involves a taxpayer named Margaret D. Brizendine
and her husband, Everett. The case was heard by the Tax Court in
1957 and the decision, rendered by Judge Rice, reads in part as
follows.
Everett W. Brizendine,

Findings of Fact
Petitioners were married in 1945 and throughout the years in issue
were husband and wife and residents of Roanoke, Virginia. They
filed no returns for the years 1945 through 1949, inclusive, but did
file returns for 1950 and 1951 with the former collector of internal
revenue in Richmond.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner, Margaret D. Brizendine, was
convicted and fined on five separate occasions for operating a house
of prostitution, or for working in such a house. Petitioner, Everett
W. Brizendine, prior to the years in issue, had served a term in the
penitentiary. During the years in issue, he was convicted and fined
seven times for violation of the Roanoke City Gambling Code, for
operating a gambling house, and for disorderly conduct.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner M argaret D. Brizendine, met
an individual in a Roanoke, Virginia, restaurant with whom she be
came friendly. The individual promised her that if she would dis
continue her activities as a prostitute he would buy her a home and
provide for her support. In 1945, the individual paid Margaret
$2,000 with which sum she made the down payment on a house; he
also arranged for her to secure a loan to pay the balance of the
purchase price. From 1945 and until the time of his death in March
1950, the individual provided money with which Margaret made
payments on such loan. In addition, he paid her approximately $25
per week in cash and also paid her money to provide for utilities,
insurance, furniture, and clothing. In 1946, he paid her $500 which
she used to buy a fur coat.
In determining the deficiencies herein, the respondent arrived at
petitioners’ adjusted gross income by adding annual estimated liv
ing expenses in the amount of $2,000 to the known expenditures
made by them. The amounts of adjusted gross income so determined
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were as follows:
1945 ...............................................$4,784.80
1946 .............................................. 3,300.70
1947 .............................................. 2,645.00
1948 ....................................
2,978.62
1949 .............................................. 2,763.37
1950 .............................................. 4,812.82
1951 .............................................. 3,641.57
Petitioners' living expenses did not exceed $1,200 in addition to
the known personal expenditures made by them during each of the
years in issue.
Petitioners’ failure to file returns for the years 1945 through 1949
inclusive, was not due to reasonable cause. The deficiencies in issue
were due to petitioners’ negligence or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations. The petitioners’ failure to file declarations of esti
mated tax was not due to reasonable cause and resulted in an under
estimate of estimated tax.
Opinion
Petitioners contended that the amount received by M argaret from
the individual, with which she made a down payment on a house,
as well as all other amounts received from him until the time of his
death in 1950, were gifts to her and, therefore, did not constitute
taxable income. The respondent, while accepting petitioner’s testi
mony as to the source of the sums, argues that she has not estab
lished that the amounts received from the individual were really
gifts. He further points out that Margaret testified that the pay
ments received from the individual were in consideration of her
forbearance to refrain from engaging in prostitution, and to grant
him her companionship, and argues th at her promise constituted
valid consideration for the payments which causes them to be tax
able as ordinary income.
Both petitioners testified at the hearing in this case. Their demeanor
on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves con
siderable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual
to Margaret were the only source of petitioner’s income during the
years in question, or that such amounts as the individual paid to
M argaret were gifts. Since petitioners thus failed to establish that
those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that such amounts
were correctly determined by respondent to be taxable income
which petitioners received during the years in issue. We further
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think that there is considerable merit to the respondent’s argument
that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forbear from engaging
in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, constituted
sufficient consideration for the money received from him to make it
taxable to her.
We think, on the basis of the whole record, that respondent’s es
timate of personal living expenses in the amount of $2,000 was ex
cessive. Many of the known expenditures which petitioners made
during the years in issue were for living expenses, and pursuant to
our findings we are satisfied that an additional $1,200 adequately
covers all of their personal living expenses.

The second case involved a taxpayer named Greta Starks. The
case was heard by the Tax Court in 1966 and the decision, rendered
by Judge Mulroney, reads in part as follows.
Greta Starks, TC Memo 1966-134

Findings of Fact
Petitioner, who was unmarried during the years in question, lives
at 16900 Parkside, Detroit, Michigan. She filed no Federal income
tax returns for the years 1954 through 1958. She was 24 years old in
1954 and during that year and throughout the years 1955, 1956,
1957 and 1958 she received from one certain man, amounts of money
for living expenses, and a house (he gave her the cash to buy it in
her name), furniture, an automobile, jewelry, fur coats, and other
clothing. This man was married and about 55 years old in 1954.
Respondent in his notice of deficiency stated that he determined
that the property and money petitioner received each year consti
tuted income received by petitioner “for services rendered” and in
his computation he held her subject to self-employment tax. He ex
plained his computation of the deficiency for each year by refer
ence to Exhibit A which was attached to the notice of the defi
ciency. Page 13 of this Exhibit A is as follows:
Analysis of Living Expenses and Assets Received for Services
Rendered
Year 1954
1955 Oldsmobile automobile
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 20 weeks)
Total

$ 3,000.00
3,000.00
$ 6,000.00
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Year 1955
16900 Parkside
Roberts Furs
Saks Fifth Avenue
Piano and furniture
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 52 weeks)
Total

$22,211.08
5,038.00
828.18
6,000.00
7,800.00
$41,877.26

Year 1956
Roberts Furs
Saks Fifth Avenue
Miscellaneous household expense
Total

$1,570.00
3,543.17
1,500.00
$ 6,613.17

Year 1957
Furs by Roberts
Saks Fifth Avenue
Living expenses

$

Total

121.00
1,353.19
4,000.00

$ 5,474.19

Year 1958
Furs by Roberts
Saks Fifth Avenue
Living expenses

$

Total

35.00
978.79
4,000.00

$ 5,013.79

The money and property received by petitioner during the years
in question were all gifts from the above described man with whom
she had a very close personal relationship during all of the years
here involved.
Opinion
The question in this case is whether the advancements made by
respondent’s witness were gifts under section 102, Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, or in some manner payments that would constitute
taxable income. The question is one of fact.
There were two witnesses in this case. Petitioner took the stand
and testified she was not gainfully employed during the years here
involved except for an occasional modeling job in 1954 for which
her total receipts did not exceed $600. She said she had no occu
pation and was not engaged in any business or practicing any pro
fession and had no investments that yielded her income during the
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years in question. She in effect admitted the receipt of the items of
money and property recited in respondent’s notice of deficiency but
said they were all gifts made to her by the man she identified as
sitting in the front row in the courtroom. She testified that this man
gave her money to defray her living expenses, and about $20,000
cash to buy the house at 16900 Parkside in 1955. She testified that
she mortgaged this house for about $9,000 and she and this man
lived for a time off of the proceeds of this loan. She said that this
man gave her the furniture, jewelry, and clothing but she never con
sidered the money and property turned over to her by this man
as earnings. She said she had during the years in question, love and
affection for this man and a very personal relationship.
The only other witness in the case was the alleged donor who
sat in the courtroom during all of petitioner’s testimony. He was
called to the stand by respondent. He admitted on direct examina
tion (there was no cross-examination) that he had advanced peti
tioner funds for the purchase of a house, clothes, fur coat, and fur
niture for the house. He was asked the purpose of the payments and
he replied: “To insure the companionship of Greta Starks, more or
less of a personal investment in the future on my part.” The only
other portion of his testimony that might be said to have any bear
ing on whether the advancements were gifts or not is the following:
Q. In advancing Greta Starks monies to purchase the properties
I previously mentioned, what factors did you take into considera
tion pertaining to your wish or desire of securing the permanent
companionship of Greta Starks?
A. The monies were advanced as I considered necessary. The pur
chase of a house was considered a permanent basis to last ten,
twenty years not for a short while.
Respondent, of course, asks us to believe the testimony of his wit
ness for respondent’s counsel stated he was not to be considered a
hostile witness. The witness was only asked a few questions. He had
heard all of petitioner’s testimony to the effect that the money, home,
car, furniture, clothing, etc. were gifts by him to her. It is somewhat
significant that he was not asked the direct question as to whether
the advancement of money and property, which he admits he made,
were gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two statements
he made that throw any light at all on the issue of whether the ad
vancements were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers to
the effect that he was making a “personal investment in the future”
or the house purchase was “considered a permanent basis” are in-
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comprehensive and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His
testimony, in so far as it can be understood at all, tends to corrobo
rate petitioner. He gives as his purpose for making the advancements
“to insure the companionship” of petitioner. This can well be his
purpose for making the gifts. It certainly serves no basis for the
argument advanced by respondent on brief to the effect that her
“companionship” was a service she rendered in return for the money
and property she received. Evidently respondent would argue the
man paid her over $41,000 for her companionship in 1955 and $5,000
or $6,000 for her companionship in the other years.
We are not called upon to determine the propriety of the rela
tions that existed between petitioner and her admirer during the five
years in question. He testified he had not seen her for five or six
years. Petitioner was married in 1961 and is now living with her
husband and mother. It is enough to say that all of the circum
stances and the testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s
witness support her statement that she received gifts of money and
property during the five years in question and no taxable income.

A Comparison of Facts. Even a cursory examination of these two
Tax Court memorandum decisions reveals that the two cases have
many facts in common. In both instances a female taxpayer received
substantial sums of money and other valuable property each year
for several years, from a specific male person, in exchange for the
taxpayer’s companionship.
On the other hand, the two decisions also suggest several fact dif
ferences between the two cases. For example:
1. The names, dates, and places of residence of the principal par
ties differed in each instance.
2. The woman involved in the one case was, throughout the
years in question, married; the other woman was single.
3. One of the male companion/transferors had died prior to the
legal action; the other was alive and testified at the trial.
4. One of the taxpayer/transferees had a criminal record as a
prostitute prior to the years in question; the other had no such
record.
Because the pertinent tax issue is the same in both cases, the ques
tion is whether the facts common to the two cases are sufficiently
alike to demand a common result or whether facts are sufficiently
dissimilar to justify opposite results in each case. Ms. Brizendine had
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to report taxable income; Ms. Starks was found to have received
only gifts and, therefore, had no taxable income to report. The law
was the same in both instances; therefore, the different results must
be explained either by the differences in the facts or by differences
in the judicial process. Theoretically, the judicial process should
work equally well in every case; if so, the different results can only
be explained by different facts.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results. The published decision ren
dered by any court is, quite obviously, much less than a complete
transcript of judicial proceeding. It is, at best, a brief synopsis of
those elements of the case deemed to be most important to the
judge who has the responsibility of explaining why and how the
court reached its decision. A review of the two judicial decisions
under consideration here suggests at least two hypotheses that
might explain adequately the divergent results reached in these two
cases.
On the one hand, the fact that Margaret Brizendine was found to
have received taxable income rather than gifts may be attributable
primarily to the fact that she had a record of prior prostitution. The
fact that during the years 1945 through 1951 she elected to “dis
continue her activities as a prostitute” may suggest that the taxable
status of her receipts really had not changed all that significantly.
Prior to 1945 her receipts apparently were derived from numerous
parties; thereafter, from one individual. If the same explanation for
the receipts is common to both time periods, the tax results should
not differ simply because of the number of transferors involved. If,
however, the explanation for those transfers differed materially dur
ing the two time periods, a history of prostitution should have no
material impact on the present decision.
An alternative hypothesis that might also adequately explain the
divergent results in these two cases would emphasize the differ
ences in the judicial process rather than the differences in the facts.
In most tax litigation the taxpayer has the burden of proving that
the tax liability determined by the Commissioner of Internal Rev
enue is incorrect. If the taxpayer fails to present such proof, the
contentions of the IRS are deemed to be correct. Perhaps the at
torney for Ms. Brizendine simply failed to prove his client’s case.
Two adjacent statements in Brizendine support each of the above
hypotheses. Judge Rice first says, “. . . since petitioners thus failed
to establish that those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that
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such amounts were correctly determined by respondent to be tax
able income which petitioners received during the years in issue.”
This sentence clearly suggests that Ms. Brizendine’s primary prob
lem was one of inadequate proof. In the next sentence, however, the
judge suggests the alternative hypothesis in the following words:
“We further think that there is considerable merit to the respondents’
argument that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forebear
from engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship,
constituted sufficient consideration for the money received from
him to make it taxable to her.”
The ultimate basis for a judicial decision often is not known with
much certainty. Any impartial reading of Brizendine could not pass
lightly over the judge’s observation that the taxpayers’ “. . . demea
nor on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves
considerable doubt in our mind that the payments from the indi
vidual to Margaret . . . were gifts.” Although initially it may be
difficult to understand how courtroom behavior or criminal records
relate to the presence or absence of a gift, those facts may help to
establish the credibility of any statements made by a witness. The
process of taxation is, after all, not a laboratory procedure but a
very human process from beginning to end. Any attempt to mini
mize the significance of the human element at any level of the tax
ing process runs the risk of missing a critical ingredient.
Starks may be viewed as further evidence of the importance of
the human element in the taxing process. This time, however, the
record suggests that human sympathies were running with the tax
payer and against the IRS. Judge Mulroney seems to have been
less than pleased with the performance of the government’s attor
ney. The judge, commenting on the government’s interrogation of
the male transferor, observes that “. . . he was not asked the direct
question as to whether the advancements of money and property,
which he admits he made, were gifts by him to her. We have quoted
the only two statements he made that throw any light at all on the
issue of whether the advancements were gifts or earnings. Such
passages in his answers to the effect that he was making a ‘personal
investment in the future’ or the house purchase was ‘considered a
permanent basis’ are incomprehensive and rather absurd as state
ments of purpose. His testimony, in so far as it can be understood
at all, tends to corroborate petitioner.” In summary, even though the
taxpayer technically once again had the burden of proving the IRS
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wrong, the failure of the government’s attorney to ask the obvious
question and to pursue related questions when a witness gave “incomprehensive” answers seems to have influenced the judge in this
instance. At any event, the court did conclude that “all of the cir
cumstances and the testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s
witness support her statement that she received gifts of money and
property during the five years in question and no taxable income.”
Lessons for Tax Research. Even though the specific technical tax
content of these two cases is trivial, a tax adviser can learn several
things from these two cases. History—that is, facts that took place
well before the events deemed to be critical in a given tax dispute—
may significantly influence the outcome of the decision. Therefore,
in gathering the facts in a tax problem, the tax adviser can never
be too thorough in getting all of the facts of his case.
A study of these two cases also reveals the intricate balance be
tween facts and conclusions. If the trier of facts—IRS agent, con
feree, appellate conferee, or judge—can be convinced of the authen
ticity or even the reasonableness of the facts presented for his con
sideration, he has ample opportunity to reach the conclusion de
sired by the taxpayer. If those facts are not presented to him, or are
presented inadequately, the decision-maker cannot be blamed for
failing to give them full consideration. Disputes are often lost by the
party who fails to capitalize on the opportunity to know and present
all pertinent facts in the best light.
Finally, some further reflections on these two cases are instructive
for tax planning generally. If the parties to this litigation had cor
rectly anticipated their subsequent tax problems, what might they
have done to reduce the probabilities of an unfavorable result? For
example, would the results have differed if neither party had in
cluded “weekly allowance” in their financial arrangements? Or all
transfers had been made on such special occasions as a birthday, an
anniversary, Christmas, Saint Valentine’s Day, or some other holi
day? If gift cards had accompanied each transfer and those cards
saved and “treasured” in a scrapbook? If gift tax returns had been
filed by the transferor? Obviously, each of the additional facts sug
gested here would lend credence to the conclusion that the trans
fers were indeed gifts. At some point the evidence—perhaps the fil
ing of the gift tax return—would be so overwhelming that no one
would question the conclusion in anything but the most unusual
circumstances.
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The important point of this review is, of course, that the tax
adviser often plays a critical role in settings very remote from the
courtroom. If he correctly anticipates potential tax problems that
might arise, he is in an excellent position to recommend actions for
accumulation of supporting proof that will almost assure the con
clusion his client is interested in reaching, without going to court.
Even when the tax adviser has been consulted only after all of the
facts are “carved in stone,” the thoroughness with which he pre
sents those facts is often critical to the resolution of the tax question.
And no one can make a good presentation of the facts until he
knows precisely what they are, down to the very last detail. A study
of two more cases can yield additional insight into the critical role
which facts play in tax questions.
Deductible or Not?

In general, we know that income earned from the rendering of
a service must be reported by the person who rendered the service
and that income from property must be reported by the person who
owns the property. If a taxpayer arranges for someone else to pay
to one of his parents a part of the value that was originally owed
to him for services rendered, generally that payment would still be
taxed to the individual rendering the service, and the payment
would not ordinarily be deductible by him. Payments made to par
ents, like payments made to anyone else, would be deductible for
income tax purposes only if the parent had rendered a businessrelated service to the child and the payment made for such a ser
vice were reasonable in amount. But what exactly do those words
mean?
The third case to be reviewed here involves a professional baseball
player named Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. The case was heard by
the Tax Court in 1967 and the decision, rendered by Judge Hoyt,
reads in part as follows.

Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. 48 TC 339 (1967)

Findings of Fact

The stipulated facts are found accordingly and adopted as our
findings.
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Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as peti
tioner), filed his 1960 income tax return with the district director
of internal revenue, Richmond, Va. Martinsville, Va., was his legal
residence at the time petitioner filed the petition herein. Petitioner
is a professional baseball player and at the time of trial was a
catcher for the Chicago Cubs of the National League.
Petitioner’s father, Cecil Randolph Hundley, Sr. (hereinafter re
ferred to as Cecil), is a former semiprofessional baseball player, and
he has also been a baseball coach. Cecil played as a catcher through
out his baseball career, and received numerous injuries to his throw
ing hand while using the traditional two-handed method of catch
ing. This is a common problem of catchers. A few years before
Cecil retired from active participation in baseball as a player, he
developed a one-handed method of catching which was unique and
unorthodox. This technique was beneficial because injuries to the
catcher’s throwing hand were avoided. Cecil became actively en
gaged in the construction and excavation business in 1947 and was
still engaged in that business at time of trial.
Petitioner attended Bassett High School near Martinsville, Va., from
which he graduated in June of 1960. During 1958 petitioner was a
member of his high school baseball team and the local American
Legion team. He played catcher for both teams and was an out
standing player. In the spring of 1958, while a sophomore in high
school, petitioner decided that he wanted to become a good major
league professional ball player. Petitioner believed that Cecil was
best qualified to coach and train him for the attainment of this goal.
After discussing his ambition with Cecil, an oral agreement was
reached between petitioner and Cecil. Cecil agreed to devote his
efforts to a program of intensive training of petitioner in the skills
of baseball, to act as petitioner’s coach, business agent, manager,
publicity director, and sales agent in negotiating with professional
baseball teams for a contract. His role may best be described in
petitioner’s own words when he first asked Cecil to handle things for
him in 1958: “Daddy, do the business part and let me play the ball.”
As compensation for Cecil’s services, it was agreed that Cecil
would receive 50 percent of any bonus that might be received un
der the terms of a professional baseball contract if one should later
be signed. This contingent payment agreement was thought to be
fair and reasonable by the parties since it was unknown at that time
whether petitioner would ever develop into a player with major
league potential or sign a professional baseball contract or receive
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a bonus for signing. Moreover, petitioner could not sign a baseball
contract while still a minor without his parent’s consent or until he
graduated from high school. The size of baseball bonuses obtain
able at some unknown time, years in the future, was extremely
conjectural. A rule limiting bonuses to $4,000 for signing baseball
contracts had been suspended in 1958 and its reinstatement was a
definite possibility before 1960. It was not expected by petitioner or
Cecil at that time that an exceptionally large bonus would ever be
received. Later on they estimated that at most $25,000 might be
paid to petitioner as a bonus.
Between the spring of 1958 and petitioner’s graduation from high
school in 1960, Cecil devoted a great deal of time to petitioner’s
development into the best baseball player possible. Cecil became
petitioner’s coach and taught petitioner the skill of being a onehanded catcher. While this method is advantageous, it is difficult
to master because it is contrary to natural instincts. The perfection
of this unorthodox technique therefore required an inordinate
amount of time and effort by the teacher and the pupil. Cecil also
taught petitioner to be a power hitter in order to enhance petition
er’s appeal to professional baseball teams. Petitioner weighed only
155 pounds during his high school days which was a decided handi
cap for him both as a hitter and a catcher hoping to break into the
big leagues.
Cecil attended every baseball practice session and every home
and away game in which petitioner participated between 1958 and
1960. On many of these occasions he met with scouts for big league
teams. By mutual agreement, Cecil relieved petitioner’s high school
and American Legion coach from any duties with respect to peti
tioner. It was agreed between the coach and Cecil that it would be
in the petitioner’s interest for Cecil to be in complete charge of the
training program. Cecil supplied petitioner with baseball equipment
at his own expense during this period.
In order to obtain the best possible professional baseball contract
for petitioner, Cecil had many meetings with members of the press
during the 2-year period from the spring of 1958 to June 16, 1960,
to publicize petitioner’s skill as a baseball player. Cecil handled all
the negotiations with representatives of the many professional
baseball teams that became interested in petitioner. This undertak
ing involved numerous meetings at home and out of town. Cecil
left Sundays open for such negotiations for the entire 2-year period
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but negotiations often occurred on other days of the week. Cecil
was never paid anything for the considerable expenses he incurred
over the 2-year period.
The amount of compensation to be received by Cecil was con
tingent on the obtainment and size of a bonus to be paid petitioner
for signing a professional baseball contract. In determining the per
centage of the possible bonus to be received by Cecil, the parties
also gave consideration to Cecil’s increased expenses and the an
ticipated loss of time and income from his construction business.
Cecil had to neglect his business and he lost several substantial
contracts during the period of petitioner’s intensive training. The
amount of time he devoted to his grading and excavating business
was substantialy reduced during 1958, 1959, and 1960 with cor
responding loss of business income.
Petitioner developed into an outstanding high school baseball
player under Cecil’s tutorage and by 1960 many major league
clubs had become interested in signing him. Due to the rule requir
ing high school graduation before signing a baseball contract, ex
tensive final negotiation sessions with representatives of the various
major league baseball teams did not begin until after petitioner’s
graduation in 1960.
The final negotiation sessions were held at Cecil’s home and after
2 weeks resulted in a professional baseball contract signed by peti
tioner on June 16, 1960. All of the negotiations with the many major
league clubs bidding for petitioner’s contract were handled by
Cecil in such a way that the bidding for petitioner’s signature was
extremely competitive. Representatives of the various baseball teams
were allowed to make as many offers as they wanted during the
2-week period, but the terms of any offer were not revealed to rep
resentatives of other teams. Cecil’s expert and shrewd handling of
the negotiations was instrumental in obtaining a most favorable
contract and an extraordinarily large bonus for the petitioner.
The baseball contract finally signed by petitioner was with a
minor league affiliate of the San Francisco Giants of the National
League. The contract provided for a bonus of $110,000 to be paid
over a 5-year period at the rate of $22,000 per year, $11,000 to
petitioner and $11,000 to Cecil, and a guaranteed salary to peti
tioner of not less than $1,000 per month during the baseball play
ing season for a period of 5 years. Cecil bargained for and insisted
upon the minimum salary provision in addition to the large bonus
because of his expectation that petitioner would be playing in the
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relatively low paying minor leagues for at least 5 years. Cecil also
signed the contract because under the rules of professional baseball
the signature of a minor was not accepted without the signature of
his parent.
The baseball contract contained the following pertinent provi
sions:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the
Player agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in
connection with all games of the Club during the year 1960, includ
ing the Club’s training season, the Club’s exhibition games, the
Club’s playing season, any official series in which the Club may
participate, and in any game or games in the receipts of which the
Player may be entitled to share. The Player convenants that at the
time he signs this contract he is not under contract or contractual
obligation to any baseball club other than the one party to this con
tract and that he is capable of and will perform with expertness,
diligence and fidelity the service stated and such other duties as
may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the
Club will pay the Player at the rate of one thousand dollars
($1,000) per month . . . after the commencement of the playing
season . . . and end with the termination of the Club’s scheduled
playing season and any official league playoff series in which the
Club participates.
• • • •
14. Player is to receive cash bonus of one hundred and ten thou
sand dollars ($110,000) payable as follows:
Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) upon approval of this contract
by the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also
eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept. 15, 1962;
Sept. 15, 1963; Sept. 15, 1964.
The father, Cecil R. Hundley, is to receive eleven thousand dol
lars ($11,000) upon approval of contract by the National Associa
tion of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven thousand dollars
($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept 15, 1962; Sept. 15, 1963; and
Sept. 15, 1964.
• • • •
The designation of $11,000 to be paid annually to Cecil for 5
years was a consequence of the agreement between Cecil and peti
tioner to divide equally any bonus received by petitioner for signing
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a professional baseball contract. The scout for the San Francisco
Giants who negotiated the contract was aware of the aforemen
tioned agreement before the contract was written, and the terms
of the contract reflected the prior understanding of the contracting
parties with respect to the division of the bonus payments. Petition
er’s high school coach also knew of the 50-50 bonus agreement be
tween petitioner and Cecil and had been aware of it since its in
ception in 1958.
During the 1960 taxable year which is in issue, petitioner and
Cecil each received $11,000 of the bonus from the National Exhi
bition Co. pursuant to the terms of the contract. Petitioner did not
include the $11,000 payment received by Cecil in his gross income
reported in his income tax return for 1960. Cecil duly reported it
in his income tax return for that year.
The notice of deficiency received by petitioner stated that income
reported as received from the National Exhibition Co. was under
stated by the amount of $11,000. The parties are apparently in agree
m ent that petitioner understated his income for 1960 in the deter
mined amount, but petitioner contends that an offsetting expense
deducion of $11,000 should have been allowed for the payment re
ceived by Cecil as partial compensation for services rendered under
the 1958 agreement between petitioner and Cecil. Respondent’s posi
tion on brief is that only a $2,200 expense deduction, 10 percent of
the total bonus payment in 1960, is allowable to petitioner in 1960
as the reasonable value of services performed by Cecil.
The contract between Cecil and petitioner was made in 1958;
it was bona fide and at arm’s length, reasonable in light of the cir
cumstances existing when made and in the taxable year before us.
The payment of 50 percent of petitioner’s bonus thereunder to
Cecil in 1960 was compensation to him for services actually ren
dered to petitioner. He received and kept the $11,000 of the bonus
paid directly to him by the ball club.
Opinion
Respondent’s determination that an additional $11,000 should
have been included in petitioner’s income for 1960 is based upon
section 61(a) which provides that gross income includes compen
sation for services and section 73(a) which provides that amounts
received in respect of the services of a child shall be included in
the child’s gross income even though such amounts are not received
by the child.
It is beyond question and on brief the parties agree that the
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$11,000 received by Cecil actually represented an amount paid in
consideration of obtaining petitioner’s services as a professional
baseball player. Petitioner, while agreeing with the foregoing con
clusion, argues that a deduction in the amount of $11,000 should
be allowed for 1960 under section 162 or 212. Respondent has
conceded that such a deduction should be allowed but only in the
amount of $2,200.
Section 162 provides that a deduction shall be allowed for an
ordinary and necessary expense paid during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business including a reasonable allowance
for compensation for personal services actually rendered. Section
212 provides that an individual may deduct all ordinary and nec
essary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the
production or collection of income.
Respondent argues there is insufficient evidence to establish an
agreement in 1958 to share any bonus equally and that even if
there were such an agreement no portion paid for Cecil’s services
to petitioner prior to 1960 is deductible because prior to his grad
uation, petitioner was not in the trade or business of being a base
ball player. He contends that the only service performed by Cecil
for which petitioner is entitled to a deduction was the actual nego
tiation of the June 16, 1960, contract. He concedes on brief that a
reasonable value for the services rendered by Cecil during the 2week period from graduation to signing the contract is $2,200, 10
percent of the total bonus paid in 1960.
Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we
have so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position that
a deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense de
duction in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed in 1960. He
argues that a contingent right to 50 percent of any bonus obtained
was a reasonable value for services rendered by Cecil between the
spring of 1958 and the signing of the contract in 1960, and that
payment for such services was therefore an ordinary and necessary
expense associated with his business of professional baseball.
We agree that the 50 percent contingent compensation agreement
was reasonable in amount. Section 1.162-7(b) (2) of the regu
lations sets forth a test for the deductibility of contingent compen
sation which we have accepted as correct in Roy Marilyn Stone
Trust, 44 T.C. 349 (1965). We apply the test here.
The primary elements considered by petitioner and Cecil in de-
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termining Cecil’s contingent compensation were the amount of time
that would be spent in coaching, training, and representing peti
tioner during the uncertain period between 1958 and an eventual
contract. Cecil’s exclusive handling of all publicity and contract
negotiations and the income that would probably be lost due to
less time spent on Cecil’s construction business were also important
factors. In addition to the foregoing considerations, emphasis should
be placed on the fact that the ultimate receipt of a bonus of any
kind was uncertain and indefinite. The amount was indeterminable
and in 1958 neither petitioner, Cecil, nor the high school coach who
was aware of the agreement had any notion that an exceptionally
large bonus would be paid 2 years hence. Petitioner might well
never have become a professional ballplayer, nor was it at all certain
that he would be paid a bonus in the future. Viewing the circum
stances at the time the agreement was made in the light of all of the
evidence before us we conclude and hold that the test of resonable
ness has been met even though the contingent compensation may be
greater than the amount which might be ordinarily paid.
•

•

•

•

While it is true that an agreement of this sort between a father
and his minor son cannot possess the arm’s-length character of trans
actions between independent, knowledgeable businessmen and must
be most carefully scrutinized, the agreement here stands every search
ing test. Independent and trustworthy witnesses verified its existence
since 1958. It was in our judgement and in the opinion of both
petitioner and Cecil, then and at trial, fair to both parties. See
Olivia de Havilland Goodrich, 20 T.C. 323 (1953).
•

•

•

•

Respondent contends further, however, that even if the bonus
splitting agreement arose in 1958 and was intended to ultimately
result in a reasonable amount of compensation for services rendered
throughout the 2-year period, the full amount received by Cecil is
still not deductible because petitioner was not engaged in a trade
or business or any other income-producing activity until graduation
from high school when he became eligible to sign a professional
baseball contract. In order for an expenditure to qualify for deduc
tibility under section 162 or 212, it must have been paid or incurred
in carrying on any trade or business or for any other income pro
ducing or collecting activity... .
The contingent compensation agreement was so closely bound up
with the existence of the petitioner’s business activity of professional
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baseball that payments made thereunder must be considered as paid
in carrying on a trade or business. If petitioner had never entered
the business of professional baseball or had not been paid a bonus
therefor, no payments would have been made to or received by
Cecil. The whole basis of the agreement was the ultimate existence
and establishment of the contemplated business activity and the col
lection of a bonus. We therefore conclude that payments made un
der the terms of the agreement were paid for services actually
rendered in carrying on a business. The obligation to make the
payments to Cecil was an obligation of the business since there
would be no obligation without the business. If the business were
entered without payment of a bonus there also would be no obli
gation to share it with Cecil. The unique relationship of Cecil’s
compensation to the professional baseball contract and petitioner’s
income derived therefrom in 1960 is most persuasive of the de
ductible nature of the compensation payment made that year.
Respondent’s final argument, raised herein for the first time on
brief, is based on the premise that the services rendered prior to
high school graduation were basically educational in nature, and
that educational expenditures are personal and nondeductible if
undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or
substantial advancement in position. See sec. 1.162-5(b), Income
Tax Regs. We have previously held that claimed deductions for
educational expenditures of the foregoing type are not allowable.
Mary O. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966); Joseph T. Booth III, 35 T.C.
1144 (1961); and Arnold Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff'd. 288
F.2d 648 (C.A. 4, 1961).
However, petitioner is not claiming a deduction in the amount
of $11,000 for educational expenditures, and indeed he could not.
It is clear that a significant portion of Cecil’s compensation was not
for coaching and training petitioner in the skills of baseball, if that
be deemed education, but for other services rendered throughout
the 2-year period.
• • • •
We hold, therefore, that whereas respondent acted correctly in
including the entire $22,000 bonus in petitioner’s taxable income,
petitioner should be nevertheless allowed a deduction in the amount
of $11,000 in 1960 as a business expense for the portion of the
bonus paid directly to Cecil for his personal services actually ren
dered with such rewarding financial results for both petitioner and
his father.
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The last case to be reviewed in this chapter involves another pro
fessional baseball player named Richard A. Allen. His case was
heard by the Tax Court in 1968 and the decision, rendered by
Judge Raum, reads in part as follows.

Richard A. Alien, 50 TC 466 (1968)

Findings of Fact
Some of the facts have been stipulated and, as stipulated, are in
corporated herein by this reference along with accompanying ex
hibits.
Petitioners Richard A. and Barbara Allen are husband and wife,
who at the time of the filing of the petitions and amended peti
tions herein resided in Philadelphia, Pa. Richard A. Allen filed his
individual returns for the calendar years 1960, 1961, and 1962, and a
joint return with his wife Barbara Allen for 1963, on the cash receipts
and disbursements method of accounting, with the district director
of internal revenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. Barbara Allen is a party to this
proceeding solely by virtue of the joint return filed for 1963, and the
term petitioner’ will hereinafter refer solely to Richard A. Allen.
Petitioner was bom on March 8, 1942. In the spring of 1960 peti
tioner, then age 18, was living with his mother, Mrs. Era Allen, in
Wampum, Pa., and was a senior at a local high school. Mrs. Allen
had been separated from her husband since 1957. She had eight
children, of whom three, including petitioner, were dependent upon
her for support during 1960. She received no funds from her hus
band, and supported her family by doing housework, sewing, or
laundry work.
In the course of his high school years, petitioner acquired a
reputation as an outstanding baseball and basketball player. He was
anxious to play professional baseball, and had even expressed a
desire to leave high school for that purpose before graduation,
but was not permitted to do so by his mother. During the peti
tioner’s junior year in high school, word of his athletic talents
reached John Ogden (hereinafter “Ogden”), a baseball “scout” for
the Philadelphia National League Club, commonly known and here
inafter referred to as the Phillies. Ogden’s attention was drawn to
petitioner through a newspaper article about petitioner which,
while primarily describing him as a great basketball player, also
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mentioned that he had hit 22 “home runs” playing with a men’s
semiprofessional baseball team the summer before his junior year
in high school, and that the player who had come closest to his
total on this team, which otherwise comprised only grown men,
had hit only 15 home runs. Ogden’s function as a scout for the
Phillies was to select baseball talent capable of playing in the major
leagues, i.e., with the Phillies, and after reading this article he made
up his mind to see petitioner.
Ogden had himself played baseball for around 16 to 18 years,
was general manager of one baseball club and owner of another
for 7 or 8 years, and at the time of the trial herein had been a
baseball scout for the preceding 28 years—a total of about 52 years
in professional baseball. After interviewing petitioner and watching
him play basketball and baseball, Ogden determined that petitioner
was the greatest prospect he had ever seen. He conveyed this im
pression to John Joseph Quinn (hereinafter “Quinn”), vice president
and general manager of the Phillies, and told Quinn that petitioner
was worth “whatever it takes to get him.” Quinn thereupon gave
Ogden authority to “go and get” petitioner, i.e., to sign him to a
contract to play baseball for the Phillies.
From this point on, Ogden became very friendly with petitioner’s
family. He hired Coy Allen, petitioner’s older brother of about 36
or 37 who had played some semiprofessional baseball in the past,
as a scout for the Phillies. He also signed Harold Allen, another
brother of petitioner to a contract to play baseball in the Phillies
organization. He visited the Allen home often, and talked to peti
tioner about playing baseball. He did not, however, attempt immedi
ately to sign petitioner to a contract because of a rule adhered to by
the Phillies and other baseball teams prohibiting the signing of any
boy attending high school to a baseball contract until after his
graduation.
Ogden, as well as representatives of a dozen or more other base
ball teams that also desired petitioner’s services, discussed petition
er’s prospects with his mother, Era Allen. She was the head of the
family, and she made all the family decisions. Although petitioner
discussed baseball with the various scouts, he referred them to his
mother in connection with any proposed financial arrangements, and
he felt “bound” to play for whichever club his mother might select.
Era Allen conducted all negotiations with Ogden in respect of the
financial arrangements that might be made for petitioner if it should
be determined that he would play for the Phillies. However, she
knew nothing about baseball, particularly the financial aspects of
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baseball, and she relied almost entirely upon advice from her son
Coy Allen. After petitioner had entered into a contract to play for
the Phillies organization, as hereinafter more fully set forth, Era
Allen paid Coy $2,000 in 1960 for his services out of the funds
which she received under that contract, and she deducted that
amount from her gross income on her 1960 individual income tax
return.
One of the principal items of negotiation with Ogden was the
amount of “bonus” to be paid for petitioner’s agreement to play for
the Phillies organization. Such bonus was in addition to the monthly
or periodic compensation to be paid petitioner for services actually
rendered as a ballplayer. The purpose of the bonus was to assure
the Phillies of the right to the player’s services, if he were to play
at all, and to prevent him from playing for any other club except
with permission of the Phillies. Scouts for other teams had made
offers of a bonus of at least $20,000 or $25,000. During the course
of the negotiations Ogden made successive offers of a bonus in the
amounts of $35,000, $50,000, and finally $70,000. The $70,000 offer
was satisfactory to petitioner’s mother, but she wanted $40,000 of
that amount paid to her and $30,000 to petitioner. She thought that
she was entitled to a portion of the bonus because she was respon
sible for his coming into baseball by her hard work, perseverance,
taking care of petitioner, and seeing that he “did the right thing.”
Although it had been informally agreed prior to petitioner’s gradu
ation that he would go with the Phillies, the contract was presented
to and signed by petitioner some 30 or 40 minutes after he had re
ceived his high school diploma on June 2, 1960.
The contract was formally between petitioner and the Williams
port Baseball Club, one of six or seven minor league teams affili
ated with the Phillies through a contractual arrangement known as
a “working agreement” whereby, in general, the Phillies were en
titled, in exchange for a stated consideration, to “select” the con
tracts of any of the players on the Williamsport Club for their own
purposes and under which the Phillies further agreed, among other
things, to reimburse the Williamsport Club for any bonus paid to
a player for signing a contract with that club. The Williamsport
Club was under the substantial control of the Phillies, and the
contract between petitioner and the Williamsport Club was signed
on behalf of the latter by an official of the Phillies, who was in
charge of all the Phillies’ minor league clubs, or what was called
their “farm system,” and who was authorized to sign on behalf of
the Williamsport Club. The contract was on the standard form
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prescribed by the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues. Since petitioner was a minor, his mother gave her consent
to his execution of the contract by signing her name under a printed
paragraph at the end of the form contract entitled “Consent of
Parent or Guardian.” Such consent was given explicity [sic] “to the
execution of this contract by the minor player party hereto,” and
was stated to be effective as to any assignment or renewal of the
contract as therein specified. She was not a party to the contract.
The Phillies, in accordance with their usual practice, would not have
entered into any such contract, through the Williamsport Club or
otherwise, without having obtained the consent of a parent or
guardian of the minor player.
In addition to providing for a salary of $850 per month for peti
tioner’s services as a ballplayer, the contract provided for the
$70,000 bonus payable over a 5-year period, of which $40,000 was
to be paid directly to petitioner’s mother and $30,000 to petitioner.
The contract provided in part as follows:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the
Player agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in
connection with all games of the Club during the year 19 6 0 .... The
Player convenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not
under contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other
than the one party to this contract and that he is capable of and
will perform with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service
stated and such other duties as may be required of him in such
employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season
the Club will pay the Player at the rate of eight hundred fifty dol
lars per month.
• • • •
5. ( a ) The Player agrees that, while under contract and prior to
expiration of the Club’s right to renew the contract, and until he
reports to his club for spring training, if this contract is renewed,
for the purpose of avoiding injuries he will not play baseball other
wise than for the Club except that he may participate in post
season games as prescribed in the National Association Agreement.
(b) The Player and the Club recognize and agree that the
Player’s participation in other sports may impair or destroy his
ability and skill as a baseball player. Accordingly, the Player agrees
he will not engage in professional boxing or wrestling and that,
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except with the written consent of the Club, he will not play pro
fessional football, basketball, hockey or other contact sport.
• • • •
is to receive bonus of
D o..................................
D o..................................
D o ..................................
D o ..................................

$6,000
$8,000
$8,000
$4,000
$4,000

payable
. . d o ..
. .d o ..
. . d o ..
. . d o ..

Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of
June 2, 1960
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of
June 1, 1961
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of
June 2, 1962
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of
June 2, 1963
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of
June 2 , 1964
Total bonus seventy thousand dollars
• • • •

June
June
June
June
June

2,
1,
1,
1,
1,

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

$16,000 payable
$10,000 payable
$6,000 payable
$4,000 payable
$4,000 payable
guaranteed.

It was generally the practice in baseball to have the signature of
a parent or guardian when signing a player under the age of 21 to
a contract, and a contract lacking such signature would probably
not have been approved by the president of the National Associ
ation of Professional Baseball Leagues.
The installments of the $70,000 bonus agreed to by the Williams
port Baseball Club in its contract with petitioner were actually
paid by the Phillies under their “working agreement” with the
Williamsport Club. The Phillies viewed such bonus arrangements
as consideration to induce a player to sign a contract which thus
tied him to the Phillies and prevented his playing baseball for any
other club without the consent of the Phillies. These bonus ar
rangements represented a gamble on the part of the Phillies, for a
player might not actually have the ability to play in the major
leagues, or might decide on his own that he no longer wanted to
play baseball. The Phillies could not recover bonus money already
paid, and as a matter of baseball practice felt obligated to pay a
bonus, once agreed to, in all events, even if some part of the bonus
still remained unpaid when the player left or was given his uncon
ditional release by the club. Nevertheless, in light of petitioner’s
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future potential and ability, Ogden, who negotiated petitioner’s
bonus, and Quinn, who had the final say in these matters, felt that
$70,000 was a fair price to pay to “get” the right to petitioner’s ser
vices as a professional baseball player. It was a matter of indiffer
ence to them as to whom the bonus was paid or what division was
made of the money. The previous year, in 1959, the Phillies had
paid a bonus of approximately $100,000 to one Ted Kazanski and
in 1960, at about the same time they signed petitioner, the Phillies
paid a bonus of approximately $40,000 to one Bruce Gruber.
Following the execution of the foregoing contract in June 1960
with the Williamsport Club, petitioner performed services as a pro
fessional baseball player under annual contracts for various minor
league teams affiliated with the Phillies until sometime in 1963.
From that time, he has performed his services directly for the Phil
lies, and in 1967 his annual salary as a baseball player was ap
proximately $65,000.
Petitioner ( and his wife Barbara Allen in the taxable year 1963)
reported as taxable ordinary income in his (their) Federal income
tax returns for the taxable years 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963 the
bonus payments received by petitioner in each of said years, as
follows :
1960 .............................................. $ 6,000
1961 ..............................................
8,000
1962 ..............................................
8,000
1963 ..............................................
4,000
Petitioner’s mother, Era Allen, reported as taxable ordinary in
come in her Federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1960,
1961, 1962, and 1963 the payments received by her in each of
said years, as follows:
1960 .............................................. $16,000
1961 .............................................. 10,000
1962 ..............................................
6,000
1963 ..............................................
4,000
In his notice of deficiency to petitioner in respect of the taxable
years 1961 and 1962, and his notice of deficiency to petitioner
Richard and his wife Barbara Allen in respect of the taxable year
1963, the Commissioner determined that the bonus payments re
ceived by petitioner’s mother in 1961, 1962, and 1963 represented
amounts received in respect of a minor child and were taxable
to petitioner under sections 61 and 73 of the Internal Revenue
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Code of 1954; he increased petitioner’s taxable income in each of
those years accordingly.
Opinion
1. Inclusion of Bonus in Petitioner’s Gross Income. (a ) Petitioner
was only 18 years old when the events giving rise to the bonus
payments in controversy took place. Accordingly, if the payments
made during the years in issue (1961-63) by the Phillies to Era
Allen, petitioner’s mother, constitute “amounts received in respect
of the services” of petitioner within the meaning of section 73(a),
I.R.C. 1954, then plainly they must be included in petitioner’s
gross income rather than in that of his mother. Although petitioner
contends that the statute does not cover the present situation, we
hold that the payments made to his mother during the years in issue
were received solely in respect of petitioner’s services, and that all
such amounts were therefore includable in his income.
Petitioner argues that the payments received by his mother, total
ing $40,000 over a 5-year period, were not part of his bonus for
signing a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but
rather represented compensation for services performed by her,
paid by the Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign
the contract and giving her written consent thereto. But there was
no evidence of any written or oral agreement between the Phillies
and Era Allen in which she agreed to further the Phillies’ interests
in this manner, and we shall not lightly infer the existence of an
agreement by a mother dealing on behalf of her minor child which
would or could have the effect of consigning her child’s interests to
a secondary position so that she might act for her own profit.
Moreover, we think the evidence in the record consistently points
to the conclusion that the payments received from the Phillies by
Era Allen were considered and treated by the parties as part of
petitioner’s total bonus of $70,000. This sum was paid by the Phil
lies solely to obtain the exclusive right to petitioner’s services as a
professional baseball player; no portion thereof was in fact paid for
his mother’s consent.
We note, first of all, that there was no separate written agree
ment between the Phillies and Era Allen concerning the payment
of $40,000 to her, and that in fact the sole provision of which we
are aware for the payment of this sum appears in the contract be
tween petitioner and the Williamsport Baseball Club, a minor
league baseball club affiliated with the Phillies under a “working
agreement” which entitled the Phillies to claim the contract and
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the services of any player on the club at any time. Petitioner’s con
tract, a uniform player’s contract standard in professional baseball,
contained a paragraph requiring the parties to set forth any “ad
ditional compensation” (aside from the regular payment of salary)
received or to be received from the club “in connection with this
contract” and it is in the space provided for such “additional com
pensation” that all the annual installments of petitioner’s bonus,
both those payable to petitioner and those payable to his mother,
are set forth. After a description of all such installments, identifying
the payee (petitioner or his m other), the amount and the date due,
appear the words: “Total bonus seventy thousand dollars guaran
teed.” Moreover, if further proof be needed that the Phillies did
not consider any part of the $70,000 bonus as compensation for Era
Allen’s services it is provided by the testimony of John Ogden, the
baseball scout responsible for petitioner’s signing a contract with
the Phillies’ organization. Although Ogden resisted being pinned
down, the clear import of his testimony was that the total bonus
paid was determined solely by petitioner’s ability to play baseball
and his future prospects as a player, that the Phillies considered
$70,000 a fair price to pay for the right to petitioner’s services, and
that it made little difference to them whether petitioner’s mother
received any part of the bonus so determined.
Era Allen herself did not claim to be entitled to $40,000 by vir
tue of any services performed for or on behalf of the Phillies, and
in fact made clear in her testimony that she bargained, as one
would expect, “for whatever was best for my son.” Rather, she in
sisted upon a large portion of petitioner’s bonus because she felt
that petitioner would never have reached the point at which he was
able to sign a lucrative contract with a professional baseball team
had it not been for her hard work and perseverance in supporting
him. And indeed, as the mother of a minor child, one who by the
fruits of her own labor had contributed to the support of her minor
child without the help of the child’s father, she appears to have been
entitled to all petitioner’s earnings under Pennsylvania law. Pa. Stat.
tit. 48, sec. 91 (1965).
Prior to 1944, the Commissioner’s rulings and regulations “required
a parent to report in his (or her) return the earnings of a minor
child, if under the laws of the state where they resided the parent
had a right to such earnings,” even if none or only part of the
child’s earnings were actually appropriated by the parent. . . . Be
cause parents were not entitled to the earnings of their minor chil
dren in all States, and because even in those States following this
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common-law doctrine the parents’ right to the earnings of a minor
child could be lost if it was found that the child had been emanci
pated, the result of the Commissioner’s policy was that:
for Federal income tax purposes, opposite results obtain (ed)
under the same set of facts depending upon the applicable
State law. In addition, such variations in the facts as make ap
plicable the exceptions to the general rule in each jurisdiction
tend(ed) to produce additional uncertainty with respect to the
tax treatm ent of the earnings of minor children.
H. Rept. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1944); S. Rept.
No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22. To remedy these defects,
Congress in 1944 enacted the substantially identical predecessor of
section 73 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, providing the
easily determinable and uniform rule that all amounts received
"in respect of the services of a child” shall be included in his in
come. “Thus, even though the contract of employment is made
directly by the parent and the parent receives the compensation
for the services, for the purpose of the Federal income tax the
amounts would be considered to be taxable to the child because
earned by him.” H. Rept. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22, 23.
We think section 73 reverses what would have been the likely re
sult in this case under pre-1944 law wholly apart from the con
tract, and that the $70,000 bonus is taxable in full to petitioner.
Petitioner stresses the fact that the $70,000 bonus paid by the
Phillies did not constitute a direct payment for his “services” as a
professional baseball player, which were to be compensated at an
agreed salary of $850 per month, for the $70,000 was to be paid in
all events, whether or not petitioner ever performed any services
for the Phillies organization. Therefore, it is argued, the bonus
payments could not have constituted compensation for services
which alone are taxed to a minor child under section 73. Cf. Rev.
Rul. 58-145, 1958-1 C.B. 360. This argument misreads the statute,
which speaks in terms of “amounts received in respect of the ser
vices of a child,” and not merely of compensation for services per
formed. True, petitioner performed no services in the usual sense
for his $70,000 bonus, unless his act of signing the contract be con
sidered such, but the bonus payments here were paid by the Phillies
as an inducement to obtain his services as a professional baseball
player and to preclude him from rendering those services to other
professional baseball teams; they thus certainly constituted amounts
received “in respect of” his services.
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(b ) Even if amounts in issue were not received “in respect of the
services” of a child under section 73, we think that the bonus in
stallments paid to petitioner’s mother during the tax years 1961-63
are nevertheless chargeable to him under the general provisions
of section 61. It has long been established that one who becomes
entitled to receive income may not avoid tax thereon by causing it
to be paid to another through “anticipatory arrangements however
skillfully devised.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115; Helvering
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122; Har
rison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579.
As indicated above, the entire $70,000 bonus was paid as con
sideration for petitioner’s agreement to play baseball for the Phil
lies or any team designated by the Phillies. W e reject as contrary
to fact the argument that part of that amount was paid to his
mother for her consent to the contract. It was petitioner, and peti
tioner alone who was the source of the income and it is a m atter of
no consequence that his mother thought that she was entitled to
some of that income because of her conscientious upbringing of
petitioner. . . .
2. Petitioners Alternative Contention—Deduction of Bonus Pay
ments From His Gross Income. Finally petitioner argues alternatively
that if his entire $70,000 bonus is includable in his income, he
should be allowed to deduct the bonus payments received by his
mother as an “ordinary and necessary” expense incurred in carry
ing on his trade or business as a professional baseball player. He
places great reliance in this argument upon Cecil Randolph H und
ley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339, acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2, a case recently decided by
this Court in which a professional baseball player was allowed to
deduct that portion of his bonus for signing a baseball contract
which was paid directly to his father, the result of an agreement
entered into some 2 years before the contract was signed as a means
of compensating the father for his services as a baseball coach and
business agent. However, the special facts in Hundley, which sup
ported a finding of reasonableness for the amount of the deduction
claimed and warranted the conclusion that the amounts paid there
in fact represented a bona fide expense incurred in carrying on the
taxpayer’s trade or business of being a professional baseball player,
are almost entirely absent here.
It is unnecessary to determine the exact sum which would have
constituted a reasonable payment to Era Allen for her services,
though we note that only $2,000 was paid to her son Coy Allen for
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the advice she so greatly relied on, for we are certain that in any
case it could not have exceeded the $16,000 received by her in 1960.
Although the year 1960 is not before us in these proceedings, we
can and do take into account the payment made to her in that
year in determining whether the deductions now claimed by peti
tioner for payments made to her in the years 1961, 1962, and 1963
are reasonable in amount and deductible as “ordinary and neces
sary” business expenses. We think they clearly are not, and hold
that petitioner is not entitled to deductions in any amount for pay
ments made to his mother in those years.

A Comparison of the Facts. Once again even a cursory examina
tion of these two Tax Court decisions reveals that the cases have
several facts in common. In both instances:
1. A professional baseball player arranged to have a portion of a
sizable bonus paid to one of his parents.
2. Both the parent and the ball-playing minor child signed the
professional contract.
3. The bonus payments actually were made by the ball club to
the parent over several years.
4. The parent reported the amount received as ordinary taxable
income and paid the tax liability thereon.
The two cases also differ in several factual respects.
1. The names, dates, amounts, and places of residence of the
principal parties differed in each case.
2. The parent involved in one case was the baseball player’s
father; in the other case it involved his mother.
3. One parent was knowledgeable about and deeply involved in
training the child in the skill of ball playing; the other parent
knew relatively little about baseball.
4. One parent-child pair had a prior oral agreement about how
they would divide any bonus that might eventually be re
ceived; the other parent-child pair h a d no such prior agree

ment.
Once again, it is pertinent to inquire whether or not the com
mon facts are sufficient to require a common result or whether the
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different facts justify a different result. The decisions of the court
again were very different. Cecil Hundley, Jr., was allowed to de
duct the portion of the bonus paid to his father; Richard Allen was
denied the right to deduct the portion of the bonus paid to his
mother. Because the law was the same in both cases, and because
there is little basis in the reported decisions to conclude that differ
ences in the judicial process had much influence on these results,
we must conclude that the different facts adequately explain the
divergent results.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results. Judge Hoyt makes it clear
that the decision in Hundley is critically dependent upon the exis
tence of the oral agreement between the father and the son. He
states: “Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evi
dence that the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of
1958, and we have so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s
position. . . .” Judge Raum makes it equally clear in Allen that he
could find no contractual agreement in that case. He states: “Peti
tioner argues that the payments received by his mother . . . were not
part of his bonus for signing a contract to play baseball for the
Phillies organization, but rather represented compensation for ser
vices performed by her, paid by the Phillies in return for her in
fluencing petitioner to sign the contract and giving her written con
sent thereto. But there was no evidence of any written or oral agree
ment between the Phillies and Era Allen in which she agreed to
further the Phillies’ interests in this manner, and we shall not
lightly infer the existence of an agreement by a mother dealing on
behalf of her minor child. . . .”
One cannot help but wonder exactly how it is possible for a per
son to present convincing evidence of an oral agreement made be
tween a father and his tenth-grade son some nine years prior to the
litigation. Two brief statements in the reported decision provide the
only clues. One statement notes that the high school coach knew
of the oral agreement since its inception; the other statement sug
gests that the scout for the San Francisco Giants, who negotiated
the Hundley contract, also knew of the oral agreement since its
inception. We can only conclude, therefore, that these statements
are either based on an oral examination of witnesses at the trial or
that written depositions were obtained from these persons and sub
mitted as evidence at the trial to substantiate the existence of the
oral contract.
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Lessons for Tax Research. For the student of tax research, perhaps
the most instructive aspect of the last two cases is their demonstra
tion of the importance of favorable testimony by impartial witnesses.
Proper preparation of a tax file sometimes may include the need
to provide supporting evidence available only from disinterested
third parties. The longer one waits to locate such a party, the greater
the difficulty in finding one capable of giving the testimony needed.
To the maximum extent possible, considering economic constraints,
the tax adviser should anticipate the importance of all supporting
documents, including sworn statements from third parties. If strong
evidence of one or two critical facts can be provided to an IRS
agent or to a conferee, the probability of litigation may be signifi
cantly reduced.
A careful reading of these two decisions also reveals that very
similar fact situations may sometimes be argued on radically dif
ferent grounds. In other words, even though the facts are similar,
the questions raised may be different. Although this observation
really is more pertinent to the next chapter of this tax study than it
is to the present chapter, and even though the more unusual argu
ment did not prove to be fruitful in this instance, we observe in pass
ing that Allen argues for a favorable result in the alternative. First,
the taxpayer contends that the payments made to his mother were
not for his services as a ballplayer. Only later, should the first argu
ment fail, does he argue that the payments to his mother are de
ductible business expenses. In Hundley, on the other hand, the tax
payer never raised the former issue. The fact that both questions
deserve consideration stems directly from a careful review of the
facts and the law.
In Allen the argument is made that a bonus payment really is
not a payment for services rendered. At least in part, that payment
really is to compensate the ballplayer for not rendering services (to
a competitor club).
The pertinent statutory provisions refer to “amounts received in
respect of the services of a child.” (Emphasis added.) The question
raised, then, deals with whether a ballplayer’s bonus properly falls
within the meaning of the “in respect of” clause. After reviewing
the congressional intent behind those words, the court determined
that it did and thus rejected the taxpayer’s first line of argument.
Nevertheless, this observation should remind the tax adviser to con
sider the facts of his case in every possible way before resigning
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himself to a single line of argument. The next chapter examines in
greater detail the subtle relationship between the facts and a state
ment of the pertinent questions.
For the tax adviser, a knowledge of the statutes alone is insuffi
cient. An adviser must carefully delineate facts important to the
tax question and recognize the need to document significant facts in
the event they must be retrieved and substantiated during a later
audit. The next chapter addresses the task of extracting or anticipat
ing tax questions from the fact situation.
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3
. . . there is frequently more to be /earn’d from the
unexpected Questions of a Child, than the Discourses
of Men, who talk in a Road, according to the Notions
they have borrowed, and the Prejudices of their
Education.
JOHN LOCKE

The Elusive Nature of
Tax Questions
Tax questions arise when a unique set of fact circumstances is ex
amined in light of general rules of tax law. Learning to identify and
phrase the critical tax questions implicit in any set of facts is no
small accomplishment for, in many instances, the most important
questions are by no means obvious. The more experienced the tax
adviser, the easier it is for him to identify and to ask the right
questions. For the beginner, asking the right question is often the
most difficult part of tax research. Even the most seasoned tax vet
eran can easily overlook a very important question, and for this
reason successful tax practitioners make it a general practice to re
quire an internal review of all tax research before stating an opinion
to anyone outside the firm. This precaution sometimes is extended
to include even the preparation of a written record of all oral re
sponses made to informal inquiries received. The probability of
overlooking either an important tax question or a part of the law
is simply too great to permit any less thorough procedure.
The difficulty experienced in properly identifying and stating the
pertinent tax questions is largely attributable to the high degree of
interdependence th at exists betw een the facts, questions, and law. If
the tax adviser fails to determine all of the pertinent facts, the chance
that he will overlook a critical question is greatly increased. Simi
larly, even if the tax adviser has determined all of the critical facts,
he may fail to consider a critical part of the law and thus again over57

look a critical question. Finally, even if the tax adviser knows all
of the facts and all of the law pertinent to a case, he still may over
look an obvious question simply because of human error.
Errors in stating questions are often related to either (1) failure
to think originally or creatively about tax problems or (2) failure to
pay sufficient attention to detail. A veteran tax adviser will seldom
fail to heed detail; on the other hand, precisely because of his long
experience, he may be prone to overlook new and different ways of
viewing recurrent problems.1 In some instances, therefore, it is de
sirable to have the most complex tax situations reviewed by inex
perienced as well as experienced personnel. The former individuals
might ask the obvious question that otherwise would be overlooked,
but only the latter individuals can fully appreciate the significance
of even the obvious question once it has been asked. Frequently,
one good tax question raises two or more related questions, and be
fore long the tax result becomes dependent upon a network of
closely related but separate questions.
Initial Statement of the Question
The resolution of a tax problem often evolves through several
stages of development. In many instances the initial statement of
the question may be only remotely related to the questions that
turn out to be critical to its solution. The greater the technical com
petence of the researcher, the fewer steps in the evolution of an an
swer. The technical competence of tax researchers is, in all likeli
hood, normally distributed on a continuum ranging from little or no
competence to very great expertise. Any attempt to separate these
individuals into discrete groups is obviously unrealistic. Neverthe
less, for purposes of discussion of the difficulties encountered in
identifying tax questions, tax advisers could be categorized as fall
ing into one of three groups, namely, those with “minimal” technical
competence, those with “intermediate” technical competence, and
those with “extensive” technical competence relative to the subject
1 For example, in Allen (see chapter 2) it would have been very easy to
overlook the first of the two alternative arguments considered there; i.e.,
what exactly was Allen being paid for in the bonus? If it was for not render
ing a service, a different result might apply. Admittedly, that argument was
not successful in that particular case, but it was pertinent and could have
been important.
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at hand. Technical competence in one area of taxation does not
guarantee equal competence in other areas. Individuals who have
an extensive technical knowledge in one aspect of taxation must
move with a beginner’s caution when approaching another area of
the law; although the problems are often similar, the applicable
rules are sometimes quite different. As was stated earlier, a final tax
result depends upon three variables: facts, law, and an administra
tive (and/or judicial) process. Just as the facts of one case may
differ from another, so also may the law.
Minimal Technical Competence

A tax adviser with minimal technical competence usually can
state tax questions in only the broadest of terms. After reviewing
the facts he typically is prepared to ask such general questions
as the following:
1. Must gross income be recognized “in these fact circum
stances”?
a. If so, how much income must be recognized?
b. If so, in which year should that income be reported?
2. Can a deduction be claimed “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much can be deducted?
b. If so, in which year can the deduction be claimed?
c. If not, can something be added to the tax basis of an asset?
3. If income must be recognized, is that income ordinary income
or capital gain?
a. If capital gain, is it long or short-term?
b. If ordinary income, is it earned income?
4. What is the tax basis of a specific asset?
In any real situation, of course, the actual facts of the case must be
substituted for the phrase “in these circumstances” in the hypo
thetical questions posed above. For example, in the first question
suggested above, the facts might be such as to justify this question:
“Must gross income be recognized if a taxpayer transfers appreci
ated property to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims that she
might have against him arising from a divorce?” Or, in the second
hypothetical question, the facts might justify a question like this:
“Can an accrual-basis corporate taxpayer claim an income tax de
duction in the current year for an unpaid note given as a bonus to
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a cash-basis employee who is also the corporate-employer’s sole
stockholder?” Observe that even the initial statement of a tax ques
tion should be very carefully phrased so as to include what appear
to be all of the important facts of the situation.
Because beginning staff members typically enter the tax depart
ments of accounting firms with minimal technical competence, they
usually are prepared to ask only broad, general questions. If prop
erly phrased, however, the broad questions posed by the new staffman are ultimately the same questions which the more knowledge
able tax adviser seeks to answer. He tends, however, to phrase his
initial questions in somewhat different terms.
Intermediate Technical Competence

The tax adviser with an intermediate level of technical compe
tence often can review a fact situation and state the pertinent ques
tions in terms of specific statutory authority. For example, the first
question already considered for the beginning adviser might be
verbalized by a person with more experience in words like this:
"Has any gross income been realized within the meaning of Sec
tion 61 or 1002 if a taxpayer transfers appreciated property to his
former spouse as part of a divorce settlement in the state of Mary
land?” Or, in the second question previously considered, he may
ask: “Does Section 267 disallow the current deduction for a bonus,
otherwise deductible under Sections 162 and 461, which is payable
by a corporation to a cash-basis employee who is the corporate
employer’s sole stockholder, if the corporate obligation is evidenced
by a note due six months following the end of the employer’s tax
year?”
A comparison of the same two hypothetical questions, as phrased
by the person with minimal competence versus that phrased by the
person with an intermediate level of competence, reveals several
interesting differences.
First, the more experienced person generally understands the
statutory basis of authority which is applicable to the tax questions.
Or, to put this same difference in another way, the more experienced
person knows that most tax questions have a statutory base, and he
knows which code sections are applicable to the facts under con
sideration. In still other words, the experienced person knows that
correct tax results do not stem from secondary reference books,
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which all too frequently state “rules” ad infinitum without reveal
ing the source of authority for their conclusions.
Second, the tax adviser with intermediate technical competence
often phrases his questions in such a way that they imply the an
swer to a more general question, subject only to the determination
of the applicability of one or more “special provisions” to the facts
under consideration. For example, the phrasing of the first question
suggested earlier for the person with intermediate level skills may
really imply something like this: “The stated facts will result in
the recognition of income under the general rules of Section 61
and/or 1002, unless some other authority can be found to support
a contrary conclusion.” Note that questions phrased by the person
with greater technical competence frequently suggest where the
answers can be located. If a researcher knows which code sections
are applicable to a given fact situation, his task in locating pertinent
authority for a solution is greatly simplified.
Third, the more competent tax adviser is apt to include more
facts in his statement of the question than is the beginning adviser.
Thus, for example, he may imply the importance of state law to a
federal income tax result by adding a phrase such as “in the state
of Maryland.” This tendency to add more facts to the statement of
the question is the result of experience. The more experienced per
son often recognizes, in his statement of the question, some of the
apparently innocent facts that can so critically modify a tax result.
In daily tax practice, a person with minimal technical tax com
petence acquires a great deal of his knowledge by answering the
specific question posed to him by his more competent colleagues.
He saves valuable and expensive time by being directed to look in
the right places. Without this assistance, the beginner must spend
many hours just locating the general authority which is pertinent
to his question. (The various methods of locating authority are
described in chapter 4.) We might note, however, that the begin
ner typically prepares working papers detailing the research steps
he undertakes to answer the questions posed by his supervisors.
These working papers both permit the supervisor to review the ade
quacy of the staffman’s conclusions and leave a permanent record
of the facts and the authorities that were considered in solving any
given tax problem. These records may prove to be invaluable should
the IRS later question the way the tax adviser handled a particular
tax problem.
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Extensive Technical Competence

The tax adviser with an extensive level of technical competence
in a given area can often review a fact situation and state the per
tinent question in a still more refined manner. For example, he may
ask a question like this: “Is there any reason why Davis would not
apply ‘to this situation’?” Or he may ask, “Are all of the conditions
stipulated in Revenue Ruling 55-608 satisfied ‘in this case’?” By stat
ing his question in this way, the expert implies not only that he
knows the general statutory authority for an answer, but also that
he knows specific interpretative authority that would in all likeli
hood apply to the facts under consideration. The expert often needs
only to determine the most recent events to resolve a tax question.
Unless something new has happened, that somehow has managed
to avoid his attention or to slip his memory, his phrasing of the
question suggests that a very specific answer can be found to the
general but unstated question. Thus, the expert’s question—“Is there
any reason why Davis would not apply?”—may in reality be the
same question that the beginner phrased this way: “Must gross in
come be recognized if an ex-husband transfers appreciated prop
erty to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims she might have
against him arising from a divorce?” The former question implies
that the answer to the latter question can be found in the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 370 US 65 (1962).
Similarly, the bonus question may imply that the answer to the cur
rent deduction may be found in Revenue Ruling 55-608, 1955-2 CB
546. The phrasing of the expert’s question recognizes, however, that
there may be ample reason why specific interpretive authority
would not apply. For example, the facts of the two cases may differ
in some material way—perhaps the taxpayer in the divorce case lived
in a community property state, whereas the Davis decision involved
a taxpayer in a non-community property state—or the Davis decision
may have been otherwise modified by a regulation, ruling, or judi
cial decision issued after 1962. If one knows his way around a tax
library, it obviously will require even less time to answer the ques
tion posed by the expert than it will to answer the question posed
by the adviser with “intermediate” competency. Unfortunately, how
ever, not all tax questions are so easily stated or resolved, even by
the expert.
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Restatement of the Initial Question After Some Research
In some circumstances even an expert must move cautiously from
facts, to questions, to authority, and thence back to more facts,
more questions, and more authority before he can resolve a tax
problem. The search for authority to resolve an initial question
sometimes leads to the realization that facts never previously deemed
important are critical to the resolution of the problem. In that event
the tax adviser returns to the fact determination procedure before
looking any further for answers. The initial search suggests consid
ering other tax rules rather than isolating more facts; at other times
it suggests the need to determine additional facts as well as the need
to consider additional rules. Before reaching the administrative or
judicial process the tax adviser has only two raw materials with
which to work: facts and rules. He must learn how to identify and
phrase pertinent questions by examining facts in light of rules. That
microscopic examination is what reveals the need for further facts
and/or rules. The tax research process is not complete until all of
the facts have been fully examined in light of all of the rules and all
pertinent questions have been resolved to the extent possible.
This “research procedure” is illustrated conceptually in figure 3.1.
The spiral line shows how the researcher proceeds from an initial
statement of the facts (F 1), to an initial statement of the questions
(Q1), to an initial search for authority (A1). If the initial authority
suggests new and different questions (Q 2), as it often does, the re
searcher continues by making additional fact determinations (F 2)
and/or by considering additional authority (A2). This procedure
continues over and over until all the facts are known, all the author
ities are considered, and all the questions are answered—at least
tentatively. At this juncture the tax adviser evaluates the facts and
authorities he has just unearthed and reaches a conclusion.
Figure 3.1
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Dangers Inherent in Statements of Questions
The danger of overlooking pertinent alternatives is greatly in
creased if tax questions are stated too narrowly. This danger is par
ticularly acute for the more experienced tax adviser because, as
noted earlier, he generally knows where to begin looking. Once the
search for pertinent authority is restricted to a particular segment
of the code, for all practical purposes all other alternatives are
eliminated.
This danger has been vividly demonstrated to the authors time
and time again. While teaching a university course in tax research
methodology, it is, of course, necessary to design example cases
that will lead students to make important discoveries of their own.
A large number of the example cases are drawn from “live” prob
lems suggested by various tax practitioners. In more cases than we
care to admit, the very best solutions have been those never con
sidered by either the authors or by those who suggested the prob
lems to us in the first instance. Beginning students, unhampered by
predilection and blessed by natural curiosity and intelligence, have
managed on more than one occasion to view the problem in an en
tirely different light. This is mentioned in order to stress the im
portance of imagination and creativity in tax research and planning.
As was noted in chapter 2, the “thinking step,” the point at which
the practitioner spends time considering facts, alternatives, and op
tions, is an indispensible segment of the research process.
A second danger inherent in the statement of the question is the
tendency to phrase the question utilizing conclusions rather than
elementary facts. The important distinction between conclusions
and facts was noted in the prior chapter. The use of conclusions in
stating questions is hazardous because they tend to prejudice the
result by subtly influencing the way one searches for pertinent au
thority. If, for example, one begins to search for authority on the
proper way to handle a particular expenditure for tax purposes,
his question might ask, Should the expenditure of funds for “thisand-that” be capitalized? The answer probably will be affirmative.
On the other hand, if the same question is rephrased in terms some
thing like this—Can the expenditure of funds for ‘“this-and-that” be
deducted?—the answer, once again, will probably be affirmative.
Obviously, if the facts are the same (that is, if the “this-and-that”
in the two questions are identical) both answers cannot be correct.
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The explanation for the conflicting results probably can be traced
to the place where the researcher looked for his authority. The prior
question would tend to lead the researcher to decisions in which
Section 263 was held to be of primary importance, whereas the lat
ter question would lead him to decisions in which Section 162 was
found to be of greater importance.2 Ideally, the index of reference
volumes would include citations to both decisions in both places,
but the cost of duplication quickly becomes prohibitive, and the
human element in any classification system is less than perfect.
Consequently, the statement of the question may assume unusual
importance. Perhaps the tax adviser’s problem is akin to the lawyer’s
problem in asking a leading question of a witness. To the maximum
extent possible, tax questions should be phrased neutrally and with
out conclusions so as to permit the researcher greater freedom in
finding the best possible authority for resolving his question.
A Comprehensive Example
The remainder of this chapter is a detailed review of a relatively
simple, yet comprehensive, example that demonstrates the elusive
nature of tax questions. In the process of developing this example
we will attempt to illustrate the way in which facts, rules, and
questions are inextricably entwined, one with the other, in tax prob
lems. In following this example, the reader should not be concerned
with the problem of locating pertinent authority. The next chapter
will explain how the reader might have found that same authority
had he been working alone on this problem. To begin, let us assume
the following statement of facts.
On February 10, 1976, Ima Hitchcock, a long-time client of
your CPA firm, sold one-half of her equity interest in General

2 Section 263 reads in part as follows: “No deduction shall be allowed for—
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improve
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.”
Section 162 reads in part as follows: “There shall be allowed as a deduc
tion all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . .” Obviously, reasonable
men can and do differ in their application of these rules to specific fact
situations.
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Paper Corporation (hereafter, GPC) for $325,000 cash. Ms.
Hitchock had owned 60,000 shares (or 20 percent) of the out
standing common stock of GPC since its inception in 1946.
During the past 20 years, she had been active in GPC manage
ment. Following this sale of stock, however, she planned to re
tire from active business life. Her records clearly reveal that
her tax basis in the 30,000 shares sold was only $25,000 (onehalf of her original purchase price).
Given no additional facts, both the beginner and the seasoned tax
adviser would be likely to conclude that Ms. Hitchcock should re
port a $300,000 long-term capital gain in 1976 because of her sale
of the GPC stock. The case appears to be wholly straightforward
and without complication, as long as no one asks any questions
or volunteers any additional information. Although few persons
would ask for it in this case, the statutory authority for the sug
gested conclusion would rest upon Sections 1001, 1002, 1012,
1221, 1222, and 1223. Section 1221 would establish that the stock
is a capital asset; Sections 1222 and 1223 would determine the long
term status of the capital gain realized; Section 1012 would specify
the cost basis of the shares sold; Section 1001 would define the
gain realized as the difference between the $325,000 received and
the $25,000 cost basis surrendered; and Section 1002 would require
that the entire $300,000 realized gain be recognized. If, however,
someone happened to ask who purchased Ms. Hitchcock’s shares,
problems could arise quickly.
Diagraming the Facts

Before beginning to consider this example in more detail, a sim
ple “stick figure” diagram may be made of the transaction just de
scribed. In the authors’ opinion, every tax adviser should become
accustomed to preparing such simple diagrams of the essential facts
of any case before he begins to ask any questions or search for any
authority. In addition to diagraming the critical transaction itself,
the practitioner should diagram a simple portrayal of the fact situ
ation as it existed both before and after the transaction under ex
amination. Each person can create his own set of symbols for any
problem; this illustration, however, utilizes only a stick figure to
represent an individual taxpayer (Ima Hitchcock) and a square to
represent a corporate taxpayer (General Paper Corporation). These
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simple symbols are used to diagram the before- and after-fact situ
ation, as well as the transaction under analysis, as follows.
Figure 3.2

BEFORE

THE TRANSACTION

AFTER

The diagram of this deceptively simple tax problem is the first
critical step toward asking the necessary questions.
First Questions Cali for Additional Facts

As is evident in the diagram, the first two critical questions ap
pear to be (1) Who owns the other 80 percent of GPC stock? and
(2) Who purchased the shares from Ms. Hitchcock? The answers to
these two questions obviously call for the determination of more
facts, not for additional authority.
Suppose that the CPA knew from his prior work with this client
that GPC is a closely owned corporation; that is, it has been equally
owned by five local residents (including Ms. Hitchcock) since its
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inception in 1945. Knowing these facts, one of the two questions sug
gested above has already been answered. However, the CPA might
be curious about who purchased the stock, how the value of
$325,000 was determined, and so on. Under these circumstances, we
can easily imagine a conversation between Ms. Hitchcock and her
CPA as follows:
CPA:
Ms. H:
CPA:
Ms. H:

Who purchased your stock in GPC, Ms. Hitchcock?
Ghost Publishing, Incorporated.
That is a name that I have not heard before. Is it
a local firm?
Yes, it is my grandson’s corporation.

From there this conversation would proceed to establish the facts
that Ghost Publishing, Incorporated (hereafter, GPI) was indeed
a small but very profitable corporation whose stock was entirely
owned by Ms. Hitchcock’s favorite grandson, Alvred Hitchcock.
GPI decided to purchase the GPC stock both to guarantee its own
supply of paper and because Alvred was convinced that GPC was a
sound financial investment.
The discovery of these additional facts would begin to separate
the beginner from the more experienced tax adviser. In all prob
ability, the beginner quite possibly would not modify his prior con
clusion concerning Ms. Hitchcock’s need to report a $300,000 long
term capital gain in 1976. The more seasoned tax adviser would
know at least that sales between related parties are often subject to
special scrutiny, and he would begin to search for possible authority
that might modify his prior conclusion.
Before we proceed to examine possible authority, we should stop
and observe two apparently innocent facts that have vital impor
tance to the resolution of this tax problem: (1) The GPC shares
were purchased from Ms. Hitchcock by GPI and (2) GPI is owned
by Ms. Hitchcock’s grandson. Unless these two facts are discov
ered, and their importance fully appreciated, this problem simply
could not proceed any further. We might also pause briefly to re
diagram both our “transaction” and the after-the-transaction situa
tion to accommodate the new facts which we have just determined.
The new diagrams might look as follows, opposite.
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Figure 3.3

THE TRANSACTION

AFTER

Once again this diagram should serve to highlight the potential
problems which lie ahead of us.
An experienced researcher would realize the danger implicit in
sales between related parties and begin to look for some authority
which might modify his conclusion. The tax adviser with extensive
technical competence in the taxation of corporations and corporate
shareholder relations might be able to turn directly to Section 304 to
determine the next appropriate question—that is, Does Section 304
apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to
GPI?
The Authority

Understanding Section 304 may be difficult. It reads as follows.
SEC. 304. REDEMPTION THROUGH USE OF RELATED COR
PORATIONS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Stock Purchases.—
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary).—
For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two
corporations, and
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( B ) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires
stock in the other corporation from the person (or per
sons) so in control, then (unless paragraph (2) applies)
such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemp
tion of the stock of the corporation acquiring such stock.
In any such case, the stock so acquired shall be treated as
having been transferred by the person from whom ac
quired, and as having been received by the corporation
acquiring it, as a contribution to the capital of such cor
poration.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302
and 303, if—
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from
a shareholder of another corporation stock in such other
corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corpo
ration, then such property shall be treated as a distribution
in redemption of the stock of the issuing corporation.
(b ) Special Rules for Application of Subsection (a ).—
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302(b).—In the case
of any acquisition of stock to which subsection (a) of this
section applies, determinations as to whether the acquisition is,
by reason of section 302(b), to be treated as a distribution in
part or full payment in exchange for the stock shall be made
by reference to the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying
section 318(a) (relating to constructive ownership of stock)
with respect to section 302(b) for purposes of this paragraph,
sections 3 1 8 (a )(2 )(C ) and 3 1 8 (a )(3 )(C ) shall be applied
without regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.
(2) Amount constituting dividend.—
(A ) Where subsection (a ) ( 1 ) applies.—In the case of any
acquisition of stock to which paragraph (1) ( and not para
graph (2 )) of subsection ( a ) of this section applies, the
determination of the amount which is a dividend shall be
made solely by reference to the earnings and profits of the
acquiring corporation.
(B ) Where subsection (a ) ( 2 ) applies.—In the case of any
acquisition of stock to which subsection (a ) ( 2 ) of this sec
tion applies, the determination of the amount which is a
dividend shall be made as if the property were distrib
uted by the acquiring corporation to the issuing corpora-
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tion and immediately thereafter distributed by the issuing
corporation.
(c) Control.—
(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, control means
the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock. If a person (or persons) is in control (within
the meaning of the preceding sentence) of a corporation which
in turn owns at least 50 percent of the total combined voting
power of all stock entitled to vote of another corporation, or
owns at least 50 percent of the total value of the shares of all
classes of stock of another corporation, then such person (or
persons) shall be treated as in control of such other corpora
tion.
(2) Constructive ownership.—Section 318(a) (relating to the
constructive ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of
determining control under paragraph (1). For purposes of the
preceding sentence, sections 3 1 8 (a )(2 )(C ) and 318(a)(3 )(C )
shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent limitation
contained therein.

Although the beginner might require assistance in interpreting and
applying this code section to the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale, he
must learn how to, read and understand the language if he is ever
to succeed as a tax adviser. Certainly the beginner might take com
fort in knowing that even such a distinguished jurist as Learned
Hand found this to be a formidable assignment. He once said,
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched
in abstract terms that offer no handles to seize hold of—leave in my
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but success
fully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which
is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate ex
penditure of time.3

3Learned Hand, “Thomas Walter Swan,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 57, Decem
ber 1947, p. 169.

71

Perhaps the final line of the quotation is the most telling. Learning
how to understand the code is most certainly a time-consuming
process. Even a beginner will realize, after any careful reading of
Section 304, that certain words and phrases deserve his special at
tention. He knows that if he is ever to understand Section 304 he
must determine the import of Sections 302 and 303, that he will
have to distinguish between an acquisition by a “related corpora
tion that is not a subsidiary” and an acquisition by a subsidiary cor
poration, and that he will have to determine how the constructive
ownership rules of Section 318 are applied to determine control.
For both the beginner and for the person with an intermediate level
of tax skills, these determinations may well constitute the next
pertinent set of questions.
The Third Set of Questions

Although this conclusion is not obvious at the outset, the last of
the determinations suggested in the preceding paragraph is the
one that must be solved first. In reverse order, then, those deter
minations can be stated as questions like this:
1. After the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC common stock to GPI,
what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own, directly or indirectly,
for purposes of Section 304, giving full consideration to the
constructive ownership rules of Section 318?
2. Can the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to GPI by Ms.
Hitchcock be considered, for purposes of Section 304, as
either
(a) an acquisition by a related (but not subsidiary) corpora
tion or
(b) an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation?
3. If the answer to either question in two, above, is affirmative,
what is the tax effect of Section 302 and/or 303 on this dis
position of stock?
To solve these three questions we must turn to more authority. Our
first stop will be at Section 318, the constructive ownership rules,
which are applicable to Section 304 according to paragraph (2) of
subsection (c).
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More Authority

Fortunately, Section 318 does not, at least at the outset, appear
to be as confusing as Section 304. Section 318 reads in part, as
follows.
SEC. 318. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP O F STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—For purposes of those provisions of this sub
chapter to which the rules contained in this section are expressly
made applicable—
(1) Members of family.—
(A) In general.—An individual shall be considered as own
ing the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for—
(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally sepa
rated from the individual under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance), and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents.
(B) Effect of adoption.—For purposes of subparagraph
( a ) ( ii), a legally adopted child of an individual shall be
treated as a child of such individual by blood.
(2) Attribution from partnerships, estates, trusts, and corpora
tions.—
• • • •
(C ) From corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of
the stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly,
by or for any person, such person shall be considered as
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for
such corporation, in that proportion which the value of the
stock which such person so owns bears to the value of all
the stock in such corporation.
(3) Attribution to partnerships, estates, trusts, and corpora
tions.—
• • • •
(C ) To corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by
or for any person, such corporation shall be considered as
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for
such person.
• • • •
(5) Operating rules.—
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraphs (B)
and (C ), stock constructively owned by a person by rea
son of the application of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4),
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shall, for purposes of applying paragraphs (1), (2), (3),
and (4), be considered as actually owned by such person.
(B) Members of family.—Stock constructively owned by an
individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1)
shall not be considered as owned by him for purposes of
again applying paragraph (1) in order to make another
the constructive owner of such stock.
(C) Partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—Stock
constructively owned by a partnership, estate, trust, or
corporation by reason of the application of paragraph (3)
shall not be considered as owned by it for purposes of
applying paragraph (2) in order to make another the con
structive owner of such stock.

A reexamination of the facts already known about GPC in light of
the rules of Section 318 suggests the need to determine some addi
tional facts before proceeding toward a solution.
More Questions and More Facts

A careful reading of Section 318 suggests that we must make ab
solutely certain who it is that owns the other 80 percent of GPC.
Earlier it was stated that GPC was “equally owned by five local
residents.” After reading the quoted portion of Section 318, it should
be obvious that we must ask if any of the other four GPC owners
are related to Ms. Hitchcock within any of the family relationships
described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 318. At
the same time, we probably should make certain that none of the
other four original owners has sold any of his original stock in GPC.
If they have, we would also have to determine who purchased
those shares and determine the relationship, if any, between those
purchasers and Ms. Hitchcock. To simplify the remaining task just
a little, let us assume that we can quickly determine that none of
the other four owners of GPC are in any way related to Ms. Hitch
cock and that each of the other four original owners continues to
own all of his shares in GPC. Having determined this, we can now
reach our first tentative conclusions.
First Tentative Conclusions

Specifically, we are now prepared to answer the first of the three
questions suggested on page 72; that is, After the sale of 30,000
74

shares of GPC common stock to GPI, what shares does Ms. Hitch
cock own, directly or indirectly, for purposes of Section 304, giving
full consideration to the constructive ownership rules of Section
318? By operation of Section 318(a) (1) (A) (ii), Ms. Ima Hitch
cock constructively owns any shares of stock owned by her grand
son, Alvred. Consequently, Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100
percent of GPI, the corporation that purchased the 30,000 shares
of GPC stock from her. Furthermore, by operation of Section
318 (a )(2 ) (C ), Ms. Hitchcock’s grandson Alvred is indirectly
deemed to own any stock owned by GPI, and Section 318(a)(1)
says that effectively Ms. Hitchcock must pretend that she owns
not only what her grandson owns directly, but also that which he
owns indirectly.4 This means, of course, that Ms. Hitchcock is, for
purposes of Section 304, deemed to own that which she just sold.
Having made this determination, however, we can now also an
swer the second of the three questions posed earlier; that is, Does
Section 304 apply to this sale of stock? Obviously that question
really is two questions and we can separate them for purposes of
further investigation. First, we must determine if the acquisition of
the 30,000 shares by GPI can be considered to be an acquisition
by a related, but non-subsidiary, corporation; second, we must de
termine if that acquisition can be considered to be an acquisition
by a subsidiary corporation. These questions might lead us to ask
another tentative question: What is meant by a related but non
subsidiary corporation? Section 304 (a )(1 )(A ) apparently is in
tended to provide the rules for stock acquisitions where the seller
of the stock (that is, the “one or more persons” clause) is “in con
trol of” both the corporation whose stock is sold and the corpora
tion making the purchase. The more experienced tax adviser will
immediately recognize this as a brother-sister corporate relation
ship. That relationship can be diagramed as follows, page 76.
4The only exception to this conclusion is stated in the operating rules of Sec
tion 3 1 8 (a )(5 )(B ) which reads as follows: “Stock constructively owned by
an individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1) [that is, by
family attribution] shall not be considered as owned by him for purposes of
again applying paragraph ( 1) in order to make another the constructive
owner of such stock.” Since Alvred’s indirect ownership of GPC shares
comes about by application of paragraph (2) (C) of Section 318 and not by
application of paragraph (1), Section 318(a) ( 1) (A) (ii) requires that Ms.
Ima Hitchcock also include in her indirect ownership any shares which
GPI owns.
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Figure 3.4

In this ownership arrangement, corporations B and S are deemed
to be related to one another as brother and sister corporations. (The
degree of control required to establish this relationship is stated in
Section 304(c)(1) as either 50 percent of the voting power or 50
percent of the value of the shares.)
Even giving full consideration to all indirect ownership as well
as all direct ownership, Ms. Ima Hitchcock can be said to own only
20 percent of GPC. She owns 10 percent directly and another 10
percent indirectly.5 Thus, even though Ms. Hitchcock owns 100
percent of GPI (the acquiring corporation) indirectly, she owns
only 20 percent of GPC, and therefore the rules of Section 304(a)
(1) do not apply to her disposition. In other words, Ms. Hitchcock’s
sale would not be deemed to be an acquisition by a related non
subsidiary corporation.
We must return then to the second part of our last question;
that is, Can the sale of GPC stock by Ms. Hitchcock to GPI be
considered as an acquisition made by a subsidiary corporation?
Once again a commonsense answer would seem to be a negative
one. The acquirer (GPI) is in no way the subsidiary of GPC (the
corporation whose stock Ms. Hitchcock sold). Be careful, however,
and look again at the simple diagram on page 69. If one can impute
shares one way around an ownership circle, is it possible that the
process might work in the reverse direction as well? The answer, of
course, must be found in the wording of the code.
5 Incidentally, the revised diagram of the facts pictured on page 69 really sug
gests this conclusion with much less confusion than do all of the words of the
code. Perhaps one picture can be worth a thousand words. Note that simply
following the dotted lines of that diagram back from Alvred to Ms. Hitch
cock shows that the conclusion just reached is not really so farfetched
after all.
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Ordinarily, Section 3 1 8 (a )(3 )(C ) attributes ownership from a
stockholder to a corporation only if the stockholder owns 50 per
cent or more of the value of that corporation’s outstanding stock.
The last sentence of Section 304(c) (2), however, says that
. sec
tions 3 1 8 (a )(2 )(C ) and 3 1 8 (a )(3 )(C ) shall be applied without
regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.” This seems
to say, then, that for purposes of Section 304 any acquiring cor
poration will be deemed to own any stock owned (indirectly or
directly) by any of its stockholders. Returning to the facts of the
problem, this means that GPC owns any stock that Ms. Hitchcock
owns and, you will remember, we just determined that Ms. Hitch
cock is deemed to own 100 percent of GPL In effect, then, GPC
owns 100 percent of GPI, making GPI (the acquirer) a wholly
owned subsidiary of the corporation whose stock Ms. Hitchcock
sold. It appears, therefore, that Section 3 04(a)(2) does apply to
this disposition. Perhaps it would now be useful to paraphrase that
paragraph of the code, substituting the facts of our specific situ
ation for the exact words of the code. If we do that, the pertinent
paragraph would read something like this:
Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and 303,
if(A) in return for $325,000, GPI, acquired from Ms. Hitchcock
stock in GPC, and
(B) GPC controls GPI,
then the $325,000 shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of
the stock of GPC.

The careful reader will have observed that even at this point we
have not yet determined the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitch
cock’s stock disposition. Before we can make that determination,
we must ask still more questions.
More Questions, More Authority

Code Section 304 (a )(2 ) simply provides that Ms. Hitchcock’s
sale should be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock, and
it suggests that we look to two additional code sections to see what
that means. Our next question, then, must be this: If Ms. Hitch
cock’s disposition of GPC stock is to be treated as a stock redemp
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tion under Section 302 and/or 303, what, if anything, do those
sections say about the tax treatment of amounts received?
On further searching we could quickly discover that Section 303
deals only with distributions in redemption of stock to pay death
taxes. Clearly, the facts of our problem do not suggest anything
about Ms. Hitchcock’s making this disposition to pay death taxes,
thus we may safely conclude that Section 303 is not applicable to
our solution. We turn, therefore, to Section 302, which reads in
pertinent part as follows.
SEC. 302. DISTRIBUTIONS IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—If a corporation redeems its stock (within the
meaning of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or
(4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as
a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b ) Redemptions Treated as Exchanges.—
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.—Subsection (a)
shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.—
(A) In general.—Subsection (a) shall apply if the distri
bution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the
shareholder.
(B) Limitation.—This paragraph shall not apply unless
immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns
less than 50 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C ) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph, the dis
tribution is substantially disproportionate if—
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemp
tion bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at
such time,
is less than 80 percent of—
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately before the re
demption bears to all of the voting stock of the corpo
ration at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be
treated as substantially disproportionate unless the share
holder’s ownership of the common stock of the corporation

78

(whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemp
tion also meets the 80 percent requirement of the pre
ceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
if there is more than one class of common stock, the de
terminations shall be made by reference to fair market
value.
(D ) Series of redemptions.—This paragraph shall not ap
ply to any redemption made pursuant to a plan the pur
pose or effect of which is a series of redemptions resulting
in a distribution which (in the aggregate) is not substan
tially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder’s interest.—Subsection (a)
shall apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all
of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) Stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorgani
zation.—
• • • •
(5) Application of paragraphs.—In determining whether a re
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact
that such redemption fails to meet the requirements of para
graph (2), (3), or (4) shall not be taken into account. If a
redemption meets the requirements of paragraph (3) and also
the requirements of paragraph ( 1 ), (2), or (4), then so much
of subsection (c )(2 ) as would (but for this sentence) apply in
respect of the acquisition of an interest in the corporation with
in the 10-year period beginning on the date of the distribution
shall not apply.
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock.—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the
ownership of stock for purposes of this section.
• • • •
(d ) Redemptions Treated as Distributions of Property.—Except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a corporation redeems its
stock (within the meaning of section 317 (b )), and if subsection
(a ) of this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated
as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.

Obviously, this new and relatively lengthy code section simply
brings more new questions to mind. The careful reader should ob
serve that Section 302(a) provides a general rule that any redemp
tion will be treated as “a distribution in part or full payment in ex
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change for the stock” (emphasis added) if the conditions of any
one of four paragraphs are satisfied. This means that if the condi
tions of any one of the four subsections can be satisfied, a taxpayer
from whom stock is redeemed can treat the disposition as a sale.
In most instances this would result in capital gain treatment. The
general rules of subsection (a) say absolutely nothing, however,
about the proper tax treatment of the redemption proceeds if those
conditions cannot be satisfied. That possibility is treated in sub
section (d ), which says that “such redemption shall be treated as
a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.” (Emphasis
added.) On further investigation we could discover that Section
301 generally provides a dividend treatment for properties distrib
uted by a corporation to its shareholder. This would mean, of course,
that the redeemed shareholder would have to report an ordinary
income rather than a capital gain.
If we continued to examine the facts of our illustrative problem
in detail against all of the rules of Section 302, we would have to
proceed through another relatively complex set of code provisions
not unlike those we have just examined in some detail. Because
this procedure is no longer new, and because we really are inter
ested only in demonstrating the complex relationship which exists
between facts, authorities, and tax questions, we will discontinue
our detailed step-by-step approach and state the remainder of this
analysis in more general terms. We can begin such a summary treat
ment of our problem as follows:
1. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition a redemption within
the meaning of Section 317(b), as required by Section 302(a)?
Authority: Section 317(b) reads as follows:
Redemption of stock.—For purposes of this part, stock
shall be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the cor
poration acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange
for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is can
celled, retired, or held as treasury stock.

Conclusion: The intended meaning of this section is not ob
vious; it seems to suggest only that what the acquiring cor
poration does with shares it acquires from its shareholders
will in no way effect the classification of the stock acquisition
as a stock redemption. The section seems initially not to apply
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to our case because it refers to a corporation acquiring its stock
from a shareholder. A more general reflection on how this sec
tion is made applicable to related corporations through Sec
tion 304 suggests, however, that these words must be stretched
to include the stock of a related corporation if the obvious
meaning of Section 304 is not to be emasculated. Hence, we
would likely conclude that Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition prob
ably is a redemption within the meaning of Section 317(b).
2. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale (redemption) of 30,000
shares of GPC stock to GPI a redemption that falls within the
meaning of any one of the exceptions of Section 302(b)(1)
through (b )(4 )?
Authority: Read again Section 302 (b )(1 ) through (b )(4 ) as
quoted previously.
Conclusions (in reverse order):
(a) Clearly the exception of Section 302(b) (4) is not applic
able; that is, GPC is not a railroad corporation.
(b ) Clearly the exception of Section 3 0 2 (b )(3 ) is not applic
able; that is, Ms. Hitchcock continues to own directly
30,000 shares of GPC stock even after her sale of 30,000
shares to GPI.
(c) Clearly the exception of Section 3 0 2 (b )(2 ) is not ap
plicable; that is, considering her indirect ownership as
well as her direct ownership, Ms. Hitchcock owns after
the sale exactly what she owned before the sale, namely,
20 percent of GPC. (Note that Section 302(c) requires
that the attribution rules of Section 318 be applied to
stock redemptions.)
The Final Question

W ithout having carefully examined each of the intermediate
questions and authorities suggested above, the reader might have
some trouble in stating the final question. If he took the time to
do so, however, it would seem that Ms. Hitchcock’s final question
might be stated thus: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of
GPC to GPI properly treated as a “redemption not essentially equiv
alent to a dividend” as that phrase is used in Section 3 0 2 (b )(1 )?
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The implied conclusion stems importantly from (1) the require
ment in Section 304 (with assistance from Section 318) that Ms.
Hitchcock’s apparent sale be treated not as a sale at all but as a
redemption of a parent corporation’s stock when that stock is pur
chased by its subsidiary corporation and (2) the requirement in
Section 302 that stock redemptions be treated as a dividend unless
one of the four exceptions in Section 302(b) are satisfied.
Any detailed assessment of the authority which is pertinent to an
interpretation of Section 302(b)(1) would lead us well into the
objective of chapter 5 of this tax study. Consequently, we will not
undertake that assessment here. We will note, in passing, some
general observations that would become pertinent to a resolution
of the problem were we actually to undertake a detailed assessment.
First, “the legislative history of Section 302 (b )(1 ) . . . suggests
that it is to play a modest role in the scheme of things.”6 Second,
in the Treasury regulations the only example of a stock redemp
tion qualifying for exchange treatment under Section 302(b)(1) is
stated in Regs. Sec. 1.302-2(a), which reads, in part, as follows:
“For example, if a shareholder owns only nonvoting stock of a
corporation which is not section 306 stock and which is limited and
preferred as to dividends and in liquidation, and one-half of such
stock is redeemed, the distribution will ordinarily meet the require
ments of paragraph (1) of section 302(b) but will not meet the
requirements of paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) of such section.” This
example obviously lends no support to the case at hand since the
facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s ownership are radically different from those
described in this regulation. Third, in U.S. v. Davis, 397 US 301
(1970), the Supreme Court held “. . . that neither the absence of a
tax-avoidance motive nor the presence of a business purpose for
the redemption would protect it against dividend treatment.”7 In
summary, the authority for granting Ms. Hitchcock exchange (that
is, capital gain) treatment by operation of the exception stated in
Section 302(b)(1) appears to be relatively weak. And if the ex
ception of Section 302(b)(1) cannot be made to apply, Ms. Hitch

6Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 3d ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1971),
pp. 9-24.
7Ibid., pp. 9-25.
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cock must report a $325,000 dividend income by operation of Sec
tion 302(d).8
Do We Begin Again?

At this point the difference between the tax adviser with limited
technical competence and the more experienced tax adviser is once
again apt to become apparent. If the beginner actually had dis
covered and understood all of the facts and all of the rules con
sidered thus far in our example, he would be very apt to conclude
that the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent sale is,
after all, dividend treatment rather than capital gain. The more
experienced tax adviser is more likely to ask one last searching
question, Does this conclusion make any common sense? If his
answer to this one last question is negative, as it is apt to be in this
case, the expert sets off once more on yet another search for author
ity to justify an apparently more reasonable conclusion.
By rethinking the facts of this illustration, a tax adviser should
observe that his tentative conclusion rests largely on the presump
tion that GPI is a subsidiary of GPC when, in fact, GPC does not
directly own a single share of GPI stock. In fact, no “first generation
shareholder” of GPC even owns such stock. He might go on to ob
serve, then, that the literal application of the rules just studied
could clearly lead to potentially absurd results in some circum
stances. For example, if a stockholder owned only a few shares of
General Motors Corporation common stock and he should happen
to sell some of these shares to his grandson’s wholly owned corpo
ration, the tax result would, for the same reasons as those deter
mined here, be held to constitute a dividend. His grandson’s little
corporation would, by some wild stretch of the imagination and
the law of the land, be made into a subsidiary of General Motors.
This observation might lead the experienced tax adviser to look
into the history of Section 304, where he would discover that it was
intended to close an unintended opportunity for owners of closely
related corporations to “bail out” the earnings and profits of their
corporation as a capital gain, rather than through the payment of
8Our conclusion simply assumes a sufficiency of earnings and profits as re
quired by Section 316, which defines the word “dividend.” In actual prac
tice, of course, this would constitute another critical fact determination.
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dividends. Still further reflection on the intended purpose of Sec
tion 304 would suggest clearly that the section was never intended
to cover the isolated sale of a few shares of General Motors to a
very distantly related corporation and that, in all probability, it was
never intended to cover a situation like Ms. Hitchcock’s either. A
careful study of the constructive ownership provisions required by
Section 304 would also yield some obvious ambiguities in statutory
construction. For example, given the literal application of the con
structive ownership rules of Section 318, every brother-sister pair
of corporations is automatically a parent-subsidiary pair as well,
although both the code and the Treasury regulations imply that
the two situations are separate and must be treated differently. Fi
nally, the experienced tax adviser might locate judicial support that
would suggest that courts on rare occasions refuse to apply the code
literally if the result is clearly absurd and inconsistent with the in
tent of Congress.9 And last but not least, the tax adviser may locate
some secondary reference work that points up the very problem
encountered.10 All of these authorities give the experienced tax ad
viser some comfort, but, at the same time, they leave him in some
thing of a dilemma.
A Moral Dilemma?

Any tax adviser who painstakingly has found his way through the
facts and the law of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale might be trapped in a
moral dilemma. That adviser would understand that, in all likeli
hood, he could just report the “sale” of Ms. Hitchcock’s stock in
Part II, Schedule D, Form 1040, as a routine sale and that it would
not be questioned further. After all, what is the statistical probabil
9 For example, note the following words from the United States Supreme
Court: “When . . . [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, this
Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the Act. Frequently,
. . . even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely
an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as
a whole this court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal whole.”
U.S. v. American Trucking Association, 310 US 534 (1940).
10Relative to the parent-subsidiary relation derived solely from constructive
ownership rules see Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders, pp. 9-39/40. See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law of Federal
Income Taxation, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Callaghan and Co.) para. 9.106, pp.
328-29.
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ity of an audit that would discover who purchased the shares and
reveal who it was that owned the purchasing corporation? Beyond
that, what is the chance that an auditor would fully understand all
of the intricacies of Sections 301, 302, 304, 317, and 318? Further
more, there is some authority (admittedly weak) for treating the
sale-redemption as an exchange under Section 302 (b )(1 ) anyway.
If that authority is applicable, the correct tax result is a $300,000
long-term capital gain. The tax adviser strongly suspects that capi
tal gain treatment really is the treatment intended by Congress
(even though no one ever really considered it), but he knows
equally well that the Internal Revenue Service might reach a con
trary conclusion were it fully aware of all the facts. Certainly, the
tax adviser knows that his client intended to enter into a sale that
would produce capital gain rather than ordinary dividend income.
The real dilemma, then, may concern not the conclusion, but the
proper method of reporting all of the facts that have transpired. If
the tax adviser reveals all he knows on the tax return, the probabil
ity of an audit and the possibility of costly litigation are substantially
increased. If he remains silent, reports the disposition as a simple
sale, and all the facts are subsequently discovered and the dispute
is litigated, the adviser stands to jeopardize his professional repu
tation and possibly risk the penalties of perjury for filing a false
return.
Under the circumstances described here, the tax adviser might
seek the opinion of Ms. Hitchcock’s legal counsel to obtain another
opinion as to the correct treatment of the proceeds from the dis
position of the GPC stock and as to the proper method of reporting
that event. The latter conclusion is particularly important if legal
counsel should state that, in his opinion, the correct treatment of
the proceeds is as a capital gain. Although an opinion of legal counsel
would not absolve the tax adviser from his own professional respon
sibility, it would lend credence to the tax treatment he finally re
ports and, to some extent, demonstrate his desire to perform his
duty in a professionally responsible manner.
That foregoing example demonstrates (1) the critical role of
facts, (2) the interdependency of facts and rules, and (3) the elu
sive nature of pertinent tax questions. If all the facts are discovered
and all the rules are known and understood, apparently simple
transactions have a way of creating relatively complex tax problems
in all too many situations. The tax adviser must ask the right ques
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tions, not because he desires to convert a simple situation into a
complex problem and a larger fee, but because the correct report
ing of a tax result depends so directly upon his asking those ques
tions. Questions often evolve from fact determination to rule ap
plication. For example, in our illustration the first critical questions
were (1) Who purchased the shares? and (2) Who owned the
purchaser? Certainly those are fact questions. Nevertheless, unless
a person has some appreciation of the applicable rules, it would
be highly unlikely that he would continue to ask the right ques
tions. After the facts were determined, the critical questions con
cerned the application of rules to known facts, for example, (1)
Does Section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of
GPC to GPI? (2) Does Section 318 apply to make GPI a subsidiary
corporation of GPC? and (3) Does the exception of Section 302
(b) (1) apply to this same disposition? Each question appears to be
more esoteric than the preceding one. Yet every question depends
to an important degree upon the tax adviser's knowledge of the
authority that is applicable to the given fact situation.

86

4
. . . reasons are as two graines of wheate,
hid in two bushels of chaffe;
you shall seeke all day ere you finde them . . .
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE

Locating Appropriate
Authority
In chapters 2 and 3 we discussed the importance of facts and the
methodology employed to delineate questions that must be an
swered to solve tax problems successfully. To determine a techni
cally correct answer to a tax question, the tax adviser may consult
statutory, administrative, judicial, and, in some instances, editorial
authority. This process consists of two distinct phases: (1) the tax
adviser must locate the appropriate authority and (2) he must as
sess the importance of that authority; augment it if it is found to be
incomplete, and, on occasion, choose between conflicting authori
ties. The following pages will identify the various kinds of tax
authorities and ways to locate them, and chapter 5 will concentrate
on the assessment of authorities.
The Tax-Legislation Process
Our present income taxing system began with the Tariff Act of
October 3, 1913. Since then numerous revenue acts have been
enacted into law. Due to their number and increasing complexity,
existing revenue acts were codified into a single document called
the Internal Revenue Code in 1939. The Internal Revenue Code of
1939 was revised and simplified again in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. All revenue acts enacted into law after 1939 have been
integrated into the extant Internal Revenue Code.
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By virtue of Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution, all revenue
bills must originate in the House and cannot be sent to the Senate
until the House has completed action on the bill. After introduction,
most of the actual work on a revenue bill takes place in the House
Ways and Means Committee. In the case of major bills, public
hearings are scheduled. The first and most prominent witness dur
ing these hearings usually is the secretary of the Treasury, repre
senting the executive branch of the government. Upon conclusion
of the hearings, the committee goes into executive session and, after
tentative conclusions have been reached, prepares the House Ways
and Means Committee report, which includes the proposed bill
drafted in legislative language, an assessment of its effect on rev
enue, and a general explanation of the provisions in the bill. The
report represents the only written document that details the reasons
for the committee’s actions and, therefore, it constitutes an impor
tant reference source for the courts, the Internal Revenue Service,
and practitioners in determining legislative intent in connection
with each section of the code. Upon completion of the committee
report, the bill is reported to the floor of the House for action. Prior
to 1975, revenue legislation usually was considered “privileged”
business and, as such, had priority over other matters on the floor.
In the past, the approval of the Rules Committee usually was sought
before a bill was placed on the floor. This procedure was followed
so that a tax bill could be debated under the “closed rule”; thus,
amendments from the floor were forbidden unless the Ways and
Means Committee approved them. This procedure appears to be
changing and it is anticipated that future revenue legislation will
be subject to amendments on the floor of the House.
After approval by the House, a tax bill is sent to the Senate where
it is immediately referred to the Finance Committee. If it is a major
bill, the Senate Finance Committee holds its own hearings and pre
pares its own committee report. Debate on the floor of the Senate
proceeds with few restraints; consequently, Senate amendments to
a revenue bill are commonplace. Obviously, the Senate Finance
Committee report will not disclose the intent of Congress on the
amended portion of a bill. For those portions it becomes necessary
to consult the Congressional Record to understand the reasons for
the amendment.
If the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill,
further congressional action is necessary. After the House adopts
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a motion to disagree with the Senate version of a revenue bill, a
conference committee is appointed to iron out the differences. Like
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee, the conference committee may prepare its own com
mittee report, concentrating on the areas of disagreement. Their
report usually is rather technical and does not explain how the two
bills were reconciled. However, statements made on the floor of
either chamber prior to the final vote on the conference report are
entered in the Congressional Record. These statements often shed
light on congressional intent for the amended sections. After ap
proval of the conference bill by both the House and the Senate, the
bill is sent to the President for his signature.1
To illustrate how the tax adviser might utilize his knowledge of
the foregoing process, let us refer to the Revenue Act of 1971, which
was signed by the President as Public Law 92-178 on December 10,
1971, amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Among many
other changes, the act considerably liberalized Section 214 of the
code, which deals with child care expenses. The new child care ex
pense provisions are found in Section 210 of the 1971 act. In addi
tion to numerous other changes incorporated in Section 210, the
act requires that married taxpayers who claim a deduction for
child care expenses must both be gainfully employed on a “substan
tially full-time” basis, unless one of the spouses is physically or men
tally incapacitated. The tax practitioner who is faced with the ques
tion of whether or not his client satisfies the “substantially full-time”
employment criterion might, in the absence of other authoritative
pronouncements (such as Treasury regulations or revenue rulings),
consult the committee reports. The House Ways and Means Com
mittee report for the 1971 act contains no mention of any proposed
change to Section 214 of the 1954 code. Following the legislative
process of a tax bill, the next logical step is to examine the Senate
Finance Committee report, which discloses that changes dealing
with the child care expense deduction were added by the Senate
Finance Committee. A careful perusal of the Senate report reveals
exactly what was meant by the provision that married taxpayers
must both satisfy, among other requirements, the “substantially
full-time” employment test. The committee report states that
1For a more complete discussion of the legislative process, see Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax Policy, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu
tion, 1971).
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. . . the term employed on a fulltime basis’ means employed for
three-quarters or more of the normal or customary work week (or
the equivalent on the average during the m onth).2

Tracing this Senate Finance Committee amendment to the confer
ence committee report reveals that the liberalized child care deduc
tion provisions were adopted by the conference committee as
Amendment No. 49 without further elaboration on the meaning of
“substantially full-time” employment.
Accessing Public Documents
Committee reports can be obtained in a number of ways. The of
ficial report of each committee (House Ways and Means, Senate
Finance, and conference) is published by the Government Printing
Office ( GPO). These reports are available in the government docu
ments section of any library that has been designated as an official
depository. Committee reports are also reprinted in the weekly
Internal Revenue Bulletin and consequently appear in the Cumula
tive Bulletin; they can also be found in the U.S. Code Congressional
and Administrative News (USCCAN), published by West Publish
ing Company. In addition, major revenue acts—such as the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 or the Revenue Act of 1971—are published with
partial or full texts of the accompanying committee reports by
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., and Prentice-Hall, Inc. The editors
of the Rabkin and Johnson tax service (Federal Income, Gift and
Estate Taxation) also typically extract important segments of com
mittee reports and intersperse them among the code sections con
tained in the four “Code” volumes of the service.
At times it becomes necessary to trace the history of a particular
1954 code section to the 1939 code or to previous revenue acts. Bar
ton’s Federal Tax Laws Correlated (FTLC ), a six-volume refer
ence service, is an extremely useful tool to guide the researcher
from the 1954 code to the 1939 code and prior acts. Barton’s FTLC
gives the researcher citations to the official committee reports, the
USCCAN, and Cumulative Bulletin where applicable segments of
committee reports can be found. A second source for references to
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, S. Rept. 92-553, 92d Cong.,
1st sess., 1971, p. 42.
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committee reports is Seidmans Legislative History of Federal In
come Tax and Excess Profits Tax Laws. This three-volume work
contains the legislative history of tax statutes enacted from 1861 to
1953, including the original text of revenue acts and 1939 code sec
tions, with excerpts from applicable committee reports. Another
source of recent legislative history of the code is Tax Manage
ment’s Primary Sources. This publication is arranged by IRC sec
tion number and emphasizes the legislative history of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 and subsequent acts. Selected provisions are
traced back to 1954. Documentary materials pertaining to substan
tive current legislation is forwarded to subscribers on a monthly
basis.3
The well-informed tax adviser should stay abreast of congres
sional activities involving tax statutes in order to determine the
potential positive and negative tax effects such developments may
harbor with respect to his clients. One effective means of keeping
in touch with such daily congressional tax activities is through
Tax Notes, a weekly newsletter published by Tax Analysts and
Advocates, Washington, D.C. For a more comprehensive listing of
tax newsletters, see page 134 of this chapter.
The Internal Revenue Code
All federal statutes passed by Congress are compiled and pub
lished in the United States Code. Title 26 of the United States Code
contains the statutes that authorize the Treasury Department, spe
cifically, the Internal Revenue Service, to collect taxes for the fed
eral government. The present code, commonly known as the In
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, applies to taxable years beginning
after 1953. Prior to 1954, statutory authority for the collection of
taxes rested with the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Although the
Internal Revenue Code is amended almost annually, the designa
tion 1954 remains fixed with the present Internal Revenue Code.
3 Walter E. Barton and Carroll W. Browning, Federal Tax Laws Correlated
(Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1969).
J. S. Seidman, Seidmans Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws,
1938-1861 and Excess Profits Tax Laws 1953-1939 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall).
Tax Management, Primary Sources (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National
Affairs).
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is divided into the following
segments:
Subtitles
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
Financing the Presidential Election Campaigns

Chapters
1-6
11-12
21-25
31-42
51-53
61-80
91-92
95-96

The bulk of the income tax provisions is found in Chapter 1 of Sub
title A. Chapter 1 is divided into twenty subchapters, A through T.
(Effectively, however, Chapter 1 currently consists of only nineteen
subchapters since Subchapter R has been repealed.) These sub
chapter designations are often used by tax practitioners as part of
their everyday vocabulary to identify general areas of income tax
ation. The most frequently used designations are these.
Subchapter
C
F
J
K
N
S

Corporate distributions and adjustments
Exempt organizations
Estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents
Partners and partnerships
Taxation of multinational corporations
Tax status election of small business operations

Section numbers are additional subdivisions of the Internal Rev
enue Code and run consecutively through the entire code. For ex
ample, Subchapter A, which deals with the determination of an en
tity’s tax liability, includes section numbers 1 through 58. To the
extent that section numbers are unassigned, the arrangement is
suitable for future expansion of the code. The reader should also
note that section numbers give a clue to which general income tax
topic is involved. For example, code section numbers in the 300
series indicate that the section will deal with the topic of corporate
distributions and adjustments. Each section is further broken down
into categories (see exhibit 4.1, opposite).
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Exhibit 4.1
SBC. 117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS.
(a ) General R ule.—In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—

(1) any amount received—
(A ) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in sec
tion 151 (e) (4 )), or
( 6 ) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any
(A )
(B )
(C)
(D )

amount received to cover expenses for—
travel,
research,
clerical help, or
equipment,

which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only
to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
■...(b ) Limitations.—
(1) I ndividuals who are candidates for degrees.—In the case of an in
dividual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as
defined in section 151 (e) (4 )), subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion
of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or
other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condi
tion to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research,
or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients
of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition
to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other services shall not
be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
—
(2) I ndividuals who are not candidates for degrees.—In the case of an
individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution
(as defined in section 151 (e) (4 )), subsection (a) shall apply only if the
condition in subparagraph (A ) is satisfied and then only within the limita
tions provided in subparagraph (B).
(A ) Conditions for exclusion.—The grantor of the scholarship or
fellowship grant is—
(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is
exempt from tax under section 501(a),
(ii) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multi
national educational and cultural foundation or commission created
or continued pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural
Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or an instrumentality or agency thereof,
or a State, a territory, or a possession of the United States, or any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.
(B ) E xtent of exclusion.—The amount of the scholarship or fellow
ship grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be
limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for
which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellow
ship grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be
allowed under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to
exclude under this section for a period of 36 months (whether or not
consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while
not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined
in section 151 (e) (4)).

Section 117
Subsection (b)
Paragraph (2)
Subparagraph (A)
Sub-subparagraph (ii)
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The Internal Revenue Code is published annually in paperback
editions by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (CCH ), Prentice-Hall,
Inc. (P-H ), and Research Institute of America (RIA). The code
is also published in most multivolume tax services, either separately
in a loose-leaf volume or serially in several volumes. In the latter
case, the volume includes editorial comments arranged on a topical
and/or section number basis.

Administrative Interpretations
Within the executive branch, the Treasury Department has the
responsibility of implementing the tax statutes passed by Congress.
This function is specifically carried out by the Internal Revenue
Service division of the Treasury Department. The duties of the In
ternal Revenue Service are two-fold: First, the statutes must be in
terpreted according to the intent of Congress, and, second, the sta
tutes must be enforced.
The interpretive duties of the Treasury and the IRS range from
the general to the specific. Treasury regulations are written in broad,
general terms to explain the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. Revenue rulings, on the other hand, interpret the code only
with respect to specific facts and are inapplicable to fact situations
that deviate from those stated in a particular revenue ruling.
Treasury Regulations

Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate a general power to prescribe neces
sary rules and regulations to administer the tax laws as passed by
Congress. In addition to Section 7805, specific reference is made
throughout the code to the effect that the secretary or his dele
gate shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of a specific chapter or section.
Treasury regulations may be divided into regulations that are
almost “statutory” and those that are interpretive. An example of
“statutory regulations” are those promulgated under Section 1502
(formerly Section 141(b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939) dealing
with consolidated tax returns. Because of the complexity of the sub
ject, Congress failed to legislate in detail in the area of consolidated
tax returns and delegated this responsibility to the secretary of the
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Treasury or his delegate. Apparently, in 1954, Congress had second
thoughts concerning the delegation of legislative power to the secre
tary. Had the 1954 code been enacted in the form in which it passed
the House of Representatives, the consolidated return regulations
actually would have been written into the statute. The Senate Fi
nance Committee disagreed, however, and in the conference com
mittee the view of the Senate prevailed.4 Due to the complexity and
detail involved in the consolidated return regulations, Congress ap
parently felt that revisions and amendments should be left under
the purview of the Treasury.
Taxpayers electing to file consolidated returns must execute a con
sent form in which they agree to be bound by the provisions of the
regulations.5 Presumably, such an agreement leaves almost no ap
peal from the provisions of the consolidated return regulations and,
in that sense, gives them a position more nearly “statutory” than the
interpretive regulations.
The purpose of the interpretive regulations is to clarify the lan
guage of the code as passed by Congress. Although the wording of
the regulations is sometimes almost identical to the language of the
code and of little assistance, in recent years the Treasury has made
frequent attempts to add helpful examples to the regulations.
In effect, even the interpretive regulations may come to have the
force of law; however, technically, if they contradict the intent of
Congress, they can be overturned by the courts.6 Nevertheless, the
odds are very much against the taxpayer or his representative who
tries to win a case against the Internal Revenue Service solely by
attempting to declare a specific Treasury regulation to be in conflict
with the code or the intent of Congress. For a more complete dis
cussion on the status of Treasury regulations, see chapter 5.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, regulations must
be issued in proposed form before they are published in final form.
Proposed regulations for a new or existing part of the code may
begin with the formation of a special task force that may include
representatives of the Internal Revenue Service, the American Bar
Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
and other know ledgeable individuals, as was the case w ith the
4U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, S. Rept. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
sess., 1954, p. 120.
5Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.1502-75(h) (2) (1966).
6See, for example, W. W. Marett, 325 F2d 28 (CA-5, 1963).
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regulations under Section 1502. Usually, however, regulations are
prepared solely by members of the Treasury Department. Inter
ested parties generally are given thirty days from the date the pro
posed regulations appear in the Federal Register to submit objec
tions or suggestions. Depending upon the controversy surrounding
a proposed regulation, it will, after the given time period, be either
withdrawn and issued in permanent form or amended and reissued
as a new proposed regulation.
Permanent regulations are initially published as official Treasury
Decisions (TD ) and appear in the Federal Register. They subse
quently are reprinted by the Government Printing Office in codified
form and are officially cited as Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regu
lations (26 CFR . . .). Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall
publish paperback editions of the Treasury regulations periodically.
The identifying number of a specific part of the regulations can
be divided into three segments, as follows:
Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.1245-2 (a )(3 ) (ii)
Segment I II

III

Segment I indicates that the regulation deals either with a specific
tax or with a procedural rule. Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regu
lations utilizes the following designations as the identification num
bers for what we call “segment I” of a correct citation of a Treasury
regulation.
Part 1
Part 20
Part 25
Part 31
Parts 48 and 49
Part 301
Part 601

Income Tax
Estate Tax
Gift Tax
Employment Tax
Excise Taxes
Administrative and Procedural
Statement of Procedural Rules

Segment II simply coincides with the specific code section that the
regulation interprets. Thus, in the above example, one can deter
mine that the regulation cited (a) deals with the income tax (be
cause of the prefix 1) and (b ) refers specifically to Section 1245 of
the Internal Revenue Code. Segment III represents the sequence of
the regulation and a breakdown of its content. Thus, segment III in
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the example refers to Section 1245, second section, paragraph (a),
subparagraph (3), subdivision (ii). Generally, there is no direct
correlation between the sequence designation of the Internal Rev
enue Code and the organization of a Treasury regulation. For in
stance, Code Section 1245(c) discusses “Adjustment to Basis,” while
the interpretive discussion of the same topic is found in Treas. Regs.
Sec. 1.1245-5.
Frequently, there is a considerable delay between the time a par
ticular section is added to the code and the time when the Treasury
issues proposed or permanent regulations. A case in point is found
in the child care expense provisions of Code Section 214, which
underwent major modification in the Revenue Act of 1971. The new
statute became effective for the tax year 1972. Three years later the
Treasury regulations for the revised statute had not yet been pro
posed or issued. Regulations published for Section 214 are applic
able only for tax years prior to 1972. The tax researcher must, there
fore, be careful to ascertain that the regulations he consults are in
fact valid for the current statute.
Occasionally, when a major change of a particular code section
has been enacted and the commissioner of internal revenue subse
quently issues new regulations, two sets of regulations will appear
covering the same code section for a time. The regulations currently
published under Section 170, on charitable contributions, are a case
in point. Due to the major revisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
new regulations were issued in 1972 to govern Section 170. New
regulations are distinguishable from those applicable to tax years
prior to 1970 through the addition of a capital letter A. That is,
Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.170A-1 applies to years after 1969, Treas. Regs.
Sec. 1.170-1, to years before 1970. Once again, to identify current
and noncurrent regulations, the researcher must be aware of this
procedure.
Revenue Rulings

Another interpretive tool used by the Internal Revenue Service to
apply tax laws to specific situations are letter rulings. These letter
rulings generally are official replies given by the IRS to inquiries
from taxpayers concerning the tax consequences of a proposed
transaction. If, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, the
issue is of significant general application, the essence of the reply
97

will be published in the form of a revenue ruling. In the past, care
was taken to protect the identity of the actual taxpayer making the
initial request to comply with statutory provisions prohibiting the
disclosure of information obtained from the public.
Initially revenue rulings are published in the weekly Internal
Revenue Bulletin. The same rulings later appear in the permanently
bound Cumulative Bulletin, a semiannual publication of the Gov
ernment Printing Office. A typical citation for a revenue ruling
would appear in the following forms:
Rev. Rul. 74-101, IRB 13,10
or
Rev. Rul. 74-101, 1974-1 CB 131
The first citation refers to the 101st revenue ruling published in
1974 in the thirteenth weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin, on page 10.
The second citation refers to the same revenue ruling; however, in
this instance its source is the first volume of the 1974 Cumulative
Bulletin, page 131.
Prior to 1953, rulings by the Internal Revenue Service appeared
under various titles such as general counsel’s memorandums
(GCM ), appeals and review memorandums (ARM), internal
revenue mimeographs (IR-Mim.), and tax board memorandums
(TBM ), to name just a few. While some of these rulings still have
potential value, in Revenue Procedure 67-6, 1967-1 CB 576, the
IRS announced a continuing review program of rulings. If the IRS
revokes or modifies a prior revenue ruling, open tax years can be
retroactively affected for all taxpayers other than the taxpayer who
initially requested the ruling. The modification will affect the latter
party only if a misstatement or omission of material facts was in
volved. In researching a problem, the tax practitioner should con
sult a current status table to avoid the embarrassment of relying on
a ruling that has been revoked or modified. The current rulings vol
um e (vol. 7) of the Mertens’ Law of Federal Income Taxation is
particularly helpful for this task.
Published revenue rulings generally have less force than Treasury
regulations because they were intended to cover only specific fact
situations. Consequently, published rulings provide valid precedent
only if a second taxpayers facts are substantially identical. In deal
ing with revenue agents and other Internal Revenue Service per
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sonnel, however, one might remember that regulations, revenue rul
ings, and acquiesced Tax Court decisions constitute the official pol
icy of the service. Thus an agent is often more easily persuaded by
a revenue ruling than by a district court or even a circuit court de
cision. An agent’s work must be approved by his supervisor and
sometimes by the review staff; these persons tend to minimize liti
gation hazards.
Revenue Procedures

Revenue procedures announce administrative practices followed
by the Internal Revenue Service. The depreciation guidelines an
nounced in Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 are an example. If
a taxpayer will accept the estimated lives recommended in these
revenue procedures, as liberalized by the Revenue Act of 1971, the
service will not challenge the result of their application if proper
procedures were followed.
Publication and identification methods for revenue procedures
are identical to those used for revenue rulings. That is, they are in
itially published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently
in the Cumulative Bulletin and are numbered in the sequence of
their appearance. Only the prefix “Rev. Proc.” is different.
Technical Information Releases

Technical information releases (TIRs) are used by the Internal
Revenue Service to disseminate important technical information on
specific issues. TIRs are not published in the Internal Revenue Bul
letin but are distributed via a practitioners’ mailing list. In addition,
the major tax services publish them in their current-matters volume.
If the IRS decides that a TIR has enough general application, it will
be reissued as a revenue procedure. In such an instance, of course,
the TIR will appear in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subse
quently in the Cumulative Bulletin. A TIR usually includes a state
ment indicating the extent to which the practitioner may rely upon
the announcement.
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda

To further clarify provisions of the code, the Internal Revenue
Service has furnished interpretive rulings in the form of private let
ter rulings and technical advice memorandums. Private letter rulings
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are issued to taxpayers who formally request advice about the tax
consequences applicable to a specific business transaction. Such rul
ing requests have been employed frequently by taxpayers to assure
themselves of a preplanned tax result before consummating a trans
action and as a subsequent aid in the preparation of the tax return.
The Internal Revenue Service may refuse a ruling request; but even
when rulings are given it is usually understood that such a ruling is
limited in application to the taxpayer making the request, and IRS
personnel are instructed not to accept private rulings as precedent
when offered by taxpayers other than those for whom the rulings
were originally rendered. In the past, however, private letter rul
ings have often inspired the publication of revenue rulings or rev
enue procedures describing similar fact situations.
The technical advice memorandum, a special after-the-fact ruling,
also may be requested from the technical staff of the Internal Rev
enue Service. For example, if a disagreement arises in the course
of an audit between the taxpayer or his representative and the rev
enue agent, either side may request formal technical advice on the
issue(s) through the district director. If the advice is favorable to
the taxpayer, IRS personnel usually will comply with the ruling.
In some instances, such technical advice also has been used as the
basis for the issuance of a revenue ruling.
Recently, the continuation of private rulings has been placed in
serious jeopardy. Through legal action brought by various taxpay
ers against the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of In
formation Act (FOIA), the IRS has been ordered to release un
published rulings.7 At this writing, the Administration is planning
to introduce legislation that would more specifically indicate docu
ments that would be available for public scrutiny. An issue to be
resolved is to what extent such a law would have retroactive appli
cation. The commissioner of Internal Revenue has stated, however,
that based upon Tax Analysts, the Service considers technical
advice memorandums not in the same category as private letter rul
ings and thus does not anticipate the release of technical advice

memorandums.8 Nevertheless, taxpayers who have in the past uti
7Tax Analysts and Advocates, 505 F2d 350 (CA-D.C., 1974); also Fruehauf
Corp, 369 F.Supp. 108 (DC M ich, 1974), aff’d CA-6, 6/9/75.
8Joel M. Forster, e d , “Washington Report,” The Tax Adviser, March 1975,
pp. 162-65.
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lized the private rulings procedure may now steer away from it be
cause of their desire to keep certain information confidential.
Judicial Interpretations
In situations where statutory authority alone does not provide a
clearcut solution for a particular problem, the taxpayer or his ad
viser must consult judicial as well as administrative authority in
forming an opinion. Judicial interpretations provide varying degrees
of precedent, depending upon the nature of the conflict and the
jurisdictional authority of the court that rendered the opinion.
While a vast majority of all disagreements with the Internal Rev
enue Service are settled on the administrative level, unsettled dis
putes may be litigated by filing suit in one of three courts of orig
inal jurisdiction: the United States Tax Court, a United States dis
trict court, or the United States Court of Claims. Appeals from both
the Tax Court and the district courts are heard by the circuit courts
of appeals. Appeals from a circuit court or the Court of Claims must
be directed to the United States Supreme Court. The judicial alter
natives available to a taxpayer can be depicted as in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1

Courts of
Original
Jurisdiction

Appellate
Courts

United States
Tax Court

United States
District Courts

United States
Court of Claims

United States
Circuit Courts
of Appeals
United States
Supreme Court

After receiving a request for certiorari from either the govern
ment or the taxpayer, the Supreme Court decides whether or not it
should review a case. Certiorari is most commonly granted in situ
ations where a conflict already exists between two or more circuit
courts of appeals and/or the Court of Claims. Sometimes the Su
preme Court will grant certiorari without a prior conflict if it deems
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a case to have special significance. In order to understand fully the
weight of a court decision, and the degree to which it sets prece
dent, an elementary understanding of the jurisdiction of each court
is essential.
United States Tax Court

The United States Tax Court consists of sixteen judges, separate
and distinct from the Treasury Department, appointed by the Pres
ident for fifteen-year terms. Although the principal office of the Tax
Court is located in Washington, D.C., the court conducts hearings
in most large cities in the United States. The Tax Court is organized
by divisions, which usually consist of only one judge, although they
may consist of more than one. Commissioners may be assigned to
assist a judge. Proceedings before the Tax Court may be conducted
with or without trial; if sufficient facts are stipulated, the assigned
judge may render an opinion without a formal trial.
After hearing a case, the assigned judge will submit his findings
of fact and his opinion, in writing, to the chief judge, who then
decides whether or not the case should be reviewed by the full
court. Should the chief judge decide that a full review is not neces
sary, the original decision will stand and be entered either as a
"regular” or a "memorandum” decision. Regular decisions are pub
lished by the Government Printing Office.
Prior to 1943, the Tax Court was known as the Board of Tax Ap
peals, the decisions of which were published in forty-seven volumes
covering the period from 1924 to 1942. These volumes are cited as
the United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports (BTA). For ex
ample, 39 BTA 13 refers to the thirty-ninth volume of the Board
of Tax Appeals Reports, page 13. Beginning with the latter part
of 1942, when Congress changed the name of the body, the pro
ceedings have been published as The Tax Court of the United
States Reports (TC). Thus, an illustrative citation would be 12 TC
101. Bound volumes of the Tax Court reports are published only by
the United States Government Printing Office.
Tax Court memorandum decisions are reproduced by the gov
ernment in mimeograph form only. However, Commerce Clearing
House publishes memorandum decisions in their Tax Court Memo
randum Decisions (TCM ) series and Prentice-Hall makes them
available as the Prentice-Hall Memorandum Decisions (PH-TC
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Memo). In recent years the Tax Court has handed down more
memorandum opinions than regular opinions. Memorandum opin
ions usually involve conclusions that, in the opinion of the chief
judge, have been well established and require only a delineation
of facts. Nevertheless, in 1945 Judge Murdock publicly pointed out
the precedent value of memorandum decisions and acknowledged
that they could be cited in briefs.9
If, in the opinion of the chief judge, a case contains an unusual
point of law or one on which considerable disagreement exists
among the judges of the Tax Court, he may assign the case to the
full court. After each judge has had an opportunity to study the
case, the court meets for an expression of opinions and a vote. In
such instances it is possible that one or more majority and minority
opinions will be prepared and that the trial judge—possibly the only
one to have actually heard the proceedings—could write the minor
ity opinion. The majority opinion will be entered as the final de
cision of the Tax Court.
As a general rule, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction rests with the de
termination of deficiencies in income, excess profits, self employ
ment, estate, or gift taxes. Specifically excluded are claims for re
funds if the commissioner did not first assess a deficiency10 and mat
ters of administrative policy.11 Claims for refund must be tried in
either a district court or the Court of Claims. Thus, in order to
bring suit in the Tax Court of the United States, a taxpayer must
have received a notice of deficiency and a so-called ninety-day let
ter and, subsequently, have refused to pay the deficiency.
Some Tax Court transcripts disclose that a “decision has been
entered under Rule 50.” This notation signifies that the court has
reached a conclusion as to the facts and issues of the case but leaves
the computational aspects of the decision to the opposing parties.
Both parties will subsequently submit to the court their version of
the refund or deficiency computation. If both parties agree on the
computation, no further argument is necessary. In the event of dis
agreement, the court will reach its decision on the basis of the data

9 J. Edgar Murdock, “What Has the Tax Court of the United States Been
Doing?” American Bar Association Journal, June 1945, pp. 298-99.
10Scaife Company, 47 BTA 964 (1942).
11Cleveland House Brewing Company, 1 BTA 87 (1924).
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presented by each party. Data submitted or arguments heard under
Rule 50 are usually not a part of the trial transcript.
As part of Public Law 91-172, Congress enacted IRC Section
7463, which authorizes the creation of special trial procedures
within the Tax Court for disputes involving $1,000 or less (later
amended to $1,500 or less).12 A taxpayer may request trial before
the Small Tax Case Division by executing Form 2 of the Tax Court
and paying a filing fee of $10. Even this fee may be waived if in
the opinion of the court the petitioner is unable to make such pay
ment. Legal counsel is not required; the taxpayer may represent
himself. Trial procedures are conducted on an informal basis with
the filing of briefs permitted but not required. Only an informal
record of the trial proceedings is prepared and every decision is
final, making an appeal from a decision of the Small Tax Case
Division of the Tax Court impossible. Decisions of this division may
not be cited as precedent in other cases.
Acquiescence policy. In some instances the commissioner of in
ternal revenue will publicly announce his “acquiescence” or “non
acquiescence” to a regular Tax Court decision. This policy does not
encompass Tax Court memorandum decisions or decisions of other
courts. In announcing his acquiescence, the commissioner publicly
declares his agreement with a conclusion reached by the Tax Court.
This does not necessarily mean that the commissioner agrees with
the reasoning used by the court in reaching the conclusion, but only
that in the future, unless otherwise announced, the Internal Rev
enue Service will dispose of similar disputes in a manner consistent
with that established in the acquiesced case. In those situations
where the Tax Court has ruled against the government, the com
missioner may wish to express nonacquiescence to inform taxpayers
that he will continue to contest similar disputes in the future.
Acquiescence and nonacquiescence are announced in the weekly
Internal Revenue Bulletin and are republished in the semiannual
Cumulative Bulletin. In addition, citators of the major tax services
indicate whether the commissioner has acquiesced or refused to
acquiesce in a particular decision, giving specific reference to the
Cumulative Bulletin in which the commissioner’s announcement
12The $1,500 limitation includes the initial tax contested, potential additional
amounts, and penalties, but excludes interest.
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can be found. If the tax adviser plans to rely on a specific acquiesced
case, it is important that he check the original announcement, be
cause it is possible that only a partial acquiescence exists. For ex
ample, a single Tax Court case may involve multiple issues and
the commissioner may acquiesce in only one of those issues. An in
teresting example of this is found in The Friedkinder Corporation,
25 TC 70 (1955), in which the Tax Court considered three issues.
The commissioner remained silent on the first issue, expressed non
acquiescence to the second, and acquiesced to the third.13
The commissioner may also withdraw his acquiescence with retro
active effect. For example, in Caulkins, 1 TC 656 (1943), the com
missioner initially published his nonacquiescence but later changed
this to acquiescence when the court of appeals sustained the Tax
Court.14 Eleven years later another commissioner reinstated the
initial nonacquiescence.15 A taxpayer who claimed that he had re
lied on Caulkins before the acquiescence was retroactively with
drawn found no relief when, in Dixon, the Supreme Court upheld
the commissioner’s right to do so.16
United States District Court

The federal judicial system is divided into eleven judicial circuits
as illustrated in figure 4.2, page 107. Ten of the circuits are num
bered; the eleventh covers Washington, D.C. Each of the eleven
circuits is further divided into districts. At least one district judge is
assigned to each federal district. Depending upon need, however,
two or more federal district judges may hear cases in any district. A
taxpayer may bring suit in a federal district court only after he has
paid a tax, either with the return or as a deficiency assessment, and
has processed a request for refund.17 A United States district court
is the only court in which a taxpayer can request a jury trial in a
tax dispute. Published proceedings of the federal district courts can
be found in the Federal Supplement reporter series, published by
West Publishing Company.
13 Cumulative List of Announcements Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court,
1972-2 CB 2.
14 See TC 1943-24-11581, 1943-1 CB 28; see TC 1944-24-11907, 1944-1 CB 5.
15 Rev. Rul. 55-136, 1955-1 CB 7.
16 W. Palmer Dixon, 381 US 68 (1965).
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 7422.
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United States Court of Claims

The U.S. Court of Claims was created by Congress in 1855 to
dispose of claims against the United States government. The Court
of Claims is a single court consisting of a chief judge and four as
sociate judges appointed by the President. By statute, the court is
required to hold an annual term in Washington, D.C.18 Most of the
hearings are held by fifteen commissioners who report their find
ings to the judges. The prerequisites for filing suit in the Court of
Claims are identical with those applicable to the district court; that
is, the petitioners must have paid a tax and subsequently filed a
request for refund that the commissioner rejected. The proceedings
of the Court of Claims can be found in the Court of Claims Reporter
series published by the United States Government Printing Office.
In addition, West’s Federal Reporter includes all Court of Claims
cases between 1929 and 1932 and after 1959. From 1932 to 1960
the Court of Claims cases were published in the Federal Supplement
series (West Publishing Company).
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals

In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit, the states and
U.S. territories are geographically partitioned into judicial circuits
numbered from one through ten (see figure 4.2). Decisions of the
Tax Court and a district court may be appealed by either the tax
payer or the government to the circuit court in which the taxpayer
resides. Hearings before a circuit court are conducted by a panel
of three judges.
Depending upon need and policies within each particular circuit,
federal district judges may be asked to serve on a panel during a
session. Upon request by any circuit judge, regardless of whether
or not he was a member of the trial panel, the full circuit court
(that is, all the judges in that circuit) may review the decision of
a trial panel. The proceedings of the circuit courts are published by
West Publishing Company in the Federal Reporter (1st and 2nd
Series).

18 United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 174, (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1968).

106

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS

Figure 4.2
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United States Supreme Court

Final appeals from the Court of Claims or from a circuit court of
appeals rests with the Supreme Court. As previously explained, ap
peal requires a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court may or
may not grant. Supreme Court decisions are of special importance
because they constitute the final judicial authority in tax matters.
The Supreme Court decisions can be found in any one of three
publications: the United States Supreme Court Reports (U.S.),
Government Printing Office; Supreme Court Reporter (S.Ct.), West
Publishing Company; the United States Reports, Lawyers’ Edition
(L.Ed.), Lawyers’ Co-Operative Publishing Company.
Special Tax Reporter Series

All tax decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the circuit
courts of appeals, the Court of Claims, federal district courts, and
some state courts are separately published by Commerce Clearing
House in the United States Tax Cases (USTC) series and by Pren
tice-Hall in the American Federal Tax Reports (AFTR and
AFTR2d) series. These two special judicial reporter series provide
a tax practitioner with two major advantages: First, by collecting
only tax cases in one reporter series, it is economically possible for
most tax practitioners to acquire at least one complete set of all
judicial authority dealing with tax problems; second, the space re
quired to store one complete tax reporter series is minimal when
compared with the many volumes that would otherwise have to be
maintained were all judicial tax decisions readily available (tax
cases would be mixed among other civil and criminal proceedings).
Tax Court decisions, which comprise a separate volume, are not
included in either the USTC or AFTR series. In addition to the
Tax Court reporter series published annually by the Government
Printing Office, however, both CCH and P-H provide a current looseleaf service which offers all regular and memorandum Tax Court
decisions in an expeditious manner. If these loose-leaf volumes are
retained, it is unnecessary to purchase the government (TC) series
to obtain a complete set. Most practitioners, however, make that
purchase anyway in order to obtain bound volumes of the regular
Tax Court decisions. As noted earlier, unlike the government, both
Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish bound vol
umes of the Tax Court memorandum decisions.
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Although the duplication of a single judicial proceeding in sev
eral court reporter series has the advantages noted earlier, that same
duplication creates the problem of multiple citations. The extent of
the present duplication is shown in exhibits 4.2 and 4.3, pages 110
and 112. In preparing tax communications, a writer can never be
certain of which reporter series is most readily available to his
reader; therefore, it is difficult to know which series should be
cited. In order to standardize citation presentation, most formal
publications have accepted the practice of presenting at least an
initial reference to the “official” or “standard” reporter series. If
other (secondary) citations are also given, they generally follow
the standard citation. Thus, one might properly cite the decision
in Harris as Harris v. Commissioner, 340 US 106 (1950), 39 AFTR
1002, 50-2 USTC ¶10,786. Obviously additional secondary refer
ences could be added to the two in the above illustration.
The Citator

The tax researcher who must consider judicial authority has a
most useful tool at his disposal in a citator, which is simply a com
pilation of cross-references to judicial decisions. Following the initial
entry of each judicial proceeding in an alphabetical sequence, a
citator includes later cross-references to additional citations—that is,
to other cases—which in some way contain a reference to the initial
entry. To illustrate, assume that only five judicial decisions have
ever been rendered ( those being Able, Baker, Charlie, Daley, and
Evert, in chronological order.) Assume further that the court in
Baker made some mention of the Able decision; that the court in
Daley made some reference to the decisions in Able and Charlie,
but not to that in Baker; and that the court in Evert made refer
ence only to the decision in Baker. Given these assumptions a com
plete citator could be prepared as follows:
Able (initial citation)
. . . Baker (cross-reference to page in Baker which “cites” A ble)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley which “cites” Able)
Baker (initial citation)
. . . Evert ( cross-reference to page in Evert w hich “cites” Baker)
Charlie (initial citation)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley which “cites” Charlie)
Daley (initial citation only)
Evert (initial citation only)
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Salome Jr. v. U.S.,
395 F2d 990
(CA-6, 1968)
Prentice-Hall

Commerce
Clearing House

The Lawyers
Co-Operative
Publishing Company
Prentice-Hall

Harris v. Comm.,
340 US 106
(1950)
Harris v. Comm.,
71 S. Ct. 181 (1950 )

Salome Jr. v. U.S.,
22 AFTR2d 5039

Harris v. Comm.,
39 AFTR 1002
Harris v. Comm.,
1950-2 USTC ¶10, 786

Harris v. Comm.,
95 L.Ed. 111

Standard Citation

West Publishing
Company

W hittington v. Jones,
96 F. Supp 967
(W.D. Okla., 1951)

Court of Claimsb

West Publishing
Company

Scott v. U.S.,
354 F2d 292
(Ct. Cl., 1965)

Scott v. U.S.,
16 AFTR2d 6087

W hittington v. Jones,
1951-1 USTC ¶9302
Commerce
Clearing House
Prentice-Hall

W hittington v. Jones,
40 AFTR 553
Prentice-Hall

Commerce
Salome Jr. v. U.S.,
___________________________________________________ Clearing House_______ 1968-2 USTC ¶9440

West Publishing
Company

West Publishing
Company

U.S. Government
Printing Office

Publisher

Secondary
Standard Citation

________ ___________________________________

District Courts

Circuit Courts
of Appeal

______________

Supreme Courta

Publisher

Primary
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Charles F. Long,
12 BTA 488
Frank L. Owen,
40 BTA 1377,
Dock 8 7811
(M emo), June 6,
1939, 1939 P-H ¶6530
Mae F. Meurel,
20 TC 614 (1953)
Stephen L. &
Doris M. Morrow,
1967 P-H TC
Memo 67, 242
Stephen L. &
Doris M. Morrow,
26 TCM 1222 (1967)

U.S. Government
Printing Office

Prentice-Hall

U.S. Government
Printing Office

Prentice-Hall

Board of Tax
Appeals

Board of Tax
Appeals
( memorandum
decisions)

Tax Court

Tax Court
( memorandum
decisions)

Prentice-Hallc
Commerce Clearing
Housec

Commerce
Clearing House

Scott v. U.S.,
1966-1 USTC ¶9169

aThe Supreme Court Reporter, published by West Publishing Company, is considered primary authority during the period prior to the publi
cation of the official report by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
b Cases decided in the Court of Claims from 1929 to the present are cited to the West publications. Earlier cases are cited to the Court of
Claims Reports published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
cBoth P-H and CCH publish “advance sheets” on all Tax Court decisions. Even though they are never bound, if a person collected and retained
all of the loose-leaf (advance) sheets, he would in effect have the TC reports.

Commerce Clear
ing House

Scott v. U.S.,
173 Ct. Cl. 650
(1965)

U.S. Government
Printing Office

American Federal Tax Reports

United States Tax Cases (1)

COURTS

APPEALS

U.S. Court of Claims Reports

Federal Supplement

U.S. Board of Tax Appeals Reports
-------------------------------------------------------------United States Tax Court Reports (3)

United States Tax Cases (1)

1) From 1913 to 1933 only opinions of genuine precedent value are included from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, District Courts & Court of Claims.
2) Since 1925 the Federal Reporter is published as the Federal Reporter 2d Series.
3) Prior to 1970 this publication was known as Tax Court of the United States Reports.

TAX COURT
Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (P-H)
(regular &
____________________________________
memo decisions) Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (CCH)

BOARD OF
TAX APPEALS
and

OF
Federal Reporter (2)
C L A I M S -------------------------------------------------------------American Federal Tax Reports

COURT

American Federal Tax Reports

COURTS

United States Tax Cases (1)

Federal Supplement

DISTRICT

Federal Reporter (2)

Federal Reporter (2)

United States Tax Cases (1)

American Federal Tax Reports

CIRCUIT

SUPREME
COURT

U.S. Supreme Court Reports

Supreme Court Reporter
„ ------ ---------------------------------------------U.S. Reports_________________________

Publication Summary of Judicial Decisions

Exhibit 4.3

Obviously, there are thousands of judicial decisions and many
thousands of cross-references. Were there no citators (or other
equivalent data retrieval systems), it would be virtually impossible
to locate much of the pertinent judicial authority on most tax ques
tions. With citators available, the task is at least feasible. To illus
trate, consider the problem of interpreting what the words “ordi
nary” and “necessary” mean as they are used in Code Sections 162
and 212. This task was undertaken by the Supreme Court in 1933
in Welch v. Helvering, 290 US 111 (1933). Since that 1933 deci
sion, Welch v. Helvering has been “cited” in more than 300 sub
sequent court decisions. A citator greatly facilitates the task of
locating any or all of these decisions, which just may offer addi
tional perspective on the meaning of the words “ordinary” and
“necessary,” because it identifies a reasonable set of cases to exam
ine further. In most instances, of course, the list of cases suggested
by a citator will be much smaller than the 300 noted here.
Using the Citator. To demonstrate the methodology applied in
searching for pertinent judicial decisions, assume that a tax re
searcher has somehow identified a potentially important case with
a primary citation. If that practitioner has only the USTC or
AFTR reporter series available to him, he must first find an “equiva
lent” secondary citation before he can read the decision he is inter
ested in reviewing. If he has the AFTR series available, he should
begin with the P-H Citator; if he has the USTC series available, he
should begin with the CCH Citator. Each citator will give the
secondary citation for its own reporter series only. The case “names”
(technically called styles) are arranged in alphabetical sequence
in both citators. However, the P-H Citator consists of five separate
volumes, whereas the CCH Citator consists of only one. Thus, in
working with P-H materials, a tax researcher may have to consult
more than one volume if he wants to locate all of the subsequent
decisions that have cited the initial entry. The number of volumes
to be consulted will depend upon the year the initial case was
heard. If a case was first tried sometime between 1796 and 1941,
the researcher using the P-H series must consult all three volumes
of the AFTR series, volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and the looseleaf volume for current citations. On the other hand, if the case
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being examined was first tried sometime between 1948 and 1954,
the researcher would consult only volume 3 of the AFTR series,
volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and the current (loose-leaf) vol
ume. Exhibit 4.4, see below, compares the CCH Citator with the
P-H Citator; exhibit 4.5, opposite, cross-references the P-H Citator to
other judicial reporters.
Exhibit 4.4
Key to Citator Services
Year
Publisher

1796-1941

1941-1948

1948-1954

1954-1967

Since 1967

Prentice-Hall

1st Series
Vol. 1

1st Series
Vol. 2

1st Series
Vol. 3

2nd Series
Vol. 1

Looseleaf

Commerce Clearing
House

Only one loose-leaf volume covering all dates

Any meaningful comparison of these two citator services must go
beyond the apparent convenience factor of working with one CCH
volume as opposed to five P-H volumes because the usefulness of
either citator becomes a function of what the researcher wants to
find. Should he desire to obtain a brief judicial history of a case,
the CCH Citator is a handy research tool. For example, assume that
the researcher wants to trace the history of Germantown Trust Co.
This case came to his attention in a tax periodical, where it was
cited as 309 US 304 (1940). A simple check in the one-volume
CCH Citator, which is arranged in alphabetical order, discloses that
Germantown Trust Co. was originally tried by the Board of Tax Ap
peals in 1938 and entered as a memorandum decision; this decision
was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and in turn was
reversed by the Supreme Court (see exhibit 4.6, page 116). In ad
dition, the CCH Citator discloses that Germantown Trust Co. has
subsequently been cited in over twenty additional cases, most re
cently in 1972. All of this information may or may not be pertinent
to the researcher’s tax problem. Finally, of course, the CCH Citator
gives the cross-reference of the case in the USTC series.
To gather this same information through the use of the P-H
Citator, the researcher would proceed along the following lines
(see exhibits 4.7-4.11, pages 117-121). The original citation, Ger
mantown Trust Co., 309 US 304 (1940), discloses the decision year;
thus, the researcher turns to volume 1 of the P-H Citator (17961941) to learn that the Board of Tax Appeals was the court of
114
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Prentice-Hall
Citator Volume:
1919-1941

Volume 1
1942-1948

Volume 2
1949-1953

Volume 3
1954-1967

Volume 1 (2d)

1968-to date

Current Volume

1943-1948
# 4 8 , 167
1-10

—
-

45 to end

Source: John C. Williams, Golden Gate University.

a W here a volum e is split, the break-off page num ber is ind icated in brackets ( —) if know n.

U.S. Board of Tax
Appeals Reports (BTA)
Tax Court Memorandum
Decisions (P-H T C Memo)
United States Tax
Court Reports (T C )

1934-1942

94-110

1-45(629)

1-629

Board of Tax Appeals Memorandum

Decisions (BTA Memo)

1-93

U.S. Court of Claims
Reports (Ct. Cl.)

# 4 8 , 168-54,
205
11-22(85)

—

—

111-127

# 5 4 , 206-76,
253
22-35(438)

—

—

127-144

35(439)-

# 6 7 , 254-

—

—

145-

Federal Reporter (Fed.)
1-300
—
—
—
—
Federal Reporter—
1-123(746)
123-163(286)
163-205(73)
205-285
2862d Series ( F2d)
Federal Supplement
1-41(907)
41-72(925)
72-112
113-188
189(F. Supp.)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

American Federal
1-27
28-35
36-43
44-52
—
Tax Reports (AFTR) ___________________________________________________________________________ _ ______________________________
American Federal Tax
—
—
—
1-6
7Reports—2d Series ( AFTR2d)
U.S. Supreme
1-313(450)
313-332(126)
332-345
346-364
365Court Reports (US)

Judicial
Reporter Volumesa
Years covered

Exhibit 4.5
Extended Key to Prentice-Hall Citator Volumes

Exhibit 4.6
CCH Citator Page

116

Exhibit 4.7
P-H Citator— Volume 1 for AFTR Series (1919-1941)

117

Exhibit 4.8
P-H Citator— Volume 2 for AFTR Series (1941-1948)

118

Exhibit 4.9
P-H Citator— Volume 3 for AFTR Series (1948-1954)

119

Exhibit 4.10
P-H Citator— Volume 1 for AFTR— 2d Series (1954-1967)

120

Exhibit 4.11
P-H Citator— Loose-Leaf Volume for AFTR— 2d Series (Since 1967)
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original jurisdiction, which tried the case twice. Furthermore, the
P-H Citator shows that the BTA decision was reversed by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals and that the text of the Supreme Court
decision may be found at 23 AFTR 1084. Whether that decision
sustained or reversed the circuit court cannot be determined from
the citator. Additional cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has
been cited are listed but, in order to compile a more complete list
ing, all live citator volumes must be consulted, that is, volumes 2
and 3 of the AFTR series, volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and
finally the loose-leaf edition covering cases since 1967.
It should be apparent that the CCH Citator is the more conveni
ent source for locating a particular case in order to determine its
original trial court, to trace its history through the appeals courts,
and finally to compile a summary of cases in which the decision was
subsequently cited. However, in the case of Germantown, the mul
tiple-volume P-H Citator, in the aggregate, discloses a larger num
ber of cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited than
does the one-volume CCH Citator. Furthermore, the P-H Citator
features several other advantages not to be found in the CCH
Citator, which may be of considerable importance to the careful
tax researcher. Most of these advantages will assist the tax adviser
in the process of assessing potential tax authority and thus a de
tailed discussion of these desirable features will be deferred until
the following chapter.

Editorial Interpretations
The sheer bulk and complexity of the tax statutes make it hu
manly impossible for any individual to understand all of the rules
and regulations pertinent to a tax practice. Fortunately, the tax
practitioner has at his disposal a variety of editorial interpretations
ranging from extensive loose-leaf tax services to brief explanations
in professional journals and pamphlets, much of which is invaluable
to an efficient tax practice.
Tax Services

Perhaps the most significant assistance is available through a sub
scription to one or more major tax services. Tax services are de
signed to help quickly locate statutory, administrative, and judicial
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authority and to give helpful editorial interpretations of those pri
mary authorities. The various tax services constantly update the
information they provide. Subscribers are regularly informed of
changes in the statute or regulations, new court decisions and rev
enue rulings, and other pertinent matters. Nothing is more embar
rassing to a practitioner than to plan a tax strategy with an outdated
authority. Current subscription tax services are a tremendous time
saving device that the tax practitioner can ill afford to be without.
A practitioner usually begins his research with the service with
which he is most familiar. Dependence upon one service, however,
can become detrimental. Each service is compiled and maintained
by editors with divergent approaches to solving the same tax prob
lem. Consequently, each service develops a distinct interpretive
personality. While the salesman representing the publisher may
believe that his product is adequate by itself, the experienced re
searcher will discover that, because of their unique features, most
tax services really complement each other.
The key to utilizing each tax service effectively lies in the mastery
of its index systems. Access to materials in individual services may
be gained through code section numbers, topical references, or
both. To demonstrate the individuality of indexes of at least two
frequently used tax services, assume the following fact situation. An
immediate family member of an important client has become the
victim of a political kidnapping. A sizable ransom is demanded and
eventually delivered for the release of the victim. Subsequently, a
determination must be made as to the deductibility of the ransom
payment. If the tax researcher begins his inquiry with the topical
index of the Prentice-Hall Tax Service, he will find the entry “ran
som money,” with a reference to paragraph 7434. However, para
graph 7434 discusses ransom payments only as they constitute in
come to the extortioner. If the researcher consults the Commerce
Clearing House Index, he will find the notation “Ransom payments,
theft loss deduction,” directing him to paragraph 1571.29 and Rev
enue Ruling 72-112, which allowed a deduction of ransom pay
ments as a theft loss where the taking of money was illegal under
state law and was done with criminal intent.
As one might suspect, Revenue Ruling 72-112 can also be found
in the Prentice-Hall Tax Service under the heading “Theft” and
a subheading “ransom payments as,” with a reference to paragraph
14,407(10). Another key word will bring the same result in the P-H
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service. The heading “Extortion” will lead to the subheading
“money obtained by” and the reference to paragraph 14,407 (10).
The foregoing example is not designed to recommend one par
ticular index and tax service over another; its purpose is to demon
strate the trial-and-error approach necessary to locate pertinent au
thority. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the advisability of having
more than one tax service available.
To further illustrate this point let us continue with the foregoing
example and assume that, instead of representing the family of the
kidnapped victim, the tax adviser is representing the kidnapper
and must determine the tax aspects of the ransom money that he
obtained. In the Commerce Clearing House Index, the heading “ran
som” only leads to the deductibility question. In the Prentice-Hall
index, the term “Ransom money” refers the researcher to para
graph 7434. This citation gives a synopsis of James Rutkin, 343
US 130 (1952), in which the Supreme Court held that money ex
torted without the victim’s consent and through threats of violence
is to be included in gross income. In order to locate this authority
in the Commerce Clearing House Index, the researcher would have
to begin with the key word “extortion,” which would lead to the
heading “Extortion Payment” and the subheading “income from,”
paragraph reference 681.242.
In addition to variations in index systems, each tax service is
known for specific features that may prove to be helpful, depending
upon the research problem in question. A summary of cost, organi
zation, and techniques of supplementation utilized by major tax
service publishers can be found in exhibit 4.12, page 126.19
The following general comments outline some of the features of
each service. Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish
major tax services annually in loose-leaf binders under the titles
Standard Federal Tax Reporter and Federal Taxes, respectively.
In many ways, these two services are similar. Both publications
follow the organization of the Internal Revenue Code. Each major
division begins with a preliminary discussion introducing the sub
ject in general terms; subdivisions include exact quotations of the

19 The source for exhibits 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 is Charles Van Raimond, “CPA
Tax Libraries in Texas—Their Content and Use” (master’s thesis, the Univer
sity of Texas at Austin, 1975).
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code sections and the related Treasury regulations. In addition, each
subdivision contains interpretive explanations by the editorial staff
and brief synopses of related court decisions, revenue rulings, and
revenue procedures. Each service also features a separate volume
containing the most recent developments regarding statutory, ad
ministrative, and judicial authority.
Mertens’s tax service, entitled Law of Federal Income Taxation
(Chicago: Callaghan and Co.), is organized on a topical basis and,
therefore, does not follow the sequence of the code.20 The separate
loose-leaf volumes of Mertens’s service can be divided into two
groupings: (1) the treatise volumes, each volume containing schol
arly discussions of the various tax topics (statutory, administrative,
and judicial authorities are cited in footnote form) and (2) volumes
containing the Internal Revenue Code, a code commentary, Treas
ury regulations, and various rulings and procedures. Although the
code commentary volumes do not feature complete texts of the com
mittee reports, the editorial summaries do provide historical back
ground and suggest the apparent congressional intent for many sec
tions. The ruling volumes comprised revenue rulings, revenue pro
cedures, and miscellaneous announcements beginning with 1954.
These volumes embody an efficient index system that, in addition
to showing the current status of revenue rulings, assists in identify
ing all rulings issued in connection with a particular Internal Rev
enue Code section. Because of its encyclopedic approach to the sub
ject matter, the Mertens service is especially helpful to the indi
vidual with limited knowledge of the topic to be researched. Due
to its scholarly excellence, Mertens is cited in court opinions.
Perhaps one weakness of Mertens is the fact that revised and
new material is organized on a cumulative basis and appears in the
front of each volume. This makes it somewhat cumbersome to lo
cate the most recent developments on any particular topic. Further
more, the revision process of Mertens occurs less frequently than
that of Commerce Clearing House or Prentice-Hall.
Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (9 vols.), by Jacob
Rabkin and Mark H. Johnson (New York: Matthew Bender, Inc.)
is a loose-leaf tax service organized by subject rather than by code

20See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation (Chi
cago: Callaghan and Co., 1969).
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Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey
07632

Callaghan & Co.
6141 N. Cicero Ave.
Chicago, Ill.
60646

Federal
Tax
Service

Mertens
Law of
Federal
Taxation

2$510

$417

Commerce Clearing
House, Inc.
4025 W. Peterson Ave.
Chicago, Ill.
60646

Research Institute
of America
589 Fifth Ave.,
New York, New York
10017

Tax
Coordinator

$195

$475

1$627

Cost*

Standard
Federal
Tax
Reports

Rabkin and
Johnson,
Matthew Bender & Co.
235 E. 45th St.
Federal
Income, Gift New York, New York
10017
and Estate
Taxation

Publisher

Tax Service

Indexed by topic and code
section. Tables of court
decisions, regs., and rulings.
Organized by code section.

Indexed by code section
and key-words.
Organized by code
section.

Weekly

Checklist
every 2 weeks.
Alternate
weeks—“Bi-weekly
Alert.”

16 loose-leaf volumes;
including IRC, regs., rulings,
and court decisions, editorial
analysis and comment, and a citator.
2Covers income, estate and gift,
and excise taxes.
7 loose-leaf volumes;
including statements of law and
comments, footnoted to IRC, regs.,
rulings, and court decisions on each
page; managerial approach generally.

Indexed by topic (Vol.
12), and “Tables” (Vol. 11)
converting IRC and cases to
Mertens paragraph numbers.
Sequenced according to
Mertens paragraph numbers.

Bi-monthly permanent
supplements; other
months current matters
such as cases,
rulings, etc.

Rulings and
regs. supplemented
monthly; treatise
volumes supplemented
quarterly.

40 volumes; including
treatise, IRC, IRC commentary
regs; rulings, all as amended.
Treatise volume cross-references
material to all above-mentioned
volumes.

Master key-word
Index in Volume 1;
organized by code
section.

10 volumes; first six deal
with tax topics, next four are IRC &
legislative history of code sections.
Spotlight on commentary, but
references included in body of text,
rather than as footnotes.

Weekly

16 loose-leaf volumes,
including IRC, regs., rulings,
and court decisions, editorial
analysis and comment, and a citator.
1Covers income, estate and gift,
and excise taxes.

Indexed by topic, code
section, tables of
cases and rulings.
Organized by topic.

Supplementation

Content of Complete Set

Index & Organization

Exhibit 4.12
Tax Services
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Institute for
Business Planning
2 West 13th St.
New York, New York
10017

1231 24th St. N.W.
Washington, D C.
20037

Bureau of National

Publisher

$156

3$607

Cost*

26 new or
revised portfolios
and 26 memorandums
issued annually.
Updated monthly.
Updated by
monthly
memorandums.

Series of portfolios dealing
with specific code sections and/or
procedural matters. Each portfolio
includes a detailed analysis,
working papers section
and bibliography.
Oriented toward tax
planning. Covers tax strategy,
accounting, corporate tax
planning, investments, misc.
items, research aids.

Indexed by topic, code
section and key-words.
Bibliography at the end
of each portfolio is
referenced to other
services & sources.
Indexed by topics,
paragraph number; also
code section and regs.
Tables organized
by broad topics.

Supplementation

Content of Complete Set

Index & Organization

1Price is for a com bination of incom e, estate a nd gift, a nd excise tax services on a one year contract. If purchased on a two year contract, the price w ould be $564
per year. E ach service may be purchased separately at the following prices:
Incom e
$396 for a one year contract or $360 per year for a tw o year contract.
E state a nd Gift
$102 for a one year contract or $ 84 per year for a tw o year contract.
Excise
$ 72 for a one year contract—no reduction for a tw o year contract.
P rentice-H all also has a three-volum e bo u n d citato r w hich m ay be purchased for an additional $15/volum e.
2Price is for a com bination of incom e, estate a n d gift, and excise tax services on a one year contract. If purchased on a tw o year contract, the price w ould be $465
p er year. E ach service m ay be p urchased separately at the follow ing prices:
Incom e
$385 for a one year contract or $350 per year for a tw o year contract.
E state and G ift
$ 85 for a one year contract or $ 75 per year for a tw o year contract.
Excise
$ 70 for a one year contract or $ 65 p er year for a tw o year contract.
T h e incom e and excise tax services m ay be p urchased together for $390 on a tw o y ear contract.
3Price is for a com bination of U .S.-incom e, estate a n d gift, and foreign incom e tax services on a one year contract. If contract is for a renew al, the price w ould be
$552. E ach service m ay be purchased separately at the following prices:
U .S .-Incom e
$369-new ; $337 for a renew al
E state a nd Gifts
$138-new ; $126 for a renew al
Foreign Incom e
$255-new ; $233 for a renew al
or in various com binations a t the following prices:
U .S .-Incom e and E state and Gifts
$452-new ; $411 for a renew al
U .S .-Incom e and Foreign Incom e
$523-new ; $476 for a renew al
E state a nd Gifts a n d Foreign Incom e
$310-new ; $284 for a renew al
*Prices show n are accurate as of Jan u ary 15, 1975 and subject to change w ithout notice. Interested parties should consult publishers.

Tax
la nnmg
P

Tax
Management

Tax Service

section. For example, all material dealing with partnerships is found
in one cumulative discussion. The Internal Revenue Code and the
Treasury regulations are published in separate volumes. One of the
outstanding features of the Rabkin and Johnson service is the avail
ability of the legislative committee reports, which are interspersed
in the Internal Revenue Code volumes.
The Research Institute of America, Inc., (RIA) publishes Tax
Coordinator, a compilation of professional tax research. The service
is divided into twenty-four separate divisions identified by a let
tered tab card. Each division begins with an explanation of all prob
lems in a given area, supported with citations to appropriate author
ities. Next is the text of the applicable code section and Treasury
regulation. Explanations of latest developments appear immediately
following the verbatim reprints of the code and regulations. Edito
rial explanations include illustrations, planning points, tax traps, and
appropriate recommendations.
The Bureau of National Affairs publishes a portfolio tax service
entitled Tax Management. At present the total service consists of
some 150 portfolios that range in length from 50 to 200 pages. Each
portfolio deals with a specific tax topic. The organization of the
material within each portfolio follows a standard pattern. Part
(A ) contains a detailed analysis of the subject matter. This analysis
is written in narrative form, with extensive footnotes to statutory,
administrative, and judicial authority. The format of discussion lends
itself to research progressing from general backgrounds through
specific problems within the topic under consideration. Part (B)
provides helpful working papers, appropriate forms, and illustrations
and part (C ) includes a bibliography of related resource material.
Previously noted were two special judicial reporter series,
namely, the Commerce Clearing House USTC series and the
Prentice-Hall AFTR series. To some extent, the cases appearing
in these series are “selected” by editorial staffs. In addition, the
editors prepare “headnotes” for each case published. Headnotes
enumerate the issue(s) contained in each case in brief form and
give the court’s conclusion. Thus, a researcher may gain a quick
understanding of the general subject matter of each case included
in either series by simply scanning the headnotes. The researcher
must remember, however, that the headnotes are in effect editorial
comments and not an integral part of any official opinion.
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The decision to subscribe to only one tax service or to several
must be made on the basis of how many services a practice can
support. However, the tax adviser should keep in mind that, just as
two heads are better than one, two or more tax services can increase
effectiveness. The real benefit of any tax service lies in the time
saving factor which allows the tax practitioner to quickly find a
correct answer to his tax question. However, time constraints in a
tax practice make it impossible to consult all available services on
every problem. Anticipation of which service will most efficiently di
rect research to an acceptable solution comes only with experience.
Books

The economics of a tax practice demand that the researcher find
solutions quickly and without excessive cost to the client. Conse
quently, a tax adviser cannot afford the luxury of pulling a fulllength book from the shelf and spending a day or two pursuing
the subject in leisurely fashion. However, a survey of CPA tax libra
ries in Texas disclosed that practitioners considered some tax refer
ence books to be invaluable in their tax practice. The three most
frequently mentioned books are Federal Income Taxation of Corpo
rations and Shareholders, third edition (Boston: Warren, Gorham
and Lamont, 1971), by Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice; On
Partnership Taxation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) by Arthur
B. Willis; and The Consolidated Tax Return: Principles, Practice,
Planning, second edition (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont,
1973), by Jack Crestol, Kevin M. Hennessey, and Anthony P. Rua.21
Their special status implies that they contain information discussed
and summarized in a fashion not elsewhere available.
Numerous tax institutes and seminars are held annually through
out the United States. At such institutes, tax topics are discussed
and papers are presented that usually deal with significant current
issues. Three very popular tax institutes—the New York University
Tax Institute, the University of Southern California Tax Institute,
and the Tulane Tax Institute—publish their proceedings in annual
bound volumes. Because of the emphasis on current and complex
topics, tax researchers may benefit from consulting such materials.
21Charles Van Raimond, “CPA Tax Libraries,” p. 23.

129

Tax Magazines

More than a dozen magazines are currently published dealing
exclusively with taxation and providing valuable assistance to the
tax practitioner. Their formats range from those appealing to the
general tax practitioner to those specializing in a particular field of
taxation. For example, the Journal of Taxation features regular de
partments dealing with corporations, estates, trusts and gifts, exempt
institutions, partnerships, and so on. The Tax Adviser, published
monthly by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
is another popular tax journal for the general practitioner. A rela
tively new periodical, the Journal of Real Estate Taxation, would
obviously appeal most to the tax practitioner whose practice in
cludes numerous clients with real estate problems.
To locate pertinent articles in the periodical tax literature, a re
searcher may consult the cumulative indexes provided in the various
issues. A more efficient means of locating journal material is through
CCH Tax Articles, a three-volume service including a topical index,
a code section index, and an author’s index. The P-H tax service
index volume also contains an “Index to Tax Articles” that is organ
ized by topic using the P-H paragraph index system. For a complete
list of available tax magazines that may assist the tax researcher see
exhibit 4.13, page 132.22
Tax Newsletters

Most tax newsletters are published weekly and are, therefore,
excellent sources of the most recent developments. They keep the
tax adviser in touch with the dynamics of the tax laws. Occasionally,
in scanning a newsletter, a practitioner will spot an item that has
relevance to a client’s problem. More often, however, the newsletter
simply provides the practitioner with ideas that may be recalled and
used in later work. See exhibit 4.14, page 134, for a comprehensive
listing of the available publications.23
How many technical publications a tax adviser should purchase is,
of course, an individual decision. Many publications duplicate in
formation and reading all of them would demand too much of a
tax adviser’s valuable time. The decision must, therefore, be based
22 Raimond, “CPA Tax Libraries.”
23 Ibid.
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on the size and nature of the practice. The larger the firm, the more
varied the personalities, and the greater the areas of specialization
represented, the greater the variety of subscriptions required.
Computer Assisted Tax Research

Mead Data Central, Inc., has developed a computer storage and
retrieval system which is likely to have a far-reaching impact upon
future tax research. This system, marketed under the trade name
LEXIS, is useful in situations where authority is scarce and a man
ual search could have overlooked appropriate authority. The inher
ent speed of the computer also makes the LEXIS system invaluable
in situations where authority is voluminous and access must be
obtained quickly. The system is thorough and accurate when used
by a knowledgeable tax practitioner.
The researcher subscribing to the LEXIS data base communicates
with the computer through a terminal (possibly installed in his
office) that is connected via telephone lines to the central computer
in Dayton, Ohio. Access to the information stored in the computer
memory is accomplished through “key-words-in-context.” The re
searcher must select the words (or phrases) likely to be found in
the original text of any authority that might be pertinent to the
problem at hand. The computer scans all of the documents in its
file and indicates via the terminal video screen the number of docu
ments it has that include the selected words. The user may then
narrow or expand his original key-word selection, depending upon
the computer response. If he uses key words that are too common,
the computer simply will have too many entries to justify his look
ing at each of them. If he uses key words that are too restrictive,
the computer will overlook authority that may be pertinent to his
problem. For example, if the researcher entered only the words
“personal residence” and “sale of,” the computer would be likely to
locate 500 to 1,000 citations which contain those common words.
In order to reduce the number of documents to be examined, the
researcher might add the specific phrase “taxpayer 65 or over” and
may find that this addition reduces the number of available docu
ments substantially. Complementing this request with “primary resi
dence” may bring the number of applicable documents down to an
even more manageable size. When the search has been sufficiently
narrowed, the complete text of actual documents can then be re131
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13

41.60

12

National Tax
Journal

Oil and Gas Tax
Quarterly

The Practical
Accountant

42

17

12

28

The Journal of
Real Estate
Taxation
Journal of Taxation

The Monthly Digest
of Tax Articles

4

28

The Journal of
Corporate Taxation

12

4

4

12

4

4

$18

Estate Planning

Issues
Per Year

Cost*

Magazine
Journal of Taxation
P.O. Box 2721
Tampa, Florida 33601
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
Journal of Taxation
P.O. Box 2721
Tampa, Florida 33601
Research and Documenta
tion Corp.
14 Plaza Road
Greenvale, N.Y. 11548
National Tax Assn. &Fund for
Public Policy Research
Suite 805
1730 M St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Matthew Bender & Co.
1275 Broadway
Albany, N.Y. 12201
Institute for Continuing
Professional Development
964 3rd Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10022

Publisher

Exhibit 4.13
Tax Magazines

Includes selected articles on
taxation for the general
practitioner.

Specialized coverage of oil
and gas taxation topics.

Tax policy orientation; frequent
theoretical economic analysis.

Digest of tax articles published
in various magazines.

Comprehensive coverage of
current tax developments.

Tax planning with emphasis on
real estate transactions.

Specialized estate planning
Corporate tax planning articles
by tax practitioners.

coverage.

Coverage
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36

10

13.75

15

24

18

20

24

The Tax Adviser

The Tax Executive

Tax Law Review

The Tax Lawyer

Taxation for
Accountants

Taxation for Lawyers

Taxes—The Tax
Magazine

Trusts and Estates

12

12

6

12

4

4

4

12

4

American Bar Assn. Section
of Taxation
1705 DeSales St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Journal of Taxation
125 East 56 St.
New York, N.Y. 10022
Journal of Taxation
P.O. Box 2721
Tampa, Florida 33601
Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
4025 West Peterson Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60646
Communication Channels, Inc.
461 Eighth Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10001

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
American Institute of CPA’s
1211 Ave. of Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036
Tax Executives Institute
Suite 812
425 13th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111

General coverage of tax
topics for the accountant in
general tax practice.
General coverage of tax
topics for the lawyer in
general tax practice.
Selected articles covering current
tax developments, includes section
dealing with tax laws.
Specialized emphasis on
estate and trust taxation
and estate planning.

Current tax developments,
estate planning techniques,
tax practice management.
In-depth articles of particular inter
est to corporate tax executives writ
ten by tax professionals, scholars,
and management executives.
Usually contains 2-3 in-depth
articles on particularly complex
areas of taxation, also has
“Selected Tax Readings”—
synopsis of 7-9 recently pub
lished articles and books.
In-depth coverage of tax topics
for the lawyer in tax practice.

Includes articles dealing with
taxation topics in real estate.

*Prices shown are accurate as of January 15, 1975, and subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers for latest
prices.

28

The Real Estate
Review

134
36

36

28

28

45

Kess Tax Practice
Report

Kiplinger Tax Letter

Matthew Bender
Tax Letter

Non-Profit Organiza
tion Tax Letter
18

24

26

24

24

52

24

J. K. Lasser
Tax Report

26

27

Estate, Trust and
Gift Taxes
Interpreted
Federal Taxes
Report Bulletin

26

36

365

467

Estate Planning
Ideas

12

52

Issues
Per Year

60

$ 60

Accountant’s
Weekly Report

Acquisitions, Dispo
sitions and Distri
butions
Daily Tax Report

Cost*

Newsletter

Business Reports, Inc.
1 West Ave.
Larchmont, N.Y.
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
The Kiplinger Washington
Editors
1729 H St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Matthew Bender & Co.
1275 Broadway
Albany, N.Y. 12201
Organization Management Inc.
Box 9902
Washington, D.C. 20015

Alexander Hamilton Institute
235 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10017
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
1231 25th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Institute for Business Planning
2 New York Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10004
Alexander Hamilton Institute
235 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10017
Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632

Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632

Publisher

Exhibit 4.14
Tax Newsletters
Coverage

Current developments in taxation
as may affect tax exempt
organizations.

General coverage of current
developments in taxation.

General coverage of day to day
tax problems; emphasis on tax
planning.
General coverage of major tax
developments.

Weekly reprint of bulletin sent to
tax service subscribers; general
coverage of weekly developments,
some planning ideas.
General coverage of tax
developments.

Report on current developments
in estate, trust, and gift taxation.

Current developments in govern
ment regulations, accounting prac
tices, and taxation of businesses.
Tax implications of mergers,
acquisitions, dispositions, and
distributions.
Summary and analysis of
developments in taxation and
finance for preceding 24 hours.
Report on tax aspects of
estate planning.
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68

21
45

60

58

60

60

38.50

20

75

Tax Barometer

The Tax Consultant

Tax Notes

Tax Planning Ideas

Tax Report of
Banking and Trusts

Tax Research
Institute
a) Bi-weekly alert
b) Planning Report
Tax Wrap-Up

Taxes Interpreted

Taxes on Parade

U.S. Tax Week
52

52

26

26 ea.
( sent alter
nately—
52 total)
24

24

24

52

12

26

12

Matthew Bender & Co.
1275 Broadway
Albany, N.Y. 12201

Tax Wrap-Up
14 Plaza Road
Greenvale, N.Y. 11548
Alexander Hamilton Institute
235 E. 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10017
Commerce Clearing House
4025 W. Peterson Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60646

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
Federal Publications
1725 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
National Tax Training School
Monsey, N.Y. 10952
Tax Analysts and Advocates
732 17th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Institute for Business Planning
2 New York Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10004
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
89 Beach St.
Boston, Mass. 02111
Research Institute of America
509 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10019

*Prices shown are accurate as of January 15, 1975 and subject to change without notice.

36

Real Estate Tax
Ideas

Interprets and analyzes
current developments in
taxation.
Weekly reprint of report sent
to tax service subscribers;
general coverage of weekly
developments.
Digest and commentary of
current tax developments.

Current tax developments written
with emphasis on tax planning.
Also tax return guides and
opportunity checklists.
Current developments in
taxation.

Current tax developments
concerned with banks and trusts.

Tax ideas for future business
planning.

Tax analysis prepared by a
public interest firm.

Emphasis on individual taxation.

Tax analysis of real estate
transactions for real estate
professionals.
Digest and analysis of current
tax developments.

trieved on the video screen and, if necessary, printed out in hard
copy. The critical difference between a computer search and a
manual search is in the key words. Successful retrieval in the com
puter system depends upon the correct identification of key words
actually used in a tax authority; in the manual system it depends
upon identification of the key word selected by the preparer of an
index.24 Nevertheless, experience with one system is usually helpful
in the other.
At the present time the LEXIS data bank includes the following
documents:
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended)
Final, temporary, and proposed Treasury regulations pertaining to
the code
The Cumulative Bulletins beginning in 1954
Tax Court decisions from 1942
Tax Court memorandum decisions from 1968
Tax cases decided by the district courts from 1970
Tax cases decided by the Court of Claims from 1942
Tax cases decided by the courts of appeals from 1945
Tax cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1913
Public laws beginning with the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
House, Senate, and Conference committee reports associated with
the 1954 code and amendments to the code
Ultrafiche

Maintaining a complete tax library often requires expensive of
fice space. To partially alleviate the space problem, Commerce
Clearing House has employed an ultrafiche technique to reproduce
up to 1,700 pages on a single four-by-six-inch transparent plastic
card. These cards are read on viewers, similar to those used with
24 The LEXIS terminal can also access the accounting data banks of the AICPA’s
National Automated Accounting Retrieval System (NAARS). This system
operates through Mead Data Central’s research service and gives the user
access to a data bank containing complete accounting information on over
6,000 corporate annual reports, Accounting Research Bulletins, Accounting
Principles Board Opinions, Statements on Auditing Standards and all future
pronouncements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Detailed in
formation can be obtained from the Information Retrieval Department of the
AICPA.
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microfilm, which may be equipped with printing capacity. At the
present time the following texts have been reproduced by CCH
using this technique:
Original Publisher
Board of Tax Appeals Report (1924-1942)
United States Tax Court Reports (1943-present)
Cumulative Bulletins (1919-present)
United States Tax Court ( 1913-present)
Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (1943-present)

GPO
GPO
GPO
CCH
CCH

This entire collection of ultrafiche plastic plates is filed in CCH
loose-leaf binders and requires less than one foot of shelf space.
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5
. . . as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning
of a sentence may be more than that of the separate
words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no
degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to
the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively
create.
JUDGE LEARNED HAND

Assessing and
Applying Authority
After a tax researcher has located authority that seems pertinent
to his problem, the important task of assessing that material begins.
His aim is to arrive at a course of action that he can confidently
communicate to his client along with identification of the risks and
costs accompanying it.
Locating appropriate authority for a particular tax problem is
only half the battle. The technical jargon of many portions of the
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations requires the tax
adviser to read and comprehend unusually complex sentences in
order to determine congressional intent; other portions of the code
and regulations hinge upon deceptively simple words or phrases
whose definitions may be debatable. Furthermore, while available
secondary authorities or such interpretive sources as Treasury regu
lations, revenue rulings, or court decisions may be more compre
hensible than are primary statutory authorities, they are frequently
less authoritative.
The researcher faces another, more serious hurdle when author
ities conflict. The applicable law may be questionable due to con
flicts between statutes or between interpretations of those statutes,
between the IRS interpretations and various federal courts, and
139

among the courts themselves at various levels of jurisdiction. Fin
ally, a researcher may be unable to locate any authority at all on a
particular problem.
In attempting to assess authority and apply it to complex practice
problems, the researcher may encounter any one of four funda
mentally different situations. The first involves clear, concise tax
law that could be applied if the researcher were able to gather ad
ditional facts from his client. In two other circumstances, the ad
viser may be in possession of clearly established facts but finds (1)
conflicting statutes or (2) conflicting interpretations of those sta
tutes. Finally, a researcher may encounter a fourth situation in
which existing tax law is incomplete or inapplicable, requiring him
to resolve issues through interpolation from related authorities and
application of creative thinking.
The Law Is Clear— the Facts Are Uncertain
A tax adviser frequently finds it difficult to reach a conclusion
and to make a recommendation more because of insufficient knowl
edge of the facts in the case than because of confusion in the ap
plicable rules. In many situations, the biggest single problem is
gathering sufficient evidence to support the taxpayer’s contention
that he be granted the tax treatment clearly authorized in a specific
provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
To illustrate this kind of problem, assume that a client, Mr. Jerry
Hill, includes what he describes as a “$16,000 casualty loss” with
the information he provides for the filing of his income tax return.
A cursory line of questioning by his tax adviser reveals that the loss
is claimed for a handwoven Indian wall carpet that, the client
claims, was chewed and clawed to bits by a stray dog. Mr. Hill ex
plains that while on vacation last summer, he left his residence in
the care of his housekeeper. Apparently one day the housekeeper
neglected to close a door securely and a stray dog wandered into the
house. Upon the Hills’ return from vacation, they were told the fol
lowing story. Attracted by strange noises, the housekeeper entered
the study and found a dog gnawing and tearing on the wall rug. As
the housekeeper entered the room, the dog turned and ran growling
from the house. Although not certain of it the housekeeper reported
noticing foam around the dog’s mouth. Later a neighbor said that a
rabid dog had been seen roaming the neighborhood. The house
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keeper, who eared for Hill’s own dogs, stated that the dog discov
ered in the study was not one of Mr. Hill’s. Mr. Hill checked with
the city dogcatcher concerning the reported sighting of a mad dog.
He was, however, unable to confirm any such report with the dog
catcher. He did not check with the police department.
Through a little research, the tax adviser is convinced that in or
der for Mr. Hill to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under
Section 165(a) he must satisfy the following specific requirements:
1. The loss must have been sudden and unexpected. (Matheson
v. Commissioner, 54 F2d 537 (CA-2, 1931).)
2. The loss could not constitute a mysterious disappearance.
(Paul Bakewell, Jr., 23 TC 803 (1955).)
3. The amount of the loss deduction is limited to fair market
value (FMV) immediately before the casualty occurred, less
the FMV immediately after the casualty, less any insurance
recovery, and less a $100 floor. (Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.165-7(b).)
4. The loss could not be attributable to the taxpayer’s own dog.
(J. R. Dyer, 20 TCM 705 (1961).)
At this point a tax adviser would be faced with two alternatives:
he could accept his client’s statement at face value and claim the
deduction, or he might suggest that the client accumulate additional
substantiation of the loss if he desires to claim the deduction. If an
adviser follows the former alternative he is simply postponing the
collection of evidence until a possible audit by the IRS, because the
presence of a rather sizable casualty loss on a client’s tax return
undoubtedly would increase the risk of an audit. Furthermore, it
might be self-defeating to defer the collection of evidence because
two or three years from now individuals who could render state
ments on matters now fresh in their minds may be unavailable, or
they may not recall necessary details. Furthermore, helpful police
records may be destroyed. Since the taxpayer may be unaware of
what is needed to substantiate the loss deduction, he may, in the
meantime, dispose of important evidence, such as the ruined rug.
If a tax adviser pursues the second alternative, he should present
his client with a list of instructions and suggest that the client ac
cumulate the necessary evidence to support the deduction in the
event of an audit or eventual litigation. The list could include the
following items:
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1. Sworn statements from
(a) the housekeeper and (b) the individual who sighted the
apparently rabid dog in the neighborhood.
2. Appraisal by a qualified expert or experts showing the value
of the rug before and after the casualty.
3. Color photographs of the rug before and after the casualty.
4. Instructions to retain the damaged rug as evidence, if possible.
5. Statements from, or correspondence with, insurance agents
relative to the amount of any insurance recovery.
6. Purchase invoice showing proof of ownership and cost.
A client may ignore an adviser’s request or he may be unable to
obtain all of the evidence recommended. Nevertheless, the adviser
will have informed his client on a timely basis of the requirements
necessary to sustain the right to the deduction claimed.
In tax research work involving situations in which tax laws are
clear but the facts of the situation are in question, it behooves the
tax adviser to establish the facts necessary to reach a conclusion and
either to accumulate appropriate supporting evidence or to suggest
that his client do so. Then, in the event of an audit, the tax adviser
would have only to persuade a revenue agent to accept the mass
of overwhelming evidence and, therefore, to reach the conclusion
desired.
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Questionable
The tax researcher may encounter another kind of problem in
volving situations where facts are well established but the law is
uncertain. Uncertainty may arise either because of conflicting or
ambiguous statutes or because of conflicting interpretations of a sta
tute, the latter of which is the more common.
Conflicting Statutes

Although it is rather rare, the facts of a problem sometimes can
be analyzed in light of two entirely different provisions of the sta
tute, with each provision furnishing a different tax result. It is
reasonable under these circumstances for the tax adviser to report
the transactions under that section of the Internal Revenue Code
that would produce the lowest tax liability for his client. In this
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situation the adviser and his client should be prepared for a possible
IRS challenge.
In Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 TC 562 (1964), the Tax Court
was faced with an apparent conflict in statutory authority. The facts
of that case reveal that a taxpayer transferred stock in two compa
nies that he owned to a third corporation in exchange for that cor
poration’s stock and “boot” (cash). After the transfer, the taxpayer
owned more than 82 percent of the third corporation’s stock. Ac
cordingly, the taxpayer treated the transaction as a nontaxable trans
fer under Section 351, with “boot” received in the transfer taxable
as a capital gain. The government, on the other hand, claimed that
Section 304 was controlling. Having to choose one of these statutory
provisions, the Tax Court said in part:
Both parties present a multiplicity of arguments as to which sec
tion controls. If section 351 controls, the gain is to be taxed as a
capital gain. If section 304 controls, then the gain is to be taxed as
a capital gain or the $64,850 cash payment is to be taxed as a divi
dend, depending upon the relevant parts of section 302.

• • • •
We have no reason to believe that Congress had any intent with
regard to the fact pattern of this case. However, the statements in
sections 301(a) and 302(d), “except as otherwise provided in this
chapter [or subchapter]” of the Code, indicate that Congress made
the policy decision that dividend treatment will result from the
application of section 302 only if no other provision in the relevant
parts of the Code requires other treatment. Section 351 has no such
limitation. That section is, by its terms, applicable. That section
provides for tax treatm ent of the payment in question in a manner
other than and different from the distribution treatment provided
for by sections 302(d) and 301. Consequently, the very words of
the latter sections preclude dividend treatm ent in this case.1

The rather dubious conclusion reached by the Tax Court rests
importantly on a very careful reading of the code. It suggests, in
fact, that no statutory conflict exists even though the net result
seems clearly to be inconsistent with the general intent of Section
304. Fortunately, conflicting statutory authority is rare; when it is
discovered, however, the taxpayer should be prepared to litigate his
1Henry McK. Haserot, 41 TC 562 (1964).
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right to rely on the more advantageous provision.
In a few instances, the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code
anticipated the possible application of two provisions of the statute
to the same fact situation and provided a statutory resolution of the
conflict. For example, Section 3 6 8 (a )(2 )(A ) explicitly provides
that a corporate reorganization that satisfies both the rules of a type
C and a type D reorganization, shall be treated as a type D reorgan
ization only. Unfortunately, not all conflicts in the statutes are so
easily resolved.
Conflicting Interpretations

A tax researcher more frequently encounters conflicting interpre
tations of tax statutes by various authorities. Conflicts may be found
between the Treasury regulations and the code, between the Treas
ury regulations and the courts, or between two federal courts. In
such situations, the tax adviser must consider the alternatives and
weigh the risks—including the cost of lengthy administrative bat
tles with the IRS and potential litigation—before recommending a
particular conclusion or course of action.2 While it is the responsi
bility of the tax adviser to discover conflicting interpretations of the
statutes and to advise his client of the risks and alternatives, the cli
ent should decide which course of action to pursue. Although only
the client can decide whether to incur the costs of an administrative
or legal confrontation with the IRS, he generally relies heavily on
the recommendation of his tax adviser in reaching that decision.
Other pertinent considerations include the general inconvenience
associated with such disputes, the risk of exposure to additional
audits, and the possibility of adverse publicity.
Regulations Versus Individual Interpretation. During his research
efforts, every tax adviser will form a personal opinion concerning
the validity of specific regulations. Sometimes a tax adviser may have
serious reservations concerning the Treasury’s interpretation of a
statute and may so inform his client. However, to plan a tax strategy
that depends solely on having a particular segment of the Treasury
2For additional discussion of factors to be considered by a CPA in giving tax
advice, see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 8, “Advice to Clients” (New York: Amer
ican Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970).
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regulations declared invalid is certainly a high-risk proposition.
Nevertheless, if all other attempts to sustain a client’s position fail,
legal counsel may advise a taxpayer to challenge the validity of a
Treasury regulation.
In analyzing the validity of a specific regulation, a tax researcher
should determine, among other things, the “age” of that regulation.
Perhaps a life in excess of ten years would categorize a regulation
as “old” and anything short of ten years would warrant the designa
tion “new.” Old regulations—especially those that have been unsuc
cessfully challenged in the courts—should be considered as the equiv
alent of the statute itself. This is especially true if, subsequent to the
unsuccessful court action, Congress revised other segments of the
statute but left unchanged the provision that had been challenged.
An example of a situation in which a regulation was challenged and
later upheld by the courts can be found in Paul J. Ussery.3 In this
instance the taxpayer took issue with the construction of Treas.
Regs. Sec. 1.117-4, which excludes from the terms “fellowship” and
“scholarship” any payments granted for academic work performed
primarily for the benefit of the grantor. Because Congress amended
the Internal Revenue Code subsequent to the Ussery decision but
did not further clarify Section 117, one might assume that Con
gress has given its approval to the court’s interpretation in Ussery.
This conclusion is frequently stated by the court; see, for example,
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 US 79 (1938).
Tax advisers should generally consider “old” regulations that have
never been challenged to be well established. Most attempts to over
turn old regulations through court action would be futile while the
possibility of successfully challenging a “new” regulation is signifi
cantly greater. Before challenging a new regulation, however, the
tax adviser should determine the kind of regulation in question.4 The
likelihood of a successful challenge will be very slim if the regula
tion has been issued under specifically delegated authority. In the
3Paul J. Ussery v. U.S., 296 F2d 582 (CA-5, 1961).
4An example of statutory regulations are those under Sec. 1502, where Con
gress delegated the authority to the Treasury secretary in the consolidated tax
return area. Another example of statutory regulations will be forthcoming
when the Treasury exercises its authority under Section 385 where the secre
tary or his delegate has been granted authority to prescribe regulations that
would offer guidelines for purposes of determining whether an interest in a
corporation is either debt or equity.
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event that a tax adviser feels that a new and previously untested
interpretive regulation construes a statute contrary to the intent
of Congress, he must obtain legal counsel before embarking upon
an all-out battle against the regulation.
Regulations Versus Courts. If a regulation has already been chal
lenged, one of three possible outcomes may exist. First, the Internal
Revenue Service may have lost the challenge and either revised or
withdrawn the contested regulation. Second, the government may
have lost one or more specific tests of the regulation but still be
unwilling to concede defeat. Third, the IRS may have been able
to defend a regulation successfully, and, therefore, further attempts
to challenge that regulation would not hold much promise.
During the sixties, an interesting and prolonged conflict developed
between certain Treasury regulations and a number of court deci
sions beginning in 1954 with the Kintner decision.5 Prior to 1962, selfemployed professionals, who were unable to incorporate under state
law, could not deduct for tax purposes contributions made to profitsharing or pension plans.6 At the same time, a tax deduction for con
tributions to similar plans was available to corporations. In order
to obtain the benefits available to corporations, professional partner
ships attempted to assume the characteristics of associations, which
qualify as corporations for tax purposes. These characteristics were
first established in Morrissey and later adopted in the Treasury
regulations.7
In opposing the classification of professional partnerships as “cor
porate associations,” the commissioner lost numerous court battles.
In an attempt to strengthen its position, the Treasury amended the
regulations barring corporate treatment for unincorporated profes
sional partnerships. This move resulted in the passage of state laws
permitting the formation of professional corporations.
In a further move to strengthen the service’s position, Subsection

5U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F2d 418 (CA-9, 1954).
6 In 1962 the “H.R. 10” or “Keogh” plan was passed by Congress and allowed
self-employed individuals a contribution deduction for retirement plans of
up to the lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of earned income. The amounts
were amended in 1974 to read $7,500 and 15 percent, respectively.
7See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 US 344 (1935), and Treas. Regs. Sec.
301.7701-2.
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(h) was added to Treas. Regs. Sec. 301.7701-2 on February 2, 1965.
Subsection (h ) provided that all professional corporations would be
taxed for federal income tax purposes as partnerships, even if in
corporated under state professional corporation acts. Interested tax
payers declared war on the so-called Kintner regulations and con
sistently won one decision after another.8 The issue was finally set
tled when, on August 8, 1969, the IRS announced that henceforth
organizations formed under state professional corporation acts would
be treated for tax purposes as corporations.9 Unfortunately, however,
the Treasury regulations have not yet been fully amended to reflect
this change of heart by the IRS.
During the time of controversy, tax advisers and their clients
were faced with the options of accepting the Treasury regulations
at face value or of casting their lot with court decisions, which time
after time proved to be successful for the taxpayer. Many taxpayers
were willing to invest time and assume the risk and expense of bat
tling the IRS through administrative appeals procedures and the
courts. While in this instance the final result was favorable to the
taxpayers, in other conflicts taxpayers have been less successful.10
What has been said here concerning conflicting authority be
tween Treasury regulations and judicial opinions is, obviously,
equally applicable to conflicting authority between judicial opinions
and revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other official IRS
pronouncements. While any dispute between the IRS and the courts
is still in progress, taxpayers with similar questions become prime
targets for future litigation if they adopt a position contrary to the
service’s. The service is often looking for a “better” fact case (from
its point of view) or for a more favorable circuit in which to litigate
further. Any time a tax adviser recommends a position contrary to
that of the Internal Revenue Service, even if that contrary position
is adequately supported by judicial authority, the adviser should
also explain to the client the potential risks and extra costs implicit
in taking that position.
8 See, for example, U.S. v. Empey, 406 F2d 157 (CA-10, 1969); O’Neill v.
U.S., 410 F2d 888 (CA-6, 1969); Kurzner v. U.S., 413 F2d 97 (CA-5,
1969).

9TIR No. 1019, Federal Taxes, (P-H, 1969), par. 55, 334.
10 See, for example, B. Foreman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F2d 1144,

(CA-2, 1972), which deals with the creation of income issue under IRC
Sec. 482.
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As far as revenue agents, district conferees, and appellate con
ferees are concerned, the IRS position is the law, and they will chal
lenge a departure from this position. A tax adviser should recom
mend an intentional disregard of the official IRS position only if his
client is aware of the potential disagreement and the possible need
to litigate.
One Court’s Interpretation Versus Another’s. Disagreements be
tween courts on similar issues can be characterized as “horizontal”
and “vertical.” Horizontal differences mean conflicting opinions is
sued by courts at the same level of jurisdiction; vertical differences
refer to conflicts between lower and higher courts. Horizontal dif
ferences can occur between federal district courts, between the Tax
Court and a district court, and between the several circuit courts.
In such conflicts, the service is under no obligation to follow, on a
nationwide basis, the precedent set by either court. Thus, a district
court opinion favorable to the taxpayer would technically have prece
dent value only for a taxpayer residing within the jurisdiction of
that district court. Similarly, any circuit court opinion technically
has precedent value only within the circuit where the decision
originated because one circuit court is not bound to follow the
precedent of another. If appealed, conflicting district court opinions,
from district courts within the same circuit, are settled by the ap
propriate circuit court. The Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari,
settles conflicts between circuits. Prior to the time that a circuit
court or the Supreme Court disposes of such opposing views, the tax
adviser and his client should be fully aware of the risks involved
when relying on a court decision that may subsequently be ap
pealed and overturned.
An interesting example of conflict between courts involves em
ployee expenses for transportation of the tools of one’s trade. Rely
ing on Rev. Rul. 63-100,11 which allowed a musician an automobile
expense deduction for the transportation of his musical instrument
between his personal residence and his place of employment, a tax
payer deducted his driving expenses because he transported a thirtytwo-pound bag of tools to work each day. The Tax Court denied the
deduction; however, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to the Tax Court. On rehearing, the Tax Court allowed 25 per-1
11Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CB 34.
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cent of the total driving expenses claimed by the taxpayer.12 Subse
quently, in Fausner and in Hitt, two airline pilots, who were re
quired by their employers and by government regulations to carry
extensive flight gear, attempted to deduct transportation expenses
between their home and the airport. In Fausner, the Tax Court felt
constrained by the Sullivan decision since Fausner resided in the
Second Circuit, and it allowed the deduction for the 1965 tax year.13
However, because Hitt resided in the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court,
ruling on the same day, disregarded Sullivan and disallowed the
deduction.14 Fausner’s returns for 1966 and 1967 were again chal
lenged by the Internal Revenue Service on the same issue, and
Fausner once more petitioned the Tax Court to rule on the matter.
Although Fausner had resided in New York during 1966 and 1967,
he had moved to Texas in 1968 and was thus petitioning from the
Fifth Circuit in the latter years. In this instance, the Tax Court sus
tained the service as it had done previously in Hitt,15 Fausner ap
pealed to the Fifth Circuit and received an adverse ruling.16 At this
point a conflict between the Second and the Fifth Circuit courts
existed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an appeal
from Fausner.17 The Supreme Court finally settled the controversy
by ruling against the taxpayer.18
The foregoing example demonstrates both horizontal and ver
tical differences in judicial decisions. In horizontal differences, a
taxpayer cannot rely on a decision rendered by another court at the
same level of jurisdiction, because courts at the same level of juris
diction simply are not bound by decisions of other courts at that
same level. Vertical differences are harder to explain because lower
courts generally are bound by decisions of higher courts. In the
case of the Tax Court, however, even vertical differences may exist
because the Tax Court has national jurisdiction. The Tax Court con
12 Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F2d 1007 (CA-2, 1966) and 27 TCM 620
(1971).
13Fausner v. Commissioner, 66 TC 620 (1971).
14 Hitt v. Commissioner, 55 TC 628 (1971).
15 Fausner v. Commissioner, P-H TC Memo para. 71,277.
16Fausner v. Commissioner, 472 F2d 561 (CA-5, 1973).
17Actually the conflict between the circuits involved another decision, in
whioh the court held for the taxpayer (Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F2d 40
(CA-7, 1967)).

18Fausner v. Commissioner, 93 S.Ct. 2820 (1973).
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siders itself bound by the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals
only to the extent that taxpayers reside in the jurisdiction of a cir
cuit court that has rendered a decision on that issue.
Since the Tax Court is not obligated to accept any circuit court
opinion on a nationwide basis, it has ample opportunity to express
its displeasure with a circuit court opinion by disregarding it in fact
cases involving taxpayers from other circuits. Such a result can be
demonstrated with two cases, in which the Tax Court arrived at
opposing conclusions, involving two “50-50” stockholders in the
same Subchapter S corporation where each taxpayer had sued on an
identical issue. In both Doehring19 and Puckett,20 the issue to be
decided revolved around whether or not the two taxpayers’ loan
company had lost its Subchapter S status. The IRS had previously
disallowed the election on the grounds that more than 20 percent
of the corporation’s gross revenue was derived from interest (pas
sive income). The taxpayers, relying on House v. Commissioner,
453 F2d 982 (CA-5, 1972), argued that the ceiling did not apply
to loan companies. The Tax Court ruled against the taxpayer in
Doehring, stating that House did not apply since Doehring would
be appealed to the Eighth Circuit. In Puckett, however, the Tax
Court upheld the taxpayer’s contention, although disagreeing with
it, since appeal would be to the Fifth Circuit in which House was
controlling. The decision leaves both taxpayers in a precarious situ
ation. If Doehring could win his case on appeal to the Eighth Cir
cuit, then two circuit courts will have ruled for the taxpayer, mak
ing the government’s position relatively weak. On the other hand,
if the Eighth Circuit should rule for the government, then two cir
cuit courts’ opposing decisions would increase the possibility that
the Supreme Court may wish to grant certiorari to settle the con
flicting opinions. At this point, either both will come out winners or
both will end up losers.21 Thus, before beginning any appeals pro

19 K. W. Doehring v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. No. 32, 762 (M ), Sept. 10,
1974, TC Memo 1974-234.
20P. E. Puckett v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. No. 32, 763 (M ), Sept. 10, 1974,
TC Memo 1974-235.
21 In the event that the Supreme Court rules against the taxpayer, the gov
ernment may wish to appeal the Puckett decision provided this can be ac
complished on a timely basis. Nevertheless, Puckett’s position in future
years will have to comply with the Supreme Court decision.
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cedures, Doehring must consider the possibility of a loss that would
reverse his fellow stockholder’s present favorable position.
One taxpayer recently tested the commissioner’s right to ignore
established judicial precedent. In that case the IRS sent deficiency
notices to two taxpayers claiming that certain distributions received
from their corporation were dividends. Two stockholders challenged
the deficiency assessment in the Tax Court. While taxpayer Divine’s
suit was pending, the Tax Court ruled against taxpayer Luckman.22
Upon appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.23
The commissioner pressed on with the same position he had taken
in Luckman and obtained another favorable ruling from the Tax
Court in Divine.24 Taxpayer Divine then appealed to the Second
Circuit Court, claiming that where the commissioner is relitigating
an issue that he has previously lost and the facts are distinguishable
only by virtue of the identity of the taxpayer, the commissioner
should be barred from again bringing suit. Although the Second
Circuit Court held for taxpayer Divine, it struck down his conten
tion that the commissioner was prevented from bringing suit.25
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Incomplete
As explained earlier, whenever a statute is silent or imprecise on
a particular tax question, a tax researcher must consult such other
interpretive authorities as Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, or
court decisions. In his search for interpretive material, a tax adviser
soon discovers that finding authority with facts identical to his own
will be the exception rather than the rule. In most circumstances,
therefore, the ability to distinguish cases on the basis of facts be
comes critical, for many times it is necessary to piece together sup
port for the researcher’s position from several authorities.
An illustration of this third class of common tax problems follows.
Assume that a client, an Austrian named Werner Hoppe, presents
the following facts. Werner visited his brother, Klaus, who had
immigrated to the United States six years ago and resides in Dallas,
Texas. At the time of the visit, Werner was under contract to an
Austrian soccer team and was expected to return to the team to
22 Sid Luckman, 50 TC 619 (1968).
23Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F2d 381 (CA-7, 1969).
24 Harold S. Divine, 59 TC 152 (1972).
25 Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F2d 1041 (CA-2, 1974).
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begin play for the fall 1974 season. Werner’s brother Klaus had fallen
in love with American football and had become an enthusiastic fan of
the Dallas Cowboys. The Cowboys had recently lost their regular
kicker, Toni Fritsch, to an injury; and a replacement, picked up on
waivers, proved to be less than satisfactory. Knowing of Werner’s
kicking ability, Klaus was convinced that Werner could help the
Cowboys if given an opportunity. Klaus, therefore, contacted Toni
Fritsch, who is also a former Austrian, and suggested a tryout. Klaus
also took Werner to a Cowboy workout and introduced him to the
kicking coach. As a result of the contact with Toni Fritsch and the
visit with the kicking coach, Werner was given a tryout by the
Cowboys, who were desperate for a good kicker. Werner’s perform
ance was far superior to others at the tryout, and the Cowboys
offered him the kicking job. Werner, however, was reluctant to
accept the offer because he had planned to return to Austria in
a few weeks to continue his soccer career. Considerable encour
agement from Klaus and the Cowboy organization seemed to be
in vain until the Cowboys, at Klaus’s suggestion, offered Werner
a $40,000 bonus. At this point Werner overcame his reluctance
and signed a contract, which Klaus cosigned as witness and inter
preter. Economically speaking, the regular salary offered by the
Cowboys was considerably more attractive than was Werner’s sal
ary as a soccer player in Austria. Grateful to his brother for assist
ing as an interpreter and negotiator, and for encouraging him to
stay, Werner instructed the Cowboys to pay $15,000 of the negoti
ated bonus directly to Klaus. Klaus reported the $15,000 as other
income on his 1974 income tax return and paid the appropriate tax.
After examining Werner’s 1974 tax return, the IRS made a defi
ciency assessment claiming that the $15,000 paid to Klaus consti
tuted income to Werner and should thus be included in his income
under Section 6 1 (a )(1 ). The IRS agent relied at least in part upon
the authority of Richard A. Allen, 50 TC 466 (1968).
After determining the foregoing facts, the tax researcher decides
that, according to the language of Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.61-2 (a )(1 ),
the total bonus payment should be included in Werner’s return. The
regulations specify that, in general, wages, salaries, and bonuses are
income to the recipient unless excluded by law. After additional
research, the tax adviser locates the decision in Cecil Randolph
Hundley, Jr., which appears to contain a similar fact situation.26 In
26 Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr., 48 TC 339, acq. 1967-2 CB 2.
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Hundley, to which the commissioner acquiesced, the taxpayer in
cluded the bonus payments in his income, but he was allowed a
business expense deduction for that portion of the bonus paid to his
father. Before relying solely on the authority of Hundley, the tax
adviser must be certain that the facts of Hundley are in effect sub
stantially similar to Werner’s situation and that the expense of
further negotiations with the IRS is warranted and based on a sound
premise. Thus, the tax adviser will carefully compare the Allen and
Hundley cases with the facts presented by Werner Hoppe. In doing
this the adviser might prepare the following list of facts.
Allen

Hoppe

Hundley

1. Professional base
ball player received
sizable bonus.

1. Professional foot
ball player received
sizable bonus.

1. Professional base
ball player received
sizable bonus.

2. Taxpayer was
amateur prior to
signing contract.

2. Taxpayer was
professional soccer
player prior to sign
ing contract.

2. Taxpayer was
amateur player be
fore signing contract.

3. Parent and ball
playing minor child
signed professional
ball contract.

3. Ballplayer alone
signed contract, but
brother signed as
witness and inter
preter.

3. Parent and ball
playing minor child
signed professional
ball contract.

4. Some bonus pay
ments were actually
made to mother.

4. Some bonus pay
ments were actually
made to brother.

4. Some bonus pay
ments were actually
made to father.

5. Mother knew little
about baseball.

5. Brother had
average knowledge
of football.

5. Father was
knowledgeable in
baseball and taught
his son extensively.

6. Mother was pas
sive participant in
negotiations for con
tract and bonus.

6. Brother was an
active participant in
negotiations for con
tract and bonus.

6. Father handled
most of the negoti
ations for a contract
and bonus.

7. No oral agreement
existed.

7. No oral agree
ment existed.

7. Oral agreement
existed on how to
divide the bonus
payments.
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Because Allen was decided for the government and Hundley for
the taxpayer, it may be important to distinguish the two cases on the
basis of facts. Utilizing a simple diagram technique, we begin with
seven facts identified in each case.
Figure 5.1
Allen

Hundley

Next the researcher should identify those issues that are very simi
lar in both cases, and those that are more readily distinguishable.
Figure 5.2
Allen

Hundley

The second diagram shows that facts one through four are “neutral”
in that they are nearly identical in both cases, and that the impor
tant facts, which perhaps swayed the outcome of the Hundley case
in favor of the taxpayer, appear to be facts five through seven. Com
paring Hundley with Hoppe produces the following result.
Figure 5.3
Hundley

Hoppe

This diagram shows that Hoppe and Hundley agree in facts one,
four, and six only. The following comparison of all three fact situ
ations might provide additional insight for the tax adviser.
Figure 5.4
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This analysis shows that facts one and four are neutral in all
three cases and perhaps should not be considered to have an impact
upon the final outcome. Fact two, dealing with the professional
status of Hoppe, which can be distinguished from both Allen and
Hundley, might significantly bolster Hoppe’s claim for an ordinary
and necessary business expense under Section 162. Hoppe has al
ready established his business as a professional athlete; fact three,
the signing of the contract by Hoppe alone (again distinguished
from Allen and Hundley), seems to support the fact that Klaus was
needed in the negotiations as an interpreter, the capacity in which
he signed the contract. Facts five and six, which indicate the degree
of expertise exhibited by the respective relatives of each ballplayer
and the role played by the relatives in the contract negotiations,
seem to be of much greater significance. In Hundley’s and Hoppe’s
cases both relatives took active roles in negotiating final contracts.
In Hundley, the father was knowledgeable about baseball and con
tract negotiations. Hoppe’s situation is certainly similar. Klaus ex
hibited an ability to negotiate by recommending that a bonus be
offered, and he displayed his expertise as an interpreter. The final
fact—number seven—in which Allen and Hoppe are distinguished
from Hundley, appears to be a liability to Hoppe’s position and
weakens his case considerably.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates a situation in which the
statute is incomplete and a taxpayer and his adviser must rely on
equally incomplete interpretive materials. Careful analysis indicates
that previous interpretations appear to apply to some but not all
the existing facts. Once a thorough examination of the facts and a
review of the applicable authority have been completed, a decision
must be made about the course of action. Possible risks must be
evaluated and additional expenses must be estimated, before the
decision to contest the deficiency assessment is made. Consultation
with legal counsel concerning litigation hazards will assist the tax
payer in deciding whether to carry the case beyond administrative
procedures into the courts.
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Nonexistent
It is possible that a tax researcher may discover that his problem
is not clearly covered by any statutory, administrative, or judicial
authority. In such circumstances, the tax adviser has an opportunity
to utilize whatever powers of creativity, logical reasoning, and per
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suasion he possesses. Since the revenue agent making an examina
tion likewise will have little authority to substantiate any proposed
adjustment, it is up to the tax adviser to present a convincing argu
ment in support of his client’s position. However, as stressed
throughout this chapter, before the tax adviser proceeds with a
course of action, the client should be advised of the possible risks
and expenses associated with it. In these circumstances, the client
may want to ask the IRS for a letter ruling before he reaches a final
decision.
We have suggested that in all questionable situations the cost and
risk factors be considered before reaching a conclusion. Risk should
be interpreted as any possible adverse consequence that might oc
cur as a result of a specific course of action adopted by the taxpayer.
One must ask whether the questionable treatment of a particular
item on the return will trigger an examination, and whether such
an examination is likely to subject other items on the return to scru
tiny and a possible proposed adjustment.27 Furthermore, proposed
adjustments on one year’s tax return may lead to similar adjustments
on a prior year’s return. Thus, in addition to developing a strong
case against the IRS claims, potential risks must be considered in
the final decision process in the treatment of all tax matters. At the
same time one should not forget that the cost of disputing a tax
liability is generally deductible. For the taxpayer in a high margi
nal tax bracket, this may be a point in favor of continuing a dispute
with the IRS.
Working With the Citator
In addition to its usefulness in locating appropriate authority, the
citator can assist in the assessment process. Throughout this chapter
we have observed how conflicting interpretations of the code by
taxpayers, their tax advisers, the IRS, and the courts result in con
siderable litigation. In the litigation process, court decisions some
times are appealed and, subsequently, either affirmed or reversed by
the appropriate appellate court. Furthermore, it should be apparent
that, while a particular court decision may support a taxpayer’s
27A questionable treatment should not be confused with an illegal treatment.
The former refers to items supported by adequate authority which lend
themselves to honest disagreement between taxpayers and IRS.
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position, subsequent decisions by the same court or by other courts
may reverse a previous decision. It is imperative, therefore, that
the researcher carefully investigate the judicial history of any de
cision before placing much emphasis on it. The citator can assist
the researcher in this evaluative process. Verifying the judicial his
tory of a particular case can be accomplished effectively only
through the P-H Citator; the CCH Citator simply does not include
the information necessary to make this determination. To illustrate,
let us return to exhibit 4.6, page 116. The entry in the CCH Citator
for the Germantown Trust Co. case discloses that Germantown was
cited in Automobile Club of Michigan, 353 US 180 (1957). Because
the latter case was decided by the Supreme Court, it would be im
portant to know which issue was involved and whether or not the
Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision in Germantown Trust Co.
Such information cannot be gleaned from the CCH Citator. As
shown in exhibit 4.10, page 120, the P-H Citator lists information
similar to that found in the CCH Citator. However, the symbol
“n-1” precedes the Automobile Club citation, and similar symbols
precede other cases in which Germantown was cited. The P-H sym
bol explanation sheet (see exhibit 5.1, page 158), discloses that “n”
denotes that Germantown was cited only in a dissenting opinion.
The number “1” in connection with the symbol “n” refers the reader
to the corresponding headnote number in the AFTR series, which
identifies the issue involved. A further examination of cases in which
Germantown was cited (exhibit 4.10) indicates that issue “3” is
most frequently cited, that in one instance Germantown was “ex
plained”; and that in another instance it was “distinguished.” (See
exhibit 5.1 for an explanation of the terms explained and distin
guished, as well as other interpretive symbols.)
How the P-H Citator can assist the researcher can be demon
strated with the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Wilcox,
327 US 404 (1946). In this decision the Supreme Court held that
embezzled money does not constitute taxable income to the em
bezzler. The Supreme Court overruled the Wilcox decision in James,
366 US 213 (1961). The extract from the P-H Citator shown in ex
hibit 5.2, page 159, reveals that Wilcox was cited on various issues
in James and that in James the court overruled Wilcox on issues
three, four, and nine. Thus, reliance on Wilcox, simply because it
represented a Supreme Court decision, would be ill advised.
Before a researcher relies explicitly upon the authority of any
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Exhibit 5.1
Prentice-Hall Citator Symbols

Exhibit 5.2
Prentice-Hall Citator Extract
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particular judicial decision, he should take the few minutes it re
quires to trace that case through the P-H Citator to be sure that
subsequent developments did not render the case invalid for his
purpose.
In addition to the P-H Citator, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., publishes
a comprehensive legal citator that can assist tax researchers in trac
ing the history and current status of any case.28 Since Shepard’s
Citations includes almost all federal and state cases, the publication
consists of numerous volumes, requiring extensive space. While it
may not be economically feasible to include Shepard’s citator in a
typical tax library, it can be found in nearly all law libraries and
the tax researcher may wish to make use of it in unusual circum
stances.

28Shepard’s Citations (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Shepard’s Citations, Inc.)
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6
True ease in writing comes from art,
not chance,
As those move easiest who have
learned to dance.
ALEXANDER POPE

Communicating
Tax Research
Throughout this tax study we have used the terms tax researcher
and tax adviser synonymously. If a distinction could be made be
tween the two forms of practice, it would be based on the tax ad
visers task of reporting the conclusion that has been so painstakingly
pieced together. While some tax conclusions can be communicated
orally, much of the information gathered by a tax researcher must
eventually be placed in writing as either internal or external docu
mentation. The task of writing introduces two major problems for
the practitioner. First, the ability of some to write well is more
often than not an acquired trait, the result of practice and more
practice. Second, communicating the conclusions of tax research re
quires the ability to perceive how much or how little to express.
This task is complicated by the fact that highly technical solutions
frequently must be distilled into layman’s language. Also, the tax
adviser often must hedge on his solution because, as discussed in
chapter 5, a definitive answer simply is not available in every case.
In addition, the tax adviser must, to protect his own professional
integrity, foresee potential future claims against him. Like writing
skill, the ability to determine precisely what needs to be said usually
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can be improved through practice. In larger offices, every inexperi
enced tax researcher should be given an early opportunity to pre
sent much of his initial research in written form. A new researcher
should also be assigned the responsibility of preparing draft copies
of correspondence that will be subsequently reviewed by a super
visor for weaknesses in writing style and technical presentation. Ex
perience and assistance can mold a good researcher into a good
advisor with a mastery of writing style and an ability to pinpoint
the finer information required in tax documents.
The form in which a written tax communication appears is deter
mined by the audience for which it is intended. Some documents
are prepared for internal purposes, or firm use, only. Other docu
ments, such as client letters, protest letters, and requests for rulings,
are prepared for an external audience. In the following pages we
will illustrate the appropriate formats and contents of some of the
more frequently encountered communications. Of course, firm poli
cies often dictate specific formats and procedures; nevertheless,
certain basic features are universal to most tax communications.

Internal Communications
Within the accounting firm, the client file is the basic vehicle used
to communicate specific client information between the various lev
els of the professional staff. Pertinent information concerning each
client’s unique facts is contained in the file in the form of memos
and working papers.

Memo to the File

A memo to the file may be initiated as a result of any one of sev
eral developments. Often such memos are the result of a client’s re
quest—in person, over the telephone, or in a letter—for a solution to
a tax problem. The importance of facts in tax research was explained
in chapter 2; a memo to the file is commonly used to inform the re
searcher of the underlying facts needed to identify issues, locate
authorities, and reach solutions. In most large offices the initial con
tact with the client occurs at the partner or manager level, while
much of the actual research will be performed by a staffman. It is
critical, therefore, that accurate information be communicated be
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tween the various levels of the professional staff. A typical memor
andum to the files may appear as follows.
October 30, 1975
TO:
Files
FROM :
Tom Partner
SUBJECT: Potential exchange of common voting stock for pre
ferred nonvoting stock in Allemania Electronic, Inc.
Today Tim Dietz, financial vice-president of Electric Supply Co.,
called to request information concerning the tax consequences of a
proposed recapitalization in Allemania Electronic, Inc., an 85 per
cent-owned subsidiary. Allemania was acquired by Electric on
June 1, 1971, and has been carried in the financial statements as a
temporary investment on the equity basis. The auditors of Electric
(Meyerson, Gamer, and Leavitt) are now insisting that continued
association with Allemania would require the inclusion of the sub
sidiary in Electric’s financial statements on a fully consolidated
basis. The directors of Allemania are not in favor of such a dis
closure and have suggested that Allemania exchange sufficient com
mon voting stock for preferred nonvoting stock to reduce Electric’s
ownership in the form of voting stock from 85 percent to 50 per
cent or below. The board hopes, through the reduction of owner
ship in voting stock, that inclusion of Allemania on a consolidated
financial basis with Electric can be avoided. At the present time
Electric and Allemania join in the filing of a consolidated tax re
turn on a May 31, fiscal-year basis. Responsibility for preparation
and filing of the return rests with Electric’s internal tax department,
which we review on an annual basis. Tim Dietz requested that our
report reach him prior to Electric’s next board meeting, scheduled
for November 22, and he requested that we contact him person
ally for additional information.

The information contained in the above memo should be sufficient
for the researcher to begin his work. Furthermore, the memo com
municates a specific deadline and indicates that the client is willing
to supplement this information with additional facts if necessary.
A less formal procedure is often followed when a long-established
client calls the tax adviser for an immediate answer to a routine tax
question on a well-defined, uncontroversial topic. If the tax adviser
gives an oral reply, he should place the conversation in writing, thus
creating a record for the files. Such a record serves as protection
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against subsequent confusion or misinterpretation that may jeopar
dize the tax adviser’s professional integrity, and it can serve as a
basis for billing the client.1
Leaving Tracks

Once the necessary information has been recorded in a memo to
the files, the researcher may begin his task of identifying questions
and seeking solutions. Supporting documents for his conclusions,
such as excerpts from or references to specific portions of the In
ternal Revenue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, court
decisions, tax service editorial opinions, and periodicals, should be
put in the files. All questions and conclusions should be appropri
ately cross-indexed to facilitate subsequent retrieval of the informa
tion. Pertinent information in supporting documents should be high
lighted to avoid unnecessary reading. Examples of the content and
organization of a client’s file are presented in chapter 7.
Because time is the most important commodity any tax adviser
has for sale, a well-organized client file is of the utmost importance;
it can eliminate duplication of effort. Supervisory review of a staff
person’s research can be accomplished quickly, and additional time
is saved if and when it becomes necessary to refer to a client’s file
months, or even years, after the initial work was performed. Such a
delayed reference to a file may be required because of subsequent
IRS audits, preparation of protests, and/or the need to solve another
client’s similar tax problem. Because promotions, transfers, and staff
turnover are common occurrences in accounting firms, well-organ
ized files can be of significant help in familiarizing new staff mem
bers with client problems.
1The question of whether oral advice should be confirmed in writing arises
frequently. The AICPA subcommittee on responsibilities in tax practice
makes the following recommendation: “Although oral advice may serve a cli
ent’s needs appropriately in routine matters or in well-defined areas, written
communications are recommended in important, unusual or complicated
transactions. In the judgment of the CPA, oral advice may be followed by a
written confirmation to the client. A written record will limit misunder
standings and provide a basis for future discussions, reference, planning and
implementation of suggestions.” AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in
Tax Practice No. 8, “Advice to Clients” (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1970).

164

Another time-saving device used by practitioners is the tax sub
ject file. To prepare such a system, members of the practitioner’s
tax staff contribute tax problems together with documented conclu
sions, which are then pooled and arranged on a subject basis. In a
multioffice firm such files are duplicated, in some instances on
microfilm, and made available to each office. A subject file can elimi
nate many hours of duplicative research.
External Communications
A tax practitioner’s written communication to an external audi
ence takes on added significance because it demonstrates profes
sional expertise, renders professional advice, and exposes profes
sional reputation. Perhaps the most frequently encountered external
document in a CPA’s tax practice is the client letter. Communica
tion with the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of a client to pro
test a deficiency assessment or to request a ruling for a proposed
transaction are also quite common.
Client Letters

In a client letter the tax adviser expresses his professional opinion
to those who pay for his services. The significance of a client let
ter can perhaps best be expressed as follows:
Tax opinion letters are emerging as a new work product for tax
professionals. Anyone who has written such a letter knows why he
said what he said and has reasons for discussing certain items in
more or less detail. It is no easy task to balance the proper degree
of necessary technicality with everyday English, trying all the while
to foresee any misunderstanding that could arise and to write only
what is meant. The ability to write good tax opinion letters has be
come one of the finer attributes of the tax practitioner.2

The detailed format of client letters may vary from one firm to
another. Most good client letters, however, have several things in
common.

2W. J. DeFillips, “Developing a Tax Department in a Growing Organization,”
Journal of Advisers Accountancy, June 1974, p. 64.
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Style. Like a good speaker, a good writer must know his audience
before he begins. Because tax clients vary greatly in their own tax
expertise, it is important to consider the technical sophistication of
a client or his staff when composing a tax opinion letter. The style
of a letter may range from a highly sophisticated format, which in
cludes numerous technical explanations and citations, to a simple
composition that utilizes only laymen’s terms. In many situations,
of course, the best solution lies somewhere between the two ex
tremes.
Format and Content. Regardless of the degree of technical sophis
tication, a well-drafted client letter follows a well-planned format.
It should begin with an enumeration of the facts upon which the
tax adviser’s research is based. In conjunction with a statement of
the facts, a statement of caution (see “Disclaimer Statements,” page
168) should be included to warn the client that the research con
clusions stated are valid only for the specified facts. Next, the let
ter should state the important tax questions implicit in the previously
identified facts. Finally, the tax practitioner should list his con
clusions and the authority for those conclusions. An example of ap
propriate form and typical content of a client letter is shown in
chapter 7. Additional examples can be examined in the AICPA’s
Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management, by William L. Raby.3
A client letter may identify areas of controversy (or questions
that are not authoritatively resolved) that might be disputed by the
Internal Revenue Service. Some highly qualified tax advisers seri
ously question the wisdom of including any discussion of disputable
points in a client letter because that letter may end up in the pos
session of a revenue agent at a most inopportune time. Furthermore,
by authority of Section 7602, the IRS has the right to examine all
relevant books, papers, and records containing information relating
to the business of a taxpayer liable for federal taxes. Tax account
ants are well aware that documents in their possession, relating to
the computation of a client’s federal tax liability, are not considered
privileged communication. A recent study disclosed that in only
fourteen out of thirty-two federal tax cases in which the question
3William L. Raby, Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974).
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of privileged communication was litigated did the courts grant a
privilege to certain tax-related communications. All of those granted
were either under an attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privilege—
never under an accountant-client privilege.4 The accountant in tax
practice is thus faced with a dilemma. If a client letter discloses
both the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s tax posture, ex
posure of the letter to a revenue agent may considerably weaken
the client’s position and even assist the revenue agent in preparing
his case. On the other hand, if the potential weaknesses of the posi
tion are not clearly communicated to the client, the tax adviser ex
poses himself to potential legal liability for inappropriate advice.
Although many advisers do not agree, we believe that client letters
should contain comprehensive information, including some reference
to the more vulnerable factors which could expose the client to
potential challenge by the IRS. In our opinion, full disclosure and
self-protection against claims by clients, which may endanger the
professional reputation of all tax practitioners, is more important
than the risk of an IRS challenge. Any disclosure of weaknesses
must be carefully worded, and the client should be cautioned in ad
vance to control possession of the letter. .
The issue of privileged communication is most frequently raised
in connection with tax fraud cases, and, in the long run, a tax prac
titioner will do his practice more good by preserving his profes
sional reputation than by protecting those few clients who may be
guilty of tax fraud. In situations where a CPA suspects that fraud
may be involved, he should immediately refer the client to an attor
ney for all further work. If the attorney believes that the accountant
may be of assistance, he may reengage the accountant and thereby
possibly extend his privilege to the accountant’s workpapers.5

4 Walter V. Arnold, “Privileged Communications for the Tax Accountant” (un
published professional report, the University of Texas at Austin, 1974). Al
though fifteen states plus Puerto Rico have enacted accountant-client privi
leged communication statutes, they are without authority in federal matters.
5 See Marvin J. Garbis and William H. Burke, “Fifth Amendment Protection
of the A ccountant’s W orkpapers in T ax Fraud Investigations,” Taxes, Janu
ary, 1969, p. 20. See also Gaylord A. Jentz, “Accountant Privileged Com
munications: Is It a Dying Concept Under the New Federal Rules of Evi
dence?” American Business Law Journal, Fall 1973, pp. 149-60.
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Disclaimer Statements. Tax advisers deal with two basically dif
ferent situations. In the case of after-the-fact advice, the tax practi
tioner must assure himself that he understands all of the facts neces
sary to reach a valid conclusion. Incomplete or inaccurate facts
may lead the adviser to an erroneous, conclusion. In planning situ
ations, where many of the facts are still “controllable,” the tax ad
viser must assure himself that he fully understands the client’s ob
jective and any operational constraints on achieving that objective.
Furthermore, planning situations frequently involve lengthy time
periods during which changes in the tax laws may occur, thus pos
sibly changing the recommended course of action. Statement No.
8, issued by the AICPA responsibilities in tax practice subcommittee,
noted some of the problems associated with new developments in
tax matters.
The CPA may assist clients in implementing procedures or plans
associated with the advice offered. During this active participation,
the CPA continues to advise and should review and revise such
advice as warranted by new developments and factors affecting the
transaction.
Sometimes the CPA is requested to provide tax advice but does
not assist in implementing the plans adopted. While developments
such as legislative or administrative changes or further judicial in
terpretations may affect the advice previously provided, the CPA
cannot be expected to communicate later developments that affect
such advice unless he undertakes this obligation by specific agree
ment with his client. Thus, the communication of significant devel
opments affecting previous advice should be considered extraordi
nary service rather than an implied obligation in the normal CPAclient relationship.6

On the advisability of including some type of disclaimer state
ment in a client letter, the same subcommittee stated:
Experience in the accounting and other professions indicates that
clients understand that advice reflects professional judgment based
on an existing situation. Experience has also shown that clients

6AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 8.
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customarily realize that subsequent developments could affect
previous professional advice. Some CPAs use precautionary lan
guage to the effect that their advice is based on facts as stated and
authorities which are subject to change. Although routine use of
such precautionary language seems unnecessary based on accepted
business norms and professional relationships, the CPA may follow
this procedure in situations he deems appropriate.7

In summary, the AICPA subcommittee concludes that a dis
claimer statement is not required. The authors of this study, how
ever, are of the opinion that client letters generally should contain
disclaimer statements as a matter of policy. In our opinion, the
client letter should include a brief restatement of the important
facts, a statement to the effect that all conclusions stated in the let
ter are based on those specific facts, and a warning to the client of
the dangers implicit in any changes or inaccuracies in those facts.
In the case of tax-planning engagements, we also recommend that
the tax practitioner include a warning that future changes in the
law could jeopardize the planned end results. An example of such
a disclaimer statement in client letters appears in chapter 7.
Protest Letters

Another external document commonly prepared by the tax prac
titioner is the “protest” of a client’s tax deficiency as assessed by
the Internal Revenue Service. Although written protests are not re
quired for a district conference if the proposed tax deficiency does
not exceed $2,500, prospects of an appeal to the appellate division
often dictate the early preparation of a written protest. The Internal
Revenue Service suggests that a protest include the following in
formation:
1. A statement that you want to appeal the findings of the examin
ing officer to the District Conference Staff or to the Appellate Divi
sion, as the case may be.
2. Your name and address (the residence address of individuals;

7Ibid.
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the address of the principal office or place of business of corpora
tions ).
3. The date and symbols on the letter transmitting the proposed
adjustments and findings you are protesting.
4. The taxable years, periods, or returns involved.
5. An itemized schedule of adjustments of findings with which you
do not agree.
6. A statement of facts supporting your position in contested fac
tual issues. This statement and all major evidence submitted with the
protest is to be declared true under penalties of perjury. This may
be done by adding to the protest the following declaration, signed
by the taxpayer as an individual or by an authorized officer of a cor
poration:
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined
the statement of facts presented in this protest and in any accom
panying schedules and statements and, to the best of my knowl
edge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete.
7. Instead of the declaration required in 6 above, if your representa
tive prepares or files the protest, he may substitute a declaration
stating:
(a) W hether he prepared the protest and accompanying docu
ments, and
(b) W hether he knows personally that the statements of fact
contained in the protest and accompanying documents are
true and correct.
8. A statement outlining the law or other authority upon which you
rely. This statement is not required in offer in compromise cases
based solely on doubt of collectibility.8

In principle, the body of a protest follows the format of a client
letter in that the protest specifies important facts, delineates con
tested findings, and lists the authority supporting the taxpayer’s po
sition. An example of a typical protest letter follows.

8Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 5, "Right of Appeal and Preparing
Protests for Unagreed Cases—Income, Estate, Gift, and Excise and Employ
ment Taxes” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).
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July 14, 1975
District Director of
Internal Revenue
Federal Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: Intermountain Stove, Inc.
1408 State Street
Moroni, Utah 84646
Corporate income taxes for
the year ended 12/31/73
Sir:
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1975 (Reference—
B:S:59-A:FS:rs), which transmitted a copy of your examining of
ficer’s report dated May 8, 1975, covering his examination of Inter
mountain Stove, Inc.’s corporate income tax return for the year
ended December 31, 1973. In the report, the examining officer rec
ommended adjustments to the taxable income (loss) in the follow
ing amount:
Tax Year

Amount of
Increase in Income Reported

December 31, 1973

$42,000

PROTEST AGAINST ADJUSTMENT
Your letter granted the taxpayer a period of thirty days from the
date thereof within which to protest the recommendations of the
examining officer, which period was subsequently extended to July
22, 1975, by your letter dated June 6, 1975, a copy of which is at
tached. This protest is accordingly being filed within such period,
as extended.
The taxpayer respectfully protests against the proposed adjust
ment stated below.
FINDINGS TO W HICH TAXPAYER
TAKES EXCEPTION
Exception is now taken to the following item:
Disallowance of the following expenses of
Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Description
Year
Professional Fees

December 31, 1973

Amount
$42,000
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GROUNDS UPON W HICH TAXPAYER RELIES
The taxpayer submits the following information to support its
contentions:
Expenses of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Your examining officer contends that fees paid in the amount of
$42,000 in connection with the employment of certain individuals
who were experienced in various phases of the production and sale
of cast iron stoves should be considered as the acquisition costs of
assets in connection with expansion of operations and establishment
of a new cast iron stove division.
Taxpayer contends, for reasons set forth below, that the exam
ining officer’s position is untenable on the facts and in law and that
such costs are clearly deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in its trade or business, deductible in accordance with Sec
tion 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Facts concerning the operations of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Intermountain Stove, Inc. (ISI) is a manufacturer of campers.
As a result of the fuel crisis, orders in 1973 declined and ISI decided,
in addition to their camper operation, to again produce wood and
coal burning stoves, a product ISI had manufactured until the end
of World W ar II and for which a strong demand suddenly devel
oped. To begin immediate operation in a new stove division, ISI
contracted with a consulting firm to locate personnel with experi
ence in the production and marketing of cast iron stoves. The fee
paid for such services during 1973 amounted to $42,000.
Discussion of authorities
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides—
There shall be allowed as a deduction all of the ordinary and neces
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business.. . .

To contend, as the examining officer does, that assets were acquired
with the employment of the newly acquired employees is not with
in the usual interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
There were no employment contracts purchased, as may some
times be found in the hiring of professional athletes; the employees
were free to sever their employment relationships at any time, and,
in fact, certain of these specific individuals have done so. The ex-
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amining officer’s position was considered in David J. Primuth,
54 TC 374, in which the court stated—
It might be argued that the payment of an employment fee is capi
tal in nature and hence not currently deductible. Presumably under
this view the fee would be deductible when the related employment
is terminated. However, the difficulty with this view is to conjure
up a capital asset which had been purchased. Certainly the expense
was not related to the purchase or sale of a capital asset. . . . Cer
tainly in the ordinary affairs of life common understanding would
clearly encompass the fee paid to the employment agency herein
as ‘ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on any trade or
business’ (Section 162) within the usual, ordinary and everyday
meaning of the term.

Your examining officer is here attempting to disallow deductions
for amounts paid to outside consultants in a situation where the ex
penses would clearly be deductible if the work had been performed
by the company’s own staff. No such distinction should be made.
The corporation employed the expertise of a knowledgeable con
sultant to assist in the location of personnel with specific back
ground and experience. The payment of fees for such assistance
may be compared with the direct payroll and overhead costs of
operating an “in-house” personnel department.
The examining officer apparently believes that such costs should
be capitalized primarily because they might be nonrecurring in na
ture. This is not the test as to whether an expense is ordinary and
necessary. As the Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Welch, 290
US 111, 3 USTC 1164: “Ordinary in this context does not mean that
the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same
taxpayer may make them often.” The fees are ordinary and neces
sary because it is the common experience in the business com
munity that payments are made for assistance in the procurement
of personnel. This is emphasized by the Court in Primuth by the
following statement:
“Fees” must be deemed ordinary and necessary from every realistic
point of view in today’s marketplace where corporate executives
change employers with a notable degree of frequency.

These expenditures, if paid by the individual employees and re
imbursed by the employer, would have been clearly deductible by
both the employee and employer, with the employee having an off
setting amount of income for the reimbursement. See Rev. Rul. 60233, 1960-1 CB 57, Rev. Rul. 66-4, 1966-1 CB 233. The expense is no
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less deductible when paid directly by the corporation.
It is, therefore, contended that the disallowance made by the ex
amining officer was in error.

REQUEST FOR CONFERENCE
An oral hearing is requested before the conference staff of the
district director’s office.

STATEMENT W ITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION9
The attached protest was prepared by the undersigned on the basis
of information available to him. All statements contained therein
are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner

Requests for Rulings and Determination Letters

Frequently tax practitioners find it necessary to seek a ruling
from the IRS to fix the tax consequences of a client’s anticipated
business transaction or to settle a disagreement with a revenue agent
during an examination. The general procedures with respect to the
issuance of advance rulings (before-the-fact) and determination
letters (after-the-fact) are outlined in Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 CB
698, in which the IRS announced that a careful adherence to the
specified requirements will minimize needless delays in processing
requests for rulings and for determination letters. In addition to
Rev. Proc. 72-3, the IRS has on occasion issued procedures that gov
ern ruling requests dealing with specific topics. For example,
Rev. Proc. 73-10 suggests specific guidelines for ruling requests in
volving Section 351. Similarly, Rev. Proc. 74-17 delineates require
ments for ruling requests concerning the classification of organiza
tions, for example, partnerships versus associations.
Requests for rulings, which are addressed to the national office
of the IRS, generally take the following format.

9It is assumed that an appropriate power of attorney has been filed with the
IRS. Otherwise, a power of attorney must be attached to the protest.
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November 15, 1975
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Washington, D.C. 20224
Attention: T:PS:T
Re: Allemania Electronic, Inc.
(I.D. 73-2113112)
1403 South State Street
Austin, Texas 78712
Request for Ruling under
Section 306 to fix status
of nonvoting preferred
stock to be issued under
Section 368 ( a) (1) ( E ) in
exchange for voting com
mon stock.
Dear Sir:
Allemania Electronic, Inc. is a Texas corporation with 10,000
shares of common voting stock issued and outstanding. Of this is
sue, 8,500 shares are owned by Electric Supply Co., while the re
maining shares are owned by several minority interests. Electric and
Allemania join in the filing of a consolidated tax return on a calen
dar year basis. A plan has been proposed under which Allemania
will exchange 3,500 shares of its common voting stock now held by
Electric for 3,500 shares of preferred nonvoting stock. The proposed
exchange should constitute a recapitalization to which Section
3 6 8 (a )(1 )(E ) applies. A ruling is respectfully requested as to
whether or not the proposed issue of preferred nonvoting stock
would constitute “Section 306 stock.”
FACTS
Electric Supply Co. acquired 85 percent of Allemania’s common
voting stock on June 1, 1971. Since that time Electric has included
Allemania’s stock as a temporary investment on its audited financial
statements. Considerable pressure is now being exerted by Electric’s
auditors to include Allemania as a fully consolidated subsidiary
on its audited statement or to dispose of the investment. Since Alle
mania is a supplier of needed components to Electric, divesture is
out of the question. On the other hand, inclusion on a fully con
solidated basis is out of the question since the board of directors
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fears a negative effect upon Electric’s stock prices. Allemania has
therefore adopted a plan to exchange 3,500 shares of voting com
mon stock for an equal number of nonvoting preferred stock, thus
making it possible to continue to show Allemania on Electric’s aud
ited financial statements as a line-item investment since ownership
in voting stock does not exceed 50 percent.
DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES
Internal Revenue Code, Section 3 0 6 (c )(1 )(B )(ii) seems to im
ply that the preferred stock to be issued would be tainted as Sec
tion 306 stock. Similar thoughts are expressed in Rev. Rul. 59-84,
Rev. Rul. 66-332, and Rev. Rul. 70-199. However, given the nature of
the transaction contemplated by Allemania, there also appears to be
substantial authority for arguing that the newly issued preferred
stock should not be Section 306 stock. Since, after the proposed ex
change of common for preferred, the percentage interest in Elec
tric’s voting stock would be substantially reduced, the preferred
stock should not be Section 306 stock. This position seems to be sup
ported by Rev. Rul. 59-84, where one of the shareholders reduced his
proportionate interest in the common stock of the distributor cor
poration from 55.8 percent to 0 percent. In that instance the In
ternal Revenue Service ruled that since the shareholder’s percentage
interest in the common stock was substantially reduced by the re
capitalization, Section 306 did not apply to the newly issued pre
ferred stock.
BUSINESS PURPOSE
Taxpayer also contends that avoidance of income taxes is not a
reason for the proposed recapitalization, but that recapitalization is
motivated entirely by a valid business purpose. The business pur
pose in this instance is the avoidance of the negative impact upon
stock prices that Electric contends will result if Allemania is in
cluded as a fully consolidated subsidiary on Electric’s audited fi
nancial statements.
REQUEST FOR RULING
It is respectfully requested that the commissioner rule that the
proposed issuance of preferred nonvoting stock in exchange for com
mon voting stock under Section 3 6 8 (a )(1 )(E ) does not qualify
the newly issued preferred stock as Section 306 stock.
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STATEMENT W ITH RESPECT TO CONTENT
The statements contained in this request for ruling are true and
correct to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned and are
made under the penalties of perjury.
Allemania Electronic, Inc.
B y___________________________________
Vice President and Treasurer
STATEMENT W ITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION
The attached request for ruling was prepared by the undersigned
on the basis of information made available to him. All statements
contained therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge
and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner
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These examples are the school of mankind,
and they will learn at no other.
EDMUND BURKE

Tax Research in the
“Closed-Fact” Case:
An Example
The preparation of a well-organized working-paper file cannot be
overemphasized because it proves that research efforts have been
thorough, are logically correct, and are adequately documented. The
elements of this chapter comprise a sample client file. The formats of
files utilized in practice vary substantially among firms; the new tax
accountant who uses this tax study as a guide for his own research
efforts should be prepared to modify this illustration to conform to
the format used by his employer. It is hoped that the general format
suggested here would be approved by most experienced tax ad
visers, although any employer might disagree with any of several
specifics. The sample is based on a relatively simple incorporation
transaction. Because the tax problems illustrated are relatively sim
ple, the supporting file would be considered excessive by most ad
visers; the cost of preparing such an elaborate file would be too
great to justify. In this case, the reader should concentrate more on
general working paper content and arrangement than on the sub
stantive tax issues illustrated; although, in more complex problems
this kind of detail would be appropriate.
Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the client has con
tacted the accountant after all aspects of the incorporation trans
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action were completed. In other words, the accountant’s task in this
engagement is restricted to compliance-related tax research. We
have combined the information for two clients into one file; that is,
that of the new corporate entity and that of its president and major
stockholder. In practice, however, two separate files would be main
tained. Finally, in practice a file would very likely include a sub
stantial number of photocopies of excerpts from the Internal Rev
enue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, judicial deci
sions, commercial tax services, and other reference works. We have
attempted to simulate a real file by combining script and ordinary
type. Anything in script type would be handwritten in a real file.
Anything enclosed by a tint block represents material that would be
photocopied in a real file.
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants
2010 Professional Tower
Calum City, USA 00001

December 23, 1975
Mr. Red E. Ink, President
Ready, Incorporated
120 Publisher Lane
Calum City, USA 00002
Dear Mr. Ink:
This letter confirms the oral agreement of December 17, 1975, in which
our firm agreed to undertake the preparation of federal income tax returns
for you and Ready, Inc., for the next year. The letter also reports the pre
liminary results of our investigation into the tax consequences of the incorpo
ration of your printing business last March. We are pleased to be of service
to you and anticipate that our relationship will prove to be mutually benefi
cial. Please feel free to call upon me at any time.
Before stating the preliminary results of our investigation into the tax
consequences of your incorporation transaction, I would like to restate
briefly all of the important facts as we understand them. Please review this
statement of facts very carefully. Our conclusions depend upon a complete
and accurate understanding of all of the facts. If any of the following state
ments is either incorrect or incomplete, please call it to my attention im
mediately, no matter how small or insignificant the difference may appear to
be.
Our conclusions are based upon an understanding that on March 1, 1975,
you exchanged all of the assets and liabilities of the printing business, which
you had operated for the prior twelve years as a sole proprietorship, for 1,000
shares of common stock in Ready, Inc., a newly formed corporation. The
assets that you transferred to Ready, Inc., consisted of $20,000 cash; $10,000
(estimated market value) supplies on hand; $50,000 (face value) trade receiv
ables; and $60,000 (book value) equipment. The equipment, purchased new
in 1971 for $100,000, had been depreciated on a double-declining-balance
method for the past four years. An investment credit was claimed in 1971 on
the purchase of the equipment. The liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc.,
consisted of the $40,000 mortgage remaining from the original equipment
purchase in 1971 and current trade payables of $10,000. We further under
stand that Ready, Inc., plans to continue to occupy the building leased by
you on October 1, 1973, from Branden Properties, until the expiration of
(d r a f t )
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Red E. Ink
December 23, 1975
Page 2
that lease on September 30, 1977. Finally, we understand that Ready, Inc.,
has issued only 1,000 shares of common stock and that you retain 980 of those
shares; that your wife, Neva, holds ten shares; and that Tom Books, the
corporate secretary-treasurer, holds the remaining ten shares. The shares
held by Mrs. Ink and Mr. Books were given to them by you, as a gift, on
March 1, 1975.
Assuming that the preceding paragraph represents a complete and accu
rate statement of all of the facts pertinent to your incorporation transaction,
we anticipate reporting that event as a wholly nontaxable transaction. In
other words, neither you (individually) nor your corporation will report any
taxable income or loss solely because of your incorporation of the printing
business. Furthermore, no amount of investment credit will have to be
recaptured. However, in the future Ready, Inc., will be restricted to a 150
percent declining-balance depreciation deduction on the equipment trans
ferred. The trade receivables collected by Ready, Inc., after March 1, 1975,
will be reported as the taxable income of the corporate entity; collections
made between January 1, 1975, and February 28, 1975, will be considered
part of your personal taxable income for 1975.
If Ready, Inc.’s tax return is audited, there is a possibility that the Internal
Revenue Service may challenge the corporation’s right to deduct the $10,000
in trade payables it assumed from your proprietorship. If you so desire, I
would be pleased to explain this matter in detail. Perhaps it would be desira
ble for Mr. Bent, you, and me to meet and review this potential problem
prior to our filing the corporate tax return.*
If you wish to report the first corporate taxable income on a cash-method
fiscal-year basis, ending February 29, 1976, it is imperative that you have
Mr. Tom Books keep the corporation’s regular financial accounts on that
same basis. If he desires any help in maintaining those records, we will be
happy to assist him. It will be necessary for us to have access to your personal
financial records no later than March 1, 1975, and to your corporate records
no later than April 15, 1975, if the two federal income tax returns are to be
completed and filed on a timely basis.
Finally, may I suggest that we plan to have at least one more meeting in my
office sometime prior to February 28, 1976, to discuss possible tax-planning
opportunities available to you in the new corporation. Among other consid*Some advisors would delete this paragraph and handle the matter orally.

(d r a f t )
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erations, we should jointly review the possibility that you may want to make
a Subchapter S election, and that you may need to structure executive com
pensation arrangements carefully and may wish to institute a pension plan. It
may be desirable to discuss these opportunities at the same time that we
meet with Mr. Bent to consider the question of deducting the $10,000 in
trade payables, as noted earlier. Please telephone me to arrange an ap
pointment if you would like to do this shortly after the holidays.
Thank you again for selecting our firm for tax assistance. It is very impor
tant that some of the material in this letter be kept confidential and we
strongly recommend that you carefully control access to it at all times. If you
have any questions about any of the matters discussed, feel free to request a
more detailed explanation or drop by and review the complete files, which
are available in my office. If I should not be available, my assistant, Fred
Senior, would be happy to help you. We look forward to serving you in the
future.
Sincerely yours,

Robert U. Partner

( dr a f t )
FES
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants
2010 Professional Tower
Calum City, USA 00001

December 17, 1975
MEMO TO FILE
FROM:

R. U. Partner

SUBJECT:

Ready, Inc.—Tax Engagement

Mr. Red E. Ink (President) and Mr. Tom Books (Secretary-Treasurer) this
morning engaged our firm to prepare and file annual federal income tax
returns for Ready, Inc. In addition, Mr. Ink has requested that we prepare
his individual tax returns annually. During an interview in my office, the
following information pertinent to the first year’s tax returns was obtained.
On March 1, 1975, Red E. Ink incorporated the sole proprietorship print
ing business that he has for twelve years previously operated as Red’s Print
Shop. Mr. Ink had two primary business reasons for incorporating: (1) he
desired to limit his personal financial liability in his growing business and (2)
he wanted access to credit, which is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain
as an individual because of the prevailing interest rates and the state usury
laws. In the incorporation transaction, Red transferred all of the assets and
liabilities of his former proprietorship to Ready, Inc., a newly formed corpo
ration, in exchange for 1,000 shares of common stock. After receiving the
1,000 shares, Red gave ten shares to his wife, Neva, who was named corpo
rate vice president, and another ten shares to Tom Books, an unrelated and
long-time employee who was named the corporate secretary-treasurer. Red
stated that these two transfers were intended as gifts and not as compensa
tion for any prior services.
Tom Books provided me with a copy of the balance sheet he prepared for
Red’s Print Shop just prior to the incorporation. It appears as follows:
Red’s Print Shop
Balance Sheet
February 28, 1975
Assets
Cash
Supplies on hand
Trade receivables
Equipment (net)
Total Assets
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$ 20,000
10,000
50,000
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Memo to File (R. U. Partner)
Page 2
Liabilities & Equity
Trade payables
Mortgage payable
Total liabilities
Red E. Ink, capital
Total Liabilities & Equity

$ 10,000
40,000
$50,000
90,000
$140,000

The balance sheet was prepared at the request of Mr. Hal Bent, who
served as legal counsel to Mr. Ink during the incorporation of his business.
Incidentally, Mr. Bent recommended to Mr. Ink that he engage our firm for
the preparation and filing of the federal tax returns. Hal Bent is retained as
corporate counsel for Ready, Inc., as well as personal attorney for Mr. and
Mrs. Red E. Ink.
During our interview Mr. Ink stated that he has always reported his
personal income on a calendar-year, cash basis. It is his intention to report
the corporation’s taxable income on a cash basis in the future. He plans,
however, to have the corporate (taxable) fiscal year run from March 1 to
February 28/29.
The $40,000 mortgage payable represents the balance payable on equip
ment that was purchased for $100,000 in 1971. This equipment has been
depreciated on a double-declining-balance method since then. Investment
credit was claimed when the equipment was purchased (new). The $60,000
shown on the balance sheet is book value. Red and Tom estimate that the fair
market value of the equipment transferred was approximately $75,000 at the
time of the incorporation transaction. The trade payables represent the un
paid balances for supplies, utilities, employees’ wages, etc. as of the end of
February 1975. All of these accounts were paid by Ready, Inc., within sixty
days following incorporation. Tom has agreed to provide us with Ready,
Inc.’s income statement and year-end balance sheet by no later than March
30, 1976. Mr. Ink will provide us with additional details concerning his
personal tax return in early February.
I have assigned Fred E. Senior the responsibility of investigating all tax
consequences associated with the initial incorporation of Ready, Inc. He is
immediately to begin preparation of our file, which will be utilized early next
year in connection with the completion of the tax returns for these two new
clients. All preliminary research should be completed by Fred and reviewed
by me before December 31, 1975. I have also asked Fred to prepare a draft
of a client letter confirming this new engagement and stating our preliminary
findings on the tax consequences of the incorporation transaction.
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants
2010 Professional Tower
Calum City, USA 00001

December 19, 1975
MEMO TO FILE
FROM:

Fred E. Senior

SUBJECT:

Additional Information on Ready, Inc., Tax Engagement

After reviewing Mr. Partner’s file memo of December 17, 1975, and sub
sequently undertaking limited initial research into the tax questions perti
nent to filing the Red E. Ink/Ready, Inc., federal income tax returns, I
determined that additional information should be obtained. Specifically, I
observed that the February 28, 1975, balance sheet included no real prop
erty, and I believed that it was necessary for several reasons to confirm all of
the facts pertinent to this client’s real estate arrangements. Accordingly,
with R. U.’s approval, I telephoned Tom Books today and obtained the
following additional information.
Tom explained that Red had signed a forty-eight-month lease with Branden Properties, Inc., on October 1, 1973, and that Ready, Inc., had con
tinued to occupy the same premises and had paid all monthly rentals due
under this lease ($6,000 per month) since March 1, 1975. It is Tom’s opinion
that Red probably will construct his own building once this lease expires, but
that he probably will not try to get out of the present lease before its expira
tion on September 30, 1977. Tom said that the lease agreement calls for a
two-month penalty payment (i.e., a $12,000 payment) if either party should
break the lease prior to its expiration. According to this agreement,
whichever party breaks the lease must pay the other the sum stipulated.
Tom further stated that the present lease “really is not a particularly good
one.” In late 1973 it appeared to Red that office space in Calum City was
going to be scarce and he thought that the lease then negotiated was a wholly
reasonable one. By the spring of 1975, however, the available office space
exceeded the demand. Tom suggested (and based on his square-footage
estimates, I agree) that this same lease could now b e negotiated for about
$5,500 per month. The penalty for breaking the lease would just about equal
the saving that could be obtained by renegotiating a new lease today. Under
the circumstances, Red has elected to continue with the old lease for the
present. This option allows him time to decide whether to build or purchase
another building sometime prior to 1977.
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R ed E . I n k ( P e r s o n a l A c c o u n t )
Summar y o f Q u e s t i o n s I n v e s t i g a t e d
De c e m b e r 197 5
W.P . R e f .
7. Wa s R ed E . I n k ' s Mar c h 1 , 1 9 7 5 , e x c h a n g e
o f al l o f t h e as s e t s a n d l i a b i l i t i e s o f
R e d 's Pr i n t S h o p f o r 1 ,0 0 0 s h a t e s o f com 
m on s t o c k o f R e a d y , I n c . , a t a x -fre e
t r a n s f e r under S e c . 3 5 1?
C oncl us i o n : y e s ; al l o f t h e re q u i re m e n t s
o f S e c . 351 w e r e s a t i s f i e d .

C -1 & 2

Col l a t e rial Q u e s t i o n : I s t h e re a n y re a s o n 
abl e pos s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e l i abi l i t i es a s 
s um ed b y R e a d y , I n c . , m i g h t e x c e e d t h e
a d j u s t e d b a s i s o f t h e a s s e t s t r a n s f erre d
s o t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n ( t o S e c . 3 5 1 ) p ro
vi d e d i n S e c . 3 5 7 (c ) m i g h t d em a n d t h e
re c o g n i t i o n o f s om e g a i n i n t h i s i n c o r p o 
r a t i on t r a n s a c tio n ?
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , w h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e
b u i l d i n g l e a s e (i f a n y ) m u s t b e d e e m e d t o
c o n s t i t u t e a "l i a b i l i t y " f o r t h e p u rt p o s e
o f a p p l yi ng S e c .. 3 5 7 ( c ) ?

S e e W.P .
A -3

C oncl u s i o n : I n our opi n i o n t h e p o s s i b i l 
i t y t h a t t h e I RS c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y s u s 
t a i n th e concl u si on t h a t th e l i abi l i t i es
a s s u m e d b y R e a d y , I n c ., e x c e e d e d t h e a d 
j u s t e d b a si s o f th e a s s e t s t r ansf e r r ed i s
m o s t unl i k e l y . We b e l i e v e t h a t no par t
o f th e l e a s e s h o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d a s a
"l i abi l i ty '' f o r p u rp o se s o f S e c . 3 5 7 (c ).

C -2 t h r u
C -7

2 . I s t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e $ 6 0 ,0 0 0 i n t r a d e
r e c e i v a b l e s t r a n s f e r r e d b y R ed E . I n k t o
R eady, I n c ., and col le c te d by th e l a t t e r ,
p ro p er l y c o n s id e r e d to b e th e ta x a b le i n
co m e o f Mr . I n k ( i n d i v i d u a l l y ) o r t h a t o f
R e a d y , I n c . ( t h e Cor p o r a t i o n ) ?
C oncl u s i o n : R e a s o n a b l e a u t h o r i t y now e x 
i s ts to ju s ti f y tr e a tin g th e tr a d e r e 
c e iv a b le s col l e c te d a f t e r in c o r p o r a t i o n
a s t h e t a x a b l e i n co m e o f R e a d y , I n c .
B -1

S e e C -7
6 8
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(R e d E . I n k )
W .P . Ref.
3 . M u s t R ed E . I n k r e c a p t u r e a n y p o r t i o n ( o r
al l o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t c r e d i t c l a i m e d i n
19 7 1 b e c a u s e o f h i s t r a n s f e r o f t h e r e 
l a t e d e q u ip m e n t t o R ea d y, I n c . , on
3 /7 /7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : No r e c a p t u r e i s r e q u i r e d .

S e e C -8
&9

4 . Wh a t i s M r. I n k ' s t a x b a s i s i n t h e 9 80
s h a r e s o f R e a d y , I n c . , com m on s t o c k
w h ic h h e r e t a i n e d ?
C o n c l u s i o n : I n o u r o p i n i o n , M r. I n k ’s
b a s i s i n 98 0 s h a r e s i s $ 3 9 ,2 0 0 .
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S e e C -1 0
t h r u C- 11

R e d E . In k (P e rs o n a l A c c o u n t)
W o r k in g P a p e r s
D ecem ber 1975
W .P . Ref.

Q u e s t i o n 1 : W a s t h e in c o r p o r a tio n o f R e d 's
P rin t S h o p on 3 /1 /7 5 a ta x -free tra n sa c tio n ?
C o n c lu s io n : Y e s ; a ll o f th e c o n d itio n s o f S e c .
3 5 1 w e r e s a tis fie d in th is tr a n s a c tio n .
S e c . 5 5 1 , IR C 1 9 5 4 , r e a d s a s fo llo w s :
SEC. 351. TRANSFER TO CORPORATION
TROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.

r e q u ir e s
80% (R e d
g o t 100%;
k e p t 98%)

Fo r f a c t s , s e e
W .P . A - 1

CON

(a) General Rule.—No gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation (including, in the
case o f transfers made on or before June 30, 1967, an
investment company) by one or more persons solely in
gfor stock or securities in such corporation and
an
exch
immediately after th e exchange such person or persons are
in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation.
For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for
services shall not be considered as issued in return for
property.
(b) Receipt of Property.—If subsection (a) would apply to
an exchange but for the fact that there is received, in
addition to the stock or securities permitted to be received
under subsection (a), other property or money, then—
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized,
but not in excess of—
(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property
received; and

th e ru l e

N/A
(n o
boot
r e c 'd
b y M r.
In k )

(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule.— In determining control, for purposes of
this section, the fact that any corporate transferor distri
butes part or all of the stock which it receives in the ex
change to its shareholders shall not be taken into account.
(d) Application of June 30, 1967, Date.— For purposes of
this section, if, in connection with the transaction, a reg
istration statement is required to be filed with the Se
curities and Exchange Commission, a transfer of property
to an investment company shall be treated as made on or
before June 30, 1967, only if—

N/A

M/A

(1) such transfer is made on or before such date,
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S e c . 3 5 1 c o n ’-t.

(R ed E . In k )

(W. P . R e f.

(2) the registration statement was filed with the Se
curities and Exchange Commission before January 1,
1967, and the aggregate issue price of the stock and
securities of the investment company which are issued
in the transaction does not exceed the aggregate
amount therefore specified in the registration state
ment as of the close of December 31, 1966, and

W/A

(3) the transfer of property to the investment company
in the transaction includes only property deposited be
fore May 1, 1967.
(e) Cross References.—
(1) For special rule where another party to the ex
change assumes a liability, or acquires property subject
to a liability, see section 357.

S e e W. P .
C -2 t o 7

(2) For the basis of stock, securities, or property re
ceived in an exchange to which this section applies, see
sections 358 and 362.

S e e W. P .
10 & 11

(3) For special rule in the case of an exchange described
in this section but which results in a gift, see section
2501 and following.

W/A

(4) For special rule in the case of an exchange described
in this section but which has the effect of the payment
of compensation by the corporation or by a transferor,
see section 61(a) (1).

W/A

B e c a u s e M t.
a te l y a f t e r
gi f t s ) , a n d
cei ved, th i s
r e l i a b il i t i

I n k h a d 1 0 0 % - c o n tr o l i mm edi
t h e e x c h a n g e ( 9 8% e v e n a f t e r
b e c a u s e no " b o o t" w as r e 
i s a t a x -f r ee exchange. In
es , s e e # 2 , b e l ow).

Qu es t i o n 2 : Coul d t h e l i ab i l i t i e s as s um ed b y R e a d y ,
I n c ., e x c e e d t h e a d ju s te d bas i s o f th e
as s e t s t r a n s f e r r e d s o t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n
of S e c . 3 5 7 ( e ) m i g h t r e q u i r e t h e r e c o g 
n i t i o n of s om e g a in ?
C oncl us i o n : No ; s e e b e l ow f o r r e a s ons .
r e a d s a s f ol l o w s :

S e c . 357

SEC. 357. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY.
(a) General Rule.—Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c), if—

C -2
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S e c . 357 c o n ' t .

(R ed E . I n k )

W .P . R e f .

(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be
permitted to be received under section 351, 361, 371,
or 374 without the recognition of gain if it were the sole
consideration, and
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the
exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or ac
quires from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as
money or other property, and shall not prevent the ex
change from being within the provisions of section 351,
361, 371, or 374, as the case may be.

th e r u l e.

(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.—
(1) In general.—If, taking into consideration the nature
of the liability and the circumstances in the light of
which the arrangement for the assumption or acquisi
tion was made, it appears that the principal purpose of
the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acquisi
tion described in subsection (a)—
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on
the exchange, or

N/A

(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide busi
ness purpose,
then such assumption or acquisition (in the total
amount of the liability assumed or acquired pursuant to
such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 351, 361,
371, or 374 (as the case may be), be considered as
money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(2) Burden of proof.—In any suit or proceeding where
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove such assumption
or acquisition is not to be treated as money received by
the taxpayer, such burden shall not be considered as
sustained unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by
the clear preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.—
(1) In general.—In the case of an exchange—

N/A

QUEST ION:

(A) to which section 351 applies, or
S ee
bel ow

(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan
of reorganization within the meaning of section
368(a) (1) (D),
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus
the amount of the liabilities to which the property is
subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the
property transferred pursuant to such exchange, then

C -3

woul d t h e
l ea s e con
s ti tu te a
"l i abil
i t y " fo r
t h i s p u r
p o s e?
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S e c . 357 c o n ’t .

S e e b e l ow

(R ed E . Ink)

W.P . R e f.

such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not
a capital asset, as the case may be.
(2) Exceptions.— Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any
exchange to which—
(A) subsection (b) (1) of this section applies, or
(B) section 371 or 374 applies.

P e r R . U. Pa r t n e r ' s Memo t o F i l e
( 12 / 1 7 / 7 5 ) , p . 2 , t h e a s s e t s t r a n s f er r e d
t o R e a d y , I n c . , b y R e d E . I n k wer e a s
fo l l o w s :
FMV

A sset
( 1)
(2 )
(3 )

s ee
n o te s
b e l ow

$ 2 0 ,0 0 0
C a sh
S u p p lie s
1 0 ,0 0 0
T r a d e r e c e i v a b l e s 5 0 ,0 0 0
E q u ip m e n t
7 5 ,0 0 0
T o t a l B a s t s ofa A s s e t s

N /A

S e e W .P .

B a s ts
$ 2 0 ,0 0 0
-0 -0 6 0 ,0 0 0
$ 80 ,0 0 0

FOOTNOTES:
( 1 ) I n r es p o n s e t o m y t e l e p h o n e i n q u i r y
of t o d a y , Tom B o o k s confi r m e d t h a t Mr .
I n k h a s a lw a y s e x p e n s e d a l l s u p p l i e s f a r
ta x p u rp o se s w hen p a id .
(2 ) Mr . I n k h a s a lw a y s r e p o r t e d h a s t a x 
a b le , i n c o me o n a c a s h b a s i s .
(3 ) Va l u e e s t i m a t e d ; a d j u s t e d b a s i s i s
b o o k v a lu e .
L i a b i l i t i e s a s s u m e d b y R e a d y , I n c . , w er e
M o r tg a g e P a y a b le

$ 4 0 ,0 0 0

NOTE: T h e IR S t s l i k e l y t o c o n t e n d t h a t
t h e $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 i n t r a d e p a y a b l e s a l s o r e p r e 
s e n ts a l i a b i l i t y assum ed b y R eady, In c .
We w o u ld d i s p u t e t h a t c o n c l u s i o n (s e e
b e l o w ) . I t i s a l s o c o n c e i v a b l e , th o u g h
u n l i k e l y , t h a t t h e IR S w o u ld a l s o i n c l u d e
C -4
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W .P . A -1 W.PA-1

(R e d E . I n k )

W .P . R ef.

s o m e p o r t i o n o r a l l o f t h e r e m a in d e r o f
t h e l e a s e p a y m e n ts w i t h i n t h e m ea ni ng o f
a " l i a b i l i t y " a s u s e d i n S e c . 3 5 7 ( e ) . We
m o s t c e r t a i n l y w o u ld c o n t e s t t h a t c o n t e n 
t i o n i f r a i s e d b y t h e IR S .
T h er e i s no a u th o rt i t y w h ic h c o n c l u s i v e l y
d e f i n e s t h e w or d " l i a b i l i t y " f o r t a x pur 
p o s e s . T h e C ode d o e s n o t a n d t h e s e v e r a l
j u d i c i a l d e c is io n s i n p o in t c o n fli c t . In
T e s t o r v . C o m m is s io n e r , 327 F 2 d 788 (C A -7 ,
1 9 6 4 ) , P e t e r R a i c h , 46 TC 6 0 4 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,
a n d Wi l f o r d E . T h a tc h e r , 61 TC 4 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,
t h e a c c o u n ts p a y a b l e o f a c a s h bas i s t a x 
p a y e r w er e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e l i a b i l i t i e s
f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f a p p l y i n g IR C S e e .
3 5 7 ( e ) . W h i l e t h e c o u r t i n R a ic h n e v e r
e x p l i c i t l y d is c u s s e d th e d e fin itio n a l
p r o b le m , t h e m a jo r i t y o p i n i o n i n T h a tc h e r
a s s u m e s " t h a t C ongr e s s i n t e n d e d t h e t e r m
l i a b i l i t y t o h a v e i t s or d in a r y m e a n in g ."
W h i l e t h e " o r d in a r y " m e a n in g o f t h e w or d
w as h e l d b y t h a t c o u n t t o i n c l u d e t h e a c 
c o u n t s p a y a b l e o f a cas h bas i s t a x p a y e r ,
i t is n o t a t a l l a p p a r e n t t h a t f u t u r e
p a y m e n ts u n d e r a n u n e x p i r e d l e a s e o r e t o
b e t o cons t r u e d . B i t t k e r and E u s tic e ,
Fe d e r a l In c o m e T a x a t i o n o f Cor p o r a t i o n s
a n d S h a r e h o l d e r s , 3d e d . , p p . 1 4 -1 3 6 ,
s u g g e s t a c o n t r ar y c o n c l u s i o n , a t l e a s t
s o f a r as l e a s e p a y m e n ts m i g h t b e i n 
v o lv e d i n r eor g a n iz a tio n s .
Fur t h e r mor e , i n B o n g i o v a n n i v . C om m is
s i o n e r , 470 F2 d 9 2 1 (C A -2 , 1972) r e v ’ g
TC Memo De c . 3 1 ,0 2 7 , t h e wor d " l i a b i l i t y "
i s d e fin e d to in c lu d e o n ly ta x l i a b i l i 
t i e s — i . e . , " le in s i n e x c e ss o f ta x
c o s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y mor t g a g e s e n c u m b e r i n g
pr o p e r t y t r a n s f e r r e d i n a S e c t i o n 351
t r ans a c t i o n " — a n d e x c l u d e s t h o s e l i a b i l i 
t i e s w h ic h do n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h a t nar r ow
d e f i n i t i o n . I n f i n d i n g t h a t a c c o u n ts
p a y a b l e o f a c a s h b a s i s t a x p a y e r wer e n o t
l i a b i l i t i e s f o r pur p o s e s o f S e c . 3 5 7 ( e ) ,
t h e cour t i n B o n g io v a n n i r e l i e d u p o n pr e
C -5
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(R e d E . I n k )
c i s e l y t h e s am e S e n a t e R e p o r t a s t h a t
m e n ti o n e d i n T h a tc h e r , T e s t o r , a n d R a i c h ,
b u t w ith an oppos i t e concl u s io n . Ju d g e
Q ueal y , w ho wr o t e t h e or i g i n a l o p i n i o n i n
B o n g i o v a n n i (TC Memo 1 9 7 1 -2 6 2 ) v i g o r ous l y
d i s s e n t e d t o t h e m a jo r i t y o p i n i o n i n
T h a tc h e r , a r g u in g t h a t t h e S e c o n d C ir c u i t
C our t had c o r r e ct l y r e v e r s e d h i s p r i o r
opi n i o n . B e c a u s e t h e S e v e n t h C i n c u i t
o p i n i o n i n T e s t o r c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h a t of
t h e S e c o n d C ir c u i t t n B o n g io v a n n i, t h e
S u p r em e Cour t m ay h a v e t o r e s ol v e t h i s
d is p u te .
At t h i s d a t e i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e S e c o n d
C ir c u i t w oul d c o n s i d e r n e i t h e r I n k ' s
$ 1 0 ,0 0 0 i n t r a d e p a y a b l e s n o r t h e p a y 
m e n ts o n t h e u n e x p i r e d l e a s e a s a l i a b i l
i t y . N e i t h e r t h e S e v e n t h C ir c u i t n o r a n y
o t h e r co u r t h a s r ul e d o n t h e l e a s e - p a y 
m e n ts i s s u e .
For a c c o u n t i n g pur p o s e s , tw o t y p e s o f
l e a s e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d . T h e o p e r a t i ng
l e a s e c o n v e y s no p r o p e r t y r i g h t s t o t h e
l e s s e e . T h e l e s s or r e t a i n s fu l l t i t l e
a n d t h e l e s s e e mer e l y p a y s r e n t f o r u s i n g
t h e pr o p e r t y . T h e f i n a n c i n g l e a s e i s
c o n s i d e r e d t o b e t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a
s al e . I n t h a t k i n d of l e a s e t h e l es s e e
c a n , a t t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e , o b 
t a i n t i t l e t o t h e pr o p e r t y b y p a y i n g a
n o m in a l a m o u n t.
In th is c o n te x t th e o b lig a tio n o f a f i 
n a n c in g l e a s e m i g h t w el l b e c o n s i d e r e d t o
b e a l i a b i l i t y w i t h i n t h e c o n g r es s i o n a l
i n t e n t o f S e c . 3 5 7 (c ). Such s ec u r ed
t r a n s a c t i o n s w er e u s e d i n t h e C o m m itte e
R ep o r t s t o i l l u s t r a t e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
s e c t i o n . (S ee. S . R e p t . 1 6 2 2 , t o a c c o m 
p a n y H .R . 8 3 0 0 , P . Law 5 9 1 , 8 3 d C o n g .,
2 d se s s . , 1 9 5 4 , p . 2 7 0 ; H . R e p t . 1337
(s am e l a w ), p . A 1 2 9 .) I n a n o p e r a t i ng
l e a s e — l i k e R ed E . In k ' s - - t h e r e n t a l p a y 
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m en t s c a n o n l y b e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e p a y 
m e n ts f o r t h e c u r r e n t u s e o f p r o p e r t y .
C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e w o u ld r e j e c t a n y a t t e m p t
b y t h e IR S t o t r e a t t h e s e l e a s e p a y m e n ts
as a l i a b i l i t y fo r p u rp o ses o f
S e c . 3 5 7 (c ).
G iv e n t h e f a c t t h a t I n k ' s l e a s e w i t h
B ra n d en P r o p e r tie s d o es c a l l f o r a m anda
t o r y $ 1 2 ,0 0 0 p a y m e n t i n t h e e v e n t t h e
l ea se i s b ro ken , and gi ven th e fa c t th a t
t h i s l e a s e c o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d a s l i g h t l y
" u n f a v o r a b l e " o n e a s o f 3 / 1/ 7 5 , t h e I RS
j u s t m i g h t c o n t e n d t h a t $ 1 2 ,0 0 0 [ o f t h e
r e m a i n i n g $ 1 8 6 ,0 0 0 ) d o e s r e p r e s e n t a l i a 
b i l i t y a s s u m e d b y Re a d y , I n c . N o t e , how 
e v e r , t h a t e v e n i f b o th t h e tr a d e p a y 
a b l e s o f $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 a n d t h e l e a s e o f $ 1 2 ,0 0 0
w ere c o n s id e r e d to be l i a b i l i t i e s , th e
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0 I n b a s i s t r a n s f e r r e d w o u ld s t i l l
e x c e e d t h e su m o f a n y l i a b i l i t i e s a s s u m e d
b y P eady, In c . I t i s o n ly i f th e e n tir e
b a l a n c e o f t h e r e m a i n i n g l e a s e p a y m e n ts
i s deem ed to b e a l i a b i l i t y t h a t
S e c . 3 5 7 (c ) c a n b e m a d e t o a p p l y . B a s e d
on a l l o f th e a u th o r itie s c o n s id e r e d
h e r e , w e w o u ld s t r o n g l y r e s i s t a n y s u c h
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i f r a i s e d b y t h e I RS o n
a u d it.

S ee

W .P . A -3

F o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e S e c . 3 5 7 (c )
p r o b le m , s e e " S e c . 3 5 7 (c ) a n d T h e C a sh
B a s i s T a x p a y e r , " 115 Uni v . P e n n . Law R e v .
1154 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; " T h e F r u s t r a t i o n s i n S e c t i o n
3 5 7 ( c ) , " 25 T a x Law Re v i ew 22 7 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
Q uest i o n 3 : A r e c o l l e c t i o n s o f t h e t r a d e r ec ei v a b le s
tr a n s fe r r e d b y Mr . I n k t o R e a d y , I n c .. , o n
3 / 1/ 7 5 t o be co n s i der e d t h e t a x a b l e i n 
com e of Mr . I n k or o f R e a d y , I n c . ?
Concl u s io n : For many year s , i n r e l i ance on the

" as s i g n m e n t- o f - i n c o m e " d o c t r i n e , t h e
c our t s have h e ld t h a t an i n d iv id u a l
C -7
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t r a ns f er o r , r a t h e r t h a n t h e c o n t r o l l e d
c o r p o r a t e t r a n s f e r e e , w as t a x a b l e o n t h e
i n c h o a t e in c o m e i t e m s t r a n s f er r e d i n a
S e c . 3 5 1 t r a n s a c t i o n . B ro w n v . C om m is
s i o n e r 115 F 2 d 3 3 7 (C A -2 , 7 9 4 0 ); Cl i n t o n
Da v i d s o n , 4 3 BTA 576 [ 1 9 4 1 ) ; a n d A dol ph
Wei n b e r g , 44 TC 2 3 3 [1 9 6 5 ) a f f ’ d p e r
c u r ia m 386 F 2d 836 (C A -9 , 19 6 7 ) .
The t a x c o u r t w as f i n a l l y p e r s u a d e d , how 
e v e r , t o al l ow t h e cas h b a s i s t a x p a y e r t o
t r a n s f e r a c c o u n ts r e c e i v a b l e t a x f r e e u n 
der S e c . 3 5 1 . Thom as B r i g g s , TC Memo
1 9 5 6 -0 8 6 . S i n c e B r i g g s tw o a d d i t i o n a l
c a s e s , H e m p t B r o s . I n c , v . U S, 354 F.
S up p . 1 1 72 [DC P a . , 19 7 3 ) a n d Di v i n e , J r .
v . U S, 1 9 6 2 -2 USTC 8 5 , 592 [WD T e n n . ,
1962 ) h a v e a r g u e d t h a t t h e a s s i g n m e n t - o f i n co m e d o c t r i n e i s i n a p p l i c a b l e i n s u c h
s i t u a t i o n s . B i t t k e r and E u s tic e ( 3d e d .)
al s o n o te t h a t t h e i m p l i c i t h o l d in g of
P e t e r R a i c h , 46 TC 6 0 4 ( 1966) i s t h a t r e 
c e i v a b l e s t r a n s f e r r e d w oul d n o t h a v e b e e n
r e c o g n i z e d b ut f o r S e c . 3 5 7 ( c ) . [ B i t t k e r
a n d E u s t i c e , 3d e d . , p . 3 - 5 9 . ) U n d e r t h e
f a c t c i r c u m s t a n c e s of I n k ' s c a s e , t h e r e
s e e m s t o b e s uff i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y t o a r g u e
t h a t a ny r e c e iv a b l es col e c te d by R eady,
I n c . , s hou l d b e t r e a t e d a s t h e t a x a b l e
in c o m e of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n a n d n o t t h a t of
M r. I n k i n d i v i d u a l l y .
Q u e s t i o n 4 : M u s t M r. I n k r e c a p t u r e a n y of t h e i n v e s t 
m e n t c r e d i t cl a im e d i n 1971 b e c a u s e o f
h i s t r a n s f e r of t h e e q u i p m e n t t o R e a d y ,
I n c ., i n 1975?
C o n c l u s i o n : No— Al l c o n d i t i o n s of T r e a s . R e g s .
S e c . 1 .4 7 -3 ( f ) ( 1) are s a t i s f i e d .

The

p e r t i n e n t r e g u l a t i o n r e a d s a s f o l l o w s:
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TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.47-3(f)
(f) Mere change in form of conducting a trade or
business.—
(1) General rule.
(i) Notwithstanding the provision of § 1.47-2, re
lating to “disposition” and “cessation,” paragraph
(a) of § 1.47-1 shall not apply to section 38 prop
erty which is disposed of, or otherwise ceases to be
section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer,
before the close of the estimated useful life which
was taken into account in computing the taxpayer's
qualified investment by reason of a mere change in
the form of conducting the trade or business in
which such section 38 property is used provided
that the conditions set forth in subdivision (ii) of
this subparagraph are satisfied.

the
r ul e.

(ii) The conditions referred to in subdivision (i) of
this subparagraph are as follows:

OK h e r e
(sa m e
bus .)

(a) The section 38 property described in sub
division (i) of this subparagraph is retained as
section 38 property in the same trade or busi
ness,

OK h e r e
( 9 8% r e 
ta i n e d )

(b) The transferor (or in a case where the trans
feror is a partnership, estate, trust, or electing
small business corporation, the partner, ben
eficiary, or shareholder) of such section 38
property retains a substantial interest in such
trade or business.

OK h e r e
(a l l
pr o p .
tr a n s f. )

(c) Substantially all the assets (whether or not
section 38 property) necessary to operate such
trade or business are transferred to the trans
feree to whom such section 38 property is
transferred, and

OK h e r e
(s e e W.P.
E -3)

N/A

(d) The basis of such section 38 property in the
hands of the transferee is determined in whole
or in part by reference to the basis of such sec
tion 38 property in the hands of the transferor.
This subparagraph shall not apply to the transfer of
section 38 property if paragraph (e) of this section,
relating to transactions to which section 381 ap
plies, applies with respect to such transfer.
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Ques t i o n 5 : W h a t i s Mr . I n k ' s t a x b a s i s i n t h e 98 0
s h a r esof
R e a d y , I n c . , s t o c k t h a t he
r e t a i n e d a f t e r t h e 3 / 1 / 7 5 i n c o r p o r a t i on?
C oncl u s i o n : IRC S e c . 358 d e te r m i n e s t h e a d j u s t e d
b a s i s o f s t o c k s a n d s e c u r i t ies r e c e i v e d
i n a S e c . 351 t r a n s a c t i o n . I t r e a d s a s
f ol l ow s :
SEC. 358. BASIS TO DISTRIBUTEES.
(a) General Rule:—In the case of an exchange to which
section 351, 354, 355, 356, 361, or 371 (b) applies—
(1) Nonrecognition property.—The basis of the prop
erty permitted to be received under such section with
out the recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as
that of the property exchanged—

her e ,
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0

(A) decreased by—

- 4 0 ,0 0 0
( b u t s ee
W. P . c - 6
t h ru C -7
f o r p o s
s i bl e
IR S v i ew)

N/A

NONE
See
Sec.
3 5 8 (d )
N/A

(i) the fair market value of any other property
(except money) received by the taxpayer,
(ii) the amount of any money received by the
taxpayer, and
(iii) The amount of loss to the taxpayer which
was recognized on such exchange, and

(B) increased by—
(i) the amount which was treated as a dividend,
and

N/A

(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which
was recognized on such exchange (not includ
ing any portion of such gain which was treated
as a dividend).
(2) Other property.—The basis of any other property
(except money) received by the taxpayer shall be its fair
market value.

(b) Allocation of Basis.—

N/A

(1) In general.— Under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, the basis determined under
subsection (a)(1) shall be allocated among the proper
ties permitted to be received without the recognition of
gain or loss.

C -1 0
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(Red E. Ink)

N/A.

(2) Special rule for section 355.—In the case of an ex
change to which section 355 (or so much of section 356
as relates to section 355) applies, then in making the
allocation under paragraph (1) of this subsection, there
shall be taken into account not only the property so
permitted to be received without the recognition of
gain or loss, but also the stock or securities (if any) of
the distributing corporation which are retained, and
the allocation of basis shall be made among all such
properties.

N/A

(c) Section 355 Transactions Which Are Not Exchanges. —
For purposes of this section, a distribution to which sec
tion 355 (or so much of section 356 as relates to section
355) applies shall be treated as an exchange, and for such
purposes the stock and securities of the distributing corpo
ration which are retained shall be treated as surrendered,
and received back, in the exchange.

For

r e s ul t
r e f er
to S e c .
358 ( a ) ( 1)
(A )( i i ),
above.
N/A

(d) Assumption of Liability.—Where, as part of the con
sideration to the taxpayer, another party to the exchange
assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from the
taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption or
acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for pur
poses of this section, be treated as money received by the
taxpayer on the exchange.

W.P . Ref .

S e e a g a in
W .P . C -4
t h r u C -7
f o r m ean 
i ng o f
”l i a b . ”

(e) Exception.—This section shall not apply to property
acquired by a corporation by the exchange of its stock or
securities (or the stock or securities of a corporation which
is in control of the acquiring corporation) as consideration
in whole or in part for the transfer of the property to it.

A c c o r d in g t o S e c . 3 5 8 ( a ) , t h e r e f o r e , M r.
I n k ’s b a s i s i n t h e 1 ,0 0 0 s h a r e s h e i n i 
t i a l l y r e c e i v e d w o u ld b e $ 4 0 ,0 0 0 ( i . e . ,
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0 b a s i s t r a n s f e r r e d l e s s $ 4 0 ,0 0 0
l i a b i l i t i e s assum ed b y R eady, I n c .) . S e e
a g a i n W.P . C -4 t h r u C -6 ( o r a d i s c u s s i o n
o f t h e m e a n in g of t h e w o r d " l i a b i l i t i e s ."
B e c a u s e M r. I n k g a v e t e n s h a r e s t o M rs.
I n k a n d t e n s h a r e s t o M r. B o o k s , t h e
b a s i s i n h i s r e m a i n i n g 98 0 s h a r e s w o u ld
b e $ 3 9 , 200 ( i . e . , 98% o f $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 ) . E a ch
d o n e e w o u ld h a v e a b a s i s o f $ 4 0 0 i n t h e
te n s h a r e s r e c e iv e d p e r S e c . 1015.
C -11
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S u m m a ry o f Q u e s t i o n s I n v e s t i g a t e d
D e c e m b e r 19 7 5

W .R . R e f .

1. M u s t R e a d y , I n c . , r e p o r t a n y t a x a b l e i n 
co m e i n i t s f i r s t t a x y e a r b e c a u s e o f i t s
exch a n g e o f p r e v io u s ly u n is s u e d s to c k fo r
t h e a s s e t s o f R e d ’s P r i n t S h o p ?
C o n c l u s i o n : N o.

( S e e . 1 0 3 2 .)

S ee E -1

2 . C an R e a d y , I n c . , c l a i m a t a x d e d u c t i o n
u n d e r S e c . 162 f o r t h e $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 e x p e n d e d
w ith in s i x t y days fo llo w in g in c o r p o r a tio n
i n p a y m e n t o f t h e tr a d e p a y a b le s i t a s 
s u m e d fr o m R e d ’s P r i n t S h o p ?
C o n c lu s io n : The o f f i c e r s o f R ea d y, I n c .,
s h o u ld be a le r te d to th e p o s s i b i l i t y th a t
t h e IR S m i g h t s u c c e s s f u l l y c h a l l e n g e t h e
p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c o r p o r a tio n 's d e d u c tin g
t h e $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 e x p e n d e d i n p a y m e n t o f t h o s e
a c c o u n ts .

S e e E -1 & 2

3. I s t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e t r a d e r e c e i v a b l e s
t r a n s f e r r e d b y M r. I n k t o R e a d y , I n c . ,
and c o lle c te d by th e c o r p o r a tio n a f t e r
th e in c o r p o r a tio n , p r o p e r ly deem ed to be
t h e t a x a b l e in c o m e o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ?
C o n c lu s io n : S u f f i c i e n t a u th o r ity e x is t s
to j u s t i f y tr e a tin g th e r e c e iv a b le s c o l
l e c t e d a s t h e t a x a b l e in c o m e o f R e a d y ,
In c .

S e e a g a in
C -7 & 8

4 . Wh a t i s R e a d y , I n c . ’s , a d j u s t e d t a x b a s i s
i n t h e v a r i o u s a s s e t s i t r e c e i v e d fr o m
R ed E . I n k o n 3 /1 /7 5 ?
C o n clu sio n :

C a sh
S u p p lie s
R e c e iv a b le s
E q u ip m e n t
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5 . Wh a t i s t h e m axim um d e p r e c i a t i o n m e th o d
th a t R eady, I n c ., can u t i l i z e r e l a t i v e to
t h e e q u i p m e n t a c q u i r e d fr o m R e d E . I n k o n
3 /7 /7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : 150 p e r c e n t d e c l i n i n g - b a l a n c e
d e p r e c i a t i o n a s s u m in g t h e e q u i p m e n t h a s a
r e m a in in g u s e f u l l i f e o f t h r e e y e a r s o r
lo n g e r .

S e e E -3

6 . M u s t R e a d y , I n c . , o b t a i n t h e c o m m is s io n 
e r ’s a p p r o v a l t o f i l e i t s f i r s t t a x r e 
t u r n o n a F e b r u a r y 2 8 /2 9 f i s c a l - y e a r ,
c a s h -m e th o d b a s is ?
C o n c l u s i o n : N o; no s p e c i a l p e r m i s s i o n i s
r e q u ir e d s o lo n g as th e c o r p o r a te fin a n 
c i a l r e c o r d s a r e m a in ta in e d on t h i s sam e
b a s is .

D- 2
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W o r k in g P a p e r s
D e c e m b e r 1975
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Q u e stio n 1: M ust R ea d y, I n c ., r e p o r t a n y ta x a b le i n 
com e i n i t s f i r s t t a x y e a r b e c a u s e o f i t s
ex ch a n g e o f p r e v io u s ly u n is s u e d s to c k fo r
t h e a s s e t s o f R e d ’s P r i n t S h o p o n 3 / 1/ 7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : N o; s e e C o d e S e c . 1032 b e lo w .
SEC. 1032. EXCHANGE OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY.

(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss.—No gain or loss shall
be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or
other property in exchange for stock (including treasury
stock) of such corporation.

th e
r u le

(b) Basis.—For basis of property acquired by a corpora
tion in certain exchanges for its stock, see section 362.

Q u e s t i o n 2 : C an R e a d y , I n c . , c l a i m a t a x d e d u c t i o n
u n d e r IR C S e c . 162 f o r t h e $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 i t e x 
p en d ed w ith in s i x t y d a ys fo llo w in g in c o r 
p o r a t i o n i n p a y m e n t o f t h e t r a d e a c c o u n ts
i t a s s u m e d fr o m R e d ’s P r i n t S h o p ?
C o n c lu s io n : G e n e r a lly t h e c o u r ts h a v e d e n ie d a d e d u c 
t i o n f o r o r d i n a r y ( S e c . 16 2 ) e x p e n s e s i n 
c u r r e d b y t h e t r a n s fe r o r b u t p a id b y th e
c o r p o r a t e t r a n s f e r e e f o l l o w i n g a S e c . 351
i n c o r p o r a t i o n . A s r e c e n t l y a s 1972 t h e
T ax C o u rt d e c la r e d :
It is well settled that an expenditure of a preceding owner
of property which has accrued but which is paid by one
acquiring that property is a part of the cost of acquiring
that property, irrespective of what would be the tax
character of the expenditure to the prior owner. Such
payment becomes part of the basis of the property ac
quired and may not be deducted when paid by the ac
quired of that property.

( M. B u t e n and. S o n s , I n c . , TC Memo 1 9 7 2 - 0 4 4 .)
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Thus t h e T ax C o u rt i n B u te n i n d i c a t e s
th a t a d e f i n i te u n ifo r m ity o f a p p lic a tio n
e x is t s i n t h i s a re a . D e s p ite th e s i g n i f 
i c a n t num ber o f c a se s s u p p o r tin g t h a t
c o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , i t m ay b e s i g n i f i 
c a n t t h a t i n P e t e r R a i c h , 46 TC 6 0 4
(1 9 6 6 ), th e p a r tie s s ti p u la t e d th a t th e
a c c o u n ts p a y a b l e w e r e d e d u c t i b l e b y t h e
t r a n s f e r e e c o r p o r a t i o n . F u r th e r m o r e , i n
B o n g i o v a n n i , 470 F 2d 921 (C A -2 , 1 9 7 2 ) t h e
S e c o n d C i r c u i t C o u r t i n 1972 n o t e d t h a t
"w h ere th e a c q u ir in g c o r p o r a tio n i s on an
a c c r u a l b a s i s , s u c h a c c o u n ts a r e a l s o d e 
d u c t i b l e i n i t s i n i t i a l p e r i o d . " ( N o te :
R eady, I n c ., w i l l b e a c a s h -b a s is ta x p a y 
e r . ) P erhaps t h e m o st s i g n i f i c a n t a rg u 
m e n t f a v o r i n g d e d u c t i b i l i t y w as p r e 
s e n t e d i n US v . S m i t h , 4 1 8 F 2d 589 (C A -5 ,
1969) . T h e re th e c o u r t n o te d t h a t " I f
t h i s f a c t u a l i n q u i r y r e v e a ls a p r im a r y
p u rp o se o th e r th a n a c q u is itio n o f p ro p e r
t y , t h e c o u r t m ay p r o p e r l y a l l o w a d e d u c 
t i o n to th e c o r p o r a tio n i f a l l th e r e 
q u i r e m e n t s o f T i t l e 26 USC, S e c . 1 6 2 , a r e
m e t . . . . " In I n k 's in c o r p o r a tio n i t i s
a r g u a b l e t h a t t h e l i a b i l i t i e s o f R e d 's
P r in t S h o p w ere a ssum ed b y R eady, I n c .,
s o l e l y fo r b u s in e s s c o n v e n ie n c e re a s o n s
and n o t fo r th e a c q u is itio n o f p r o p e r ty .
I f R e d ’s d e c i s i o n t o t r a n s f e r t h e s e l i a 
b i l i t i e s ca n b e d e m o n s tr a te d to h a v e b ee n
m o tiv a te d by t h i s c r ite r io n , th e r e a s o n 
i n g i n S m i t h m i g h t s u p p o r t R e a d y , I n c . ’s ,
c l a i m f o r d e d u c t i b i l i t y . G iv e n t h e
w e ig h t o f c o n tr a r y a u th o r ity , h o w ever,
th e o f f ic e r s o f R eady, I n c ., s h o u ld be
a l e r t e d t o a p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n IR S c h a l 
l e n g e . S e e M agruder v . S u p p le e ,
316 US 394 ( 1 9 4 2 ) ; H o l d c r a f t T r a n s p o r t a 
t i o n C o . , 153 F 2d 323 (CA- 8 , 1 9 4 6 );
H a d e n C o. v . C o m m is s io n e r , 165 F 2d 588
(C A -5 , 1 9 4 8 ) a n d A t h o l M fg . C o .,
54 F 2d 230 (C A -1 , 1 9 3 1 ) .
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(Ready, I n c . )

W. P . Ref.

Q u e s t i o n 3 : A r e c o l l e c t i o n s fr o m t h e $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 i n t r a d e
a c c o u n ts r e c e i v a b l e t r a n s f e r r e d b y M r.
In k to R eady, I n c ., on 3 /1 /7 5 to be con
s i d e r e d t h e t a x a b l e in c o m e o f M r. I n k o r
o f R ea d y, I n c .?
C o n c l u s i o n : O f R e a d y , I n c . ; s e e a g a i n W .P . C -7 8 8
Q u e s t i o n 4 : W h a t i s R e a d y , I n c . ’s a d j u s t e d t a x b a s i s
i n t h e v a r i o u s a s s e t s i t r e c e i v e d fr o m
M r. I n k o n 3 / 1 / 7 5 ?
Con clu s ion: T h e b a s i s o f t h e a s s e t s r e c e i v e d b y a
c o r p o r a t e t r a n s f e r e e i n a S e c . 351 t r a n s 
a c t i o n a r e d e te r m in e d b y S e c . 3 6 2 (a )
w h ic h r e a d s a s f o l l o w s :

SEC. 362. BASIS TO CORPORATIONS.
(a) Property Acquired by Issuance of Stock or as Paid-In
Surplus.—If property was acquired on or after June 22,
1954, by a corporation—
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section
351 (relating to transfer of property to corporation con
trolled by transferor) applies, or
(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital,

th e r u le

then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands
of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recog
nized to the transferor on such transfer.

A c c o r d i n g l y , R e a d y , I n c . ’s , a d j u s t e d t a x
b a s is o f a s s e ts r e c e iv e d i s as fo llo w s :
Cash.
S u p p lie s
T rade r e c e iv a b le s
E q u ip m e n t

$ 2 0 ,0 0 0
-0 -0 6 0 ,0 0 0

Q u e s t i o n 5 : W h a t i s t h e m axim um d e p r e c i a t i o n m e th o d
th a t R eady, In c . , can u t i l i z e i n d e p r e c i
a t i n g t h e e q u i p m e n t a c q u i r e d fr o m Mr . I n k
o n 3 / 1/ 7 5 ?
E-3
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(FE5 72/79/75)

S e e W .P ..
A -1

(R e a d y , I n c . )
C o n c l u s i o n : B e c a u s e S e c . 381 d o e s n o t a p p l y t o S e c .
351 t r a n s f e r s , a l l p r o p e r t y r e c e i v e d b y
R ea d y, I n c ., i s deem ed to b e u s e d p ro p 
e r ty . S u ch p r o p e r ty can n o t b e d e p r e c i
a t e d u n d e r a n y o f t h e r a p i d m e th o d s
g r a n te d o n ly to o r ig in a l u s e r s i n
S e c . 1 6 7 (b )(2 ), (3 ), o r (4 ). S e e R ev.
R u l. 6 7 - 2 8 6 , 1 9 6 7 -2 CB 1 0 1 . H o w e v e r , a c 
c o r d i n g t o R e v . R u l . 5 7 - 3 5 2 , 1 9 5 7 -2 CB
150, a s m o d ifie d b y R ev . R u l. 5 7 -2 4 8 ,
1 9 6 7 -2 CB 9 8 , s u c h p r o p e r t y c a n b e d e 
p r e c i a t e d b y a d e c l i n i n g b a l a n c e m e th o d
n o t t o e x c e e d 150 p e r c e n t o f t h e
s t r a ig h t- lin e r a te , i f th e u sed ta n g ib le
p r o p e r ty h a s a n e s tim a te d r e m a in in g l i f e
o f th r e e yea rs o r lo n g e r .

W .P . R e f .

C o n fir m e d
by phone
w ith
Tom B o o k s
12/ 19/ 75

Q u e s t i o n 6 : M u s t R e a d y , I n c . , o b t a i n t h e c o m m is s io n 
e r 's a p p r o v a l to f i l e i t s f i r s t ta x r e 
t u r n o n a M a rch 1 f i s c a l - y e a r , c a s h b a s is ?
C o n c l u s i o n : S e e b e lo w T r e a s . R e g s . S e c . 1 .4 4 1 1 (b )(3 ).
TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-l(b)(3)
(3) A new taxpayer in his first return may adopt any taxable
year which meets the requirements of section 441 and this
section without obtaining prior approval. The first taxable
year of a new taxpayer must be adopted on or before the
time prescribed by law (not including extensions) for the
filing of the return for such taxable year. However, for
rules applicable to the adoption of a taxable year by a
partnership, see paragraph (b)(2) of § 1.442-1, section
706(b), and paragraph (b) of § 1.706-1. For rules applicable
to the taxable year of a member of an affiliated group
which makes a consolidated return, see § 1.1502-76 and
paragraph (d) of 1.442-1.

S e e a ls o T r e a s . R eg s. S e c . 1 .4 4 1 -1 ( e ) .
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(Ready, Inc.)

W.P . Ref .

TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(e)
(e) Fiscal year.
(1) The term “fiscal year” means—
(i) A period of 12 months ending on the last day of
any month other than December, or
(ii) The 52-53-week annual accounting period, if
such period has been elected by the taxpayer.
(2) A fiscal year will be recognized only if it is estab
lished as the annual accounting period of the taxpayer
and only if the books of the taxpayer are kept in accord
ance with such fiscal year.

The c o u r ts h a ve h e ld t h a t a c o r p o r a te
t r a n s f e r e e i s a s e p a r a t e t a x p a y e r fr o m
t h a t o f i t s t r a n s f e r o r . S i d v . E zo
P r o d u c ts C o ., 37 TC 385 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ; A k ro n .,
C ant o n , a n d Y o u n g s to w n R a i l r o a d C o. ,
22 TC 6 4 8 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; a n d T e x t i l e A p r o n C o .
21 TC 147 ( 1 9 5 3 ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f
R eady, I n c ., w i ll keep i t s fin a n c ia l
b o o ks on th e sam e b a s is a s i t d e s ir e s to
r e p o r t i t s t a x a b l e i n c o m e , no s p e c i a l
p e r m is s io n i s r e q u ir e d .

E -5
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(F ES 1 2 / 1 9 / 7 5 )

S ee c lie n t
le tte r

r e m in d e r

R ed E. In k /R e a d y , I n c .
S u g g e s t i o n s f o r C l i e n t ’s F u tu r e C o n s i d e r a t i o n
D e c e m b e r 1975
I f M r. I n k d e s i r e s a n y a s s i s t a n c e i n f u t u r e t a x p l a n n i n g
w e s h o u l d d i s c u s s w i t h h im , i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e , t h e
fo llo w in g m a tte r s :
1.

2.

Sub c h a p te r S E le c tio n —
a.

T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h ic h t h i s w o u ld
b e d e s ir a b le / u n d e s ir a b le .

b.

W hen t h e d e c i s i o n m u s t b e m a d e .
2 /1 a n d 3 / 3 1 .)

c.

N e e d f o r e v e r y s h a r e h o l d e r ’s a p p r o v a l .
( P o s s i b l y g e t b u y - o u t a g r e e m e n t s .)

E x e c u t i v e c o m p e n s a t io n p o s s i b i l i t i e s —
a.

G r o u p - te r m l i f e i n s u r a n c e

(S e c . 7 9 (a ) ).

b.

H e a lth a n d a c c id e n t in s u r a n c e

c.

D e a th b e n e f i t s

d.

T r a v e l a n d e n te r ta in m e n t (r e q u ir e m e n ts and
a d v a n ta g e s ) .

(S e c . 1 0 6 ).

(S e c . 1 0 1 ).

3.

P e n s i o n P la n s ( c o s t s a n d b e n e f i t s ) .

4.

F u tu r e C o n tr ib u tio n s t o C a p ita l.

5.

(B e tw e e n

a.

C o n s id e r a d v a n ta g e s o f s e c u r i t i e s .

b.

S e c . 1244 i f a d d i t i o n a l s t o c k i s i s s u e d .

C o u ld 85 p e r c e n t d i v i d e n d - r e c e i v e d d e d u c t i o n
be u sed e ffe c tiv e ly ?

F- 1
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8
It is too well settled to need citation of authorities
that it is no offense nor is it reprehensible to avoid the
attachment of taxes. One may employ a ll lawful means
to minimize taxes.
JUDGE WALTER A. HUXMAN

Research Methodology
for Tax Planning
This final chapter examines the research methodology appropriate
to tax planning. It considers (1) the general role of tax planning in
the CPA firm and (2) the technical differences between research
methodologies for tax planning and tax compliance.
A recent survey by an AICPA committee contains several impli
cations about the role of tax practice in the CPA firm.1 First, the
survey clearly establishes the fact that tax practice represents an im
portant source of revenue for the CPA (tax work accounts for be
tween 21 and 40 percent of the total billings in nearly 46 percent
of the responding firms). Second, although return preparation ac
counts for the largest portion of the tax work revenues, consultation
and planning ranks second—ahead of representation before govern
ment bodies. Third, the larger practice units tend to generate a
larger proportion of their total tax work revenues from consultation
and planning than do the smaller practice units. Fourth, most of
the respondents anticipated that consultation and planning would
account for a greater proportion of future tax work fees. All of this
suggests, of course, that the CPA who limits his tax practice to
1Jerome P. Solan and Don J. Summa, “Profile of the CPA in Tax Practice,
Tax Adviser, June 1972, pp. 324-28.
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compliance work is not taking full advantage of his opportunities.
An expansion-oriented CPA is likely to discover that tax-planning
work is a latent source of major growth. The continuing relation
ship that a CPA has with his client ordinarily provides him with
sufficient knowledge of facts to make tax-planning proposals with
minimal additional input from the client.
As we noted in chapter 2, a final tax liability depends upon three
variables: the facts, the law, and an administrative process. A
change in any one of those variables is likely to change a client’s
tax liability. To devise a tax plan which relies for its success upon
an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is usually unrealistic.
Very few taxpayers wield that much influence and, even if they
did, the response of Congress in tax matters typically is unpre
dictable and slow. Attempts to change the administrative process
would be equally ineffective and for similar reasons. Good tax plan
ning always gives adequate consideration to the administrative proc
ess, but it does not rely upon changes in that process for its success.
Thus, tax plans generally must be based on the existing law and
administrative processes because only the facts are readily modi
fied. The ultimate significance of those facts stems, of course, from
existing options already in the code.
Tax-Planning Considerations
The fundamental problems encountered in tax planning might be
compared to those inherent in, say, a decision to transport an object
from New York City to Atlanta. Momentarily ignoring operational
constraints, there appear to be an almost unlimited number of ways
to achieve the objective. That is, the object could be shipped by a
commercial carrier (with air, rail, ship, or surface carrier possibil
ities); it might be personally delivered; or a friend might deliver
it. However, only a few transportation methods are realistic because
of various operational constraints such as time (the object must be
delivered before 9 a.m . on M onday m orn in g ), cost (th e object m ust
be shipped in the most inexpensive manner possible), and/or bulk
(the object may be so large as to exclude all but a few possibilities).
The transportation decision can be managed successfully only if
the decision-maker (1) knows which options actually exist and (2)
understands the constraints. A tax problem has very similar boun
daries.
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Statutory Options

The Internal Revenue Code already contains many options from
which a taxpayer must select alternative courses of action. For ex
ample, a taxpayer generally can choose to operate his business as a
sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. By exercising
any option, a taxpayer automatically causes several different por
tions of the code to apply to his business operations, any one of
which may create a drastically different tax result. In addition to
selecting a basic business form, a taxpayer may also have an oppor
tunity to select a tax year, choose certain accounting methods, de
termine whether the entity selected should be a “foreign” or “do
mestic” one, choose between a “taxable” and “nontaxable” incor
poration transaction, or decide whether or not to capitalize certain
expenditures. Selecting the most advantageous combination of sta
tutory tax options is obviously a difficult task, depending impor
tantly upon the decision-maker’s knowledge of the very existence
of those options.
Client Constraints

In addition to understanding all of the options implicit in the
Internal Revenue Code, a tax planner must also understand the ob
jectives and operational constraints inherent in his client’s activities.
Those objectives and constraints typically are a combination of per
sonal, financial, legal, and social considerations. For example, such
personal objectives as a desire to maximize wealth, to control the
distribution of property after death, to drive a competitor out of
business, or to retire with minimal financial concerns may dictate
certain actions. Personal objectives are often constrained by finan
cial and legal obstacles. A tax planner can understand a client’s
objectives only if that client is willing to confide in the adviser;
therefore, it is absolutely essential that mutual trust and openness
exist between the client and the tax adviser before a tax-planning
engagement is undertaken.
Because tax plans often necessarily involve very significant finan
cial and legal implications, much tax planning is better achieved
through a team effort than through individual work. For example,
in an estate planning engagement, it is not unusual to include the
taxpayer’s attorney, his insurance agent, and a trust officer, as well
as his CPA on the tax-planning team. By combining the special ex
213

pertise of several individuals, the client is better served, and more
importantly, the team approach generally protects the client from
the danger of “secondary infection” that is, from the danger of
putting into operation a plan which may succeed from a tax stand
point but which may have undesirable legal or financial conse
quences.
Creativity

Even if a tax adviser knows all of the pertinent code provisions
and fully understands all of his client’s objectives and constraints,
the optimal tax plan may not be obvious. An optimal plan depends
on the creative resources of the planner. Using all of his knowledge,
he must test tentative solutions in a methodical process that rejects
some alternatives and suggests others. Without a systematic method
of considering and rejecting the many alternatives, the tax planner
is likely to overlook the very alternative he seeks. As suggested
earlier in this study, one common reason for overlooking a good
alternative is simply the tax adviser’s failure to think long and/or
hard enough about the problem. There appears to be a tendency
to rush to the books or to another person for help, hoping that the
best solution will automatically surface, when what is really needed
is more creative thought on the subject. The thinking process is
often stimulated by ideas found in books or suggested by other
persons. Our recommendation is not that books and consultants be
avoided, but rather that the ideas obtained from these sources be
given an opportunity to mature in .quiet contemplation.
Tax-Planning Aids
Books

Tax library materials can help generate successful tax-planning
ideas. Many practical ideas are contained in AICPA Tax Study No.
4, Tax Practice Management, by William L. Raby.2 In addition to
the “tax-planning ideas” portion of a client file (suggested in chap
2William L. Raby, Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974).
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ter 2 of this study), Raby recommends more complete “tax-plan
ning surveys” and “year-end tax reviews” to better evaluate and
anticipate business and estate-planning decisions. AICPA Tax Study
No. 3, Guide to Federal Tax Elections, edited by Joel M. Forster,
is a useful aid in locating many of the options that exist in the
code.3
In addition to these two AICPA publications, most of the com
mercial tax services include, in some form or another, tax-planning
ideas intended to assist the CPA in his practice.4 For example, Pren
tice-Hall’s service, Federal Taxes, contains a tax-savings-idea “in
dex” consisting of four major classifications: (1) types of taxpayers,
(2) income, (3) deductions and credits, and (4) miscellaneous.
Subtopics within each classification refer the reader to editorial ex
planations scattered throughout that tax service. In addition, Pren
tice-Hall publishes a separate, two-volume Tax Ideas service.5 Vol
ume one deals with everyday business and personal transactions;
volume two concentrates on somewhat more complicated tax prob
lems. This service features a transaction checklist of those tax mat
ters that should be taken into account for any given transaction.
The Standard Federal Tax Reporter, published by Commerce
Clearing House, contains a tax-planning section, organized on a
topical basis, in its index volume. The editorial comments found
there contain sufficient detail to handle the easier tax-planning prob
lems and are cross-referenced to other CCH paragraphs that aid in
the solution of the more difficult problems. Volume 5A of Federal
Income, Gift and Estate Taxation, published by Matthew Bender,
contains a “Planning Aids” section as well as a “tax calendar” for
various types of taxpayers.
Although neither the Tax Coordinator, published by the Research
Institute of America, nor the Tax Management Portfolios, published
by the Bureau of National Affairs, contain tax-planning volumes

3Joel M. Forster, ed., Tax Study No. 3, Guide to Federal Tax Elections (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1971).
4 For additional details concerning the publishers of the several commercial
tax services, see exhibit 4 .1 2 , p. 126.

5 Prentice-Hall also publishes a five-volume Estate Planning service; however,
its content is not limited solely to tax ideas, but considers all facets of the
estate planning function.
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per se, both include tax-planning recommendations throughout in
the commentary on the tax issues to which they relate. Matthew
Bender also publishes the three-volume Income Tax Techniques
and the three-volume Estate Tax Techniques, both edited by the
J. K. Lasser Tax Institute. The authors of these services are various
practitioners who have tried to anticipate the difficulties in tax plan
ning for clients.
Many other books, with varying degrees of sophistication, have
been written on tax planning; it simply is not practical to mention
each of them individually. Suffice it to note that readers should not
be misled by all of the titles including the phrase tax planning.
Many of these publications are intended for specific taxpayers and
their unique tax problems, for example, tax planning for profes
sionals, for real estate transactions, for closely held corporations,
or for international operations. Topics covered in one publication
are often duplicated in another. Before a practitioner decides to
purchase such a book, he would be well advised to examine it in
detail to make certain that it actually adds something to the ma
terial already available in his library. Although many of these pub
lications can be of material assistance in tax-planning work, there
is no good substitute for the ability which comes only from years
of experience.
Continuing Education

The extension of formal classroom instruction beyond the college
campus during the past decade may be partially attributable to
the institution of mandatory continuing education requirements for
several professions, including the profession of accountancy. For
tax practitioners, however, tax institutes provided continuing pro
fessional instruction long before it became mandatory in any state.
Today, continuing education programs are a second major source
of assistance in successful tax planning. Well-developed courses are
readily available from national, state, and local professional so
cieties, educational institutions, and private organizations. The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants annually pub
lishes a catalog describing most of the continuing education pro
grams offered by the AICPA and the state CPA societies. The 197576 catalog includes a description of eighty-five different courses in
taxation. The durations of the courses described there vary from
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“one-half day” to “six nights.” Costs of participation, when stated,
vary from $25 to $170 per course. Most courses are scheduled dur
ing the summer and fall, throughout the United States.
Information about other tax courses can frequently be found in
tax periodicals. Some courses are directed to the beginner, others
to an advanced audience. Some cover specific subjects; others are
of general interest. Some are well developed and taught by highly
qualified instructors; others have been hastily prepared and are
poorly presented. Obviously the caveat “let the buyer beware” is
applicable in the selection of any course.
Tree Diagrams

In tax-planning work, the alternatives that an adviser must con
sider multiply quickly. After clearly identifying a general course
of action (based on an understanding of the client’s objective and
knowledge of the code), and before reaching a conclusion, an ad
viser might consider structuring his problem in the form of a “tree
diagram.” This technique is commonly utilized in management ser
vices work.6 Such an exercise ensures a thorough and systematic
consideration of each alternative because it focuses on the critical
questions in a sequential manner. The branches of the tree derive
from options existing in the code, any one of which can achieve the
client’s objective. After ordering the options in this fashion, the ad
viser should quantify the tax result implicit in each alternative.
This quantification will facilitate discovery of many of the risks and
constraints that, in turn, eliminate some alternatives and favor
others. For an example of a tree diagram, see figure 8.1 (p. 221).
As noted above, a tax adviser cannot prepare a tree diagram for
a tax problem until he fully understands his client’s objective and
determines the tax rules applicable to each available method of
achieving that objective. Knowledge of the client’s objective can
come only from a complete and open discussion of the problem
with the client. In an operational sense, objectives and constraints
can only be determined in the same way in which facts are estab
6For further description of this technique in general see R. J. Ainslie and Alan
A. Kenney, “Decision Tables—A Tool for Tax Practitioners,” Tax Adviser, June
1972, pp. 336-45; see also Harley M. Courtney and Patricia C. Elliott, “Com
puting for Tax Planning,” Tax Adviser, May 1974, pp. 288-97.
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lished in compliance engagements. Determination of the possible
alternatives stems from a unique blend of prior experience, reading,
and thinking about the problem. Ascertaining the tax outcome for
each alternative is based on the same research techniques described
in the earlier chapters of this study. In summary, then, the only
major differences between the tax research methodologies applic
able to compliance work and to planning work are in the adviser’s
ability to identify possible alternatives and in his method for select
ing the best of the several alternatives considered. In an attempt
to focus on these aspects of tax planning, the following pages illus
trate the process involved in a relatively simple planning engage
ment. We will not examine in detail the procedures by which the
tax adviser determines the tax result implicit in each option, since
they are the same as those followed in a “closed-fact” situation.7
A Tax-Planning Example
To illustrate the procedures that might be utilized in a tax-plan
ning engagement, assume that during 1972 a client, a recently re
tired army general, purchased all 200 shares of outstanding stock
in NNH Corporation for $200,000. NNH’s only asset at the time of
this purchase consisted of seventy acres of unimproved (and unen
cumbered) land with a tax basis of $90,000 and a fair market value
of $200,000. Assume further that NNH has no current or accumu
lated earnings and profits.
In 1974, the city council approved construction of a new down
town expressway that would pass directly alongside the NNH prop
erty. Consequently, the fair market value of that property increased
to $300,000.
After discussions with several developers, the client decided to
have NNH improve the property with streets, sewers, water mains,
and so on, and to subdivide the property for sale to builders and
prospective homeowners. The anticipated additional investment re
quired is estimated to be $100,000; the client hopes that the addi

7For additional general background information, see Harry Z. Garian, Tax
Study No. 1, Tax Guide for Incorporating A Closely Held Business and
Stuart R. Josephs, Tax Study No. 2, Tax Planning Techniques for Indi
viduals (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1969 and 1971, respectively).
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tional improvements will increase the value of the land to $450,000
within the next twelve months.
Early in 1975, the client begins to discuss with his tax adviser
the potential tax implications of his proposed business venture. Be
fore leaving the adviser’s office, the client makes it clear that he
intends to make this his last business venture. He wants to make
as large a profit as possible from this land deal and then invest the
proceeds in a retirement annuity that, along with his military re
tirement pay, will guarantee him and his wife a comfortable living
for as long as they live. He asks the tax adviser to make recom
mendations concerning the tax implications of his land development
plans.
At this point the tax practitioner, using his experience and crea
tivity, must identify alternative courses of action and recommend
the one that achieves the client’s predetermined objectives with the
least possible tax cost. Several approaches are available to the prac
titioner. He can, for example, simply apply the client’s facts to his
announced plans and determine the implicit tax result. This ap
proach, however, would really not be considered tax planning; al
though a tax adviser must often recommend against the plan orig
inally proposed by a client, he generally attempts to recommend one
or more alternatives that can achieve the most important client
objectives in a tax-preferred manner.
In order to keep this example simple, we have assumed that
1. the client is married and files a joint return each year.
2. the client receives exactly $20,000 of ordinary taxable income
each year in addition to that specifically attributable to this
land development project.
3. the client does not qualify for income averaging.
4. the client sells all of the lots in one year.
5. the client personally invests the additional $100,000 necessary
to make the land improvements (with no interest cost as
sumed).
In an actual engagement, obviously, these constraints could only be
determined through consultation with the client. In fact, many of
the “constraints” assumed in this example would actually constitute
important tax-planning alternatives. For example, the opportunity
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to spread the sale of lots over several years—either to qualify for
capital gain treatment under the “safe harbor” rules of Section 1237
or to obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates that necessarily
accompany a lower annual (ordinary) income—is an obvious alter
native to the solution suggested in this example. Another equally ob
vious alternative would be to “bunch” the ordinary income in a
single year in order to take advantage of income averaging oppor
tunities available under Sections 1301-1305. As explained above, we
have made assumptions that disqualify alternatives in order to keep
the example simple. We have also assumed that the normal cor
porate tax rate is 22 percent on all corporate taxable income, and the
surtax rate is 26 percent on all income over $25,000.
Given these assumptions, it appears that two major issues con
front the client. First, there is a prospect of double taxation because
the land is currently held by a corporate entity, and the client
wants to put all of the proceeds from this venture into a private
annuity after completion of the project. Second, there is a chance
that some of the gain on the sale of the land could be converted
from ordinary income into capital gain. The tree diagram in figure
8.1 outlines eleven possible alternatives. The diagram helps to high
light the constraints under which these alternatives must be pur
sued. Other alternatives have been rejected on the premise that the
client has specifically ruled out those possibilities. For example,
one obvious alternative would have been for the client to sell his
NNH stock for $300,000. The diagram assumes that the client wants
to develop the property and sell the lots; that is, he has rejected
the option of selling out and settling for a smaller profit.
Without detailing the procedures used to determine the tax re
sult implicit in each of the eleven branches of this diagram, we
will simply note the general tax consequence inherent in that
branch. In order to facilitate communication, each branch has been
designated by a combination of letters and numbers. Thus, the
branch appearing at the top of the diagram can be readily identified
as Option A ( l) ( a ) ( i) ; the second option from the top as Option
A ( l) ( a ) ( ii) , and so forth.
Liquidation Under Section 331, A fte r D eveloping the
Property h u t Before Sale of Lots—O ptions A (1)(a)(i) and (ii)

Although the land probably would not qualify as either a capital
asset (Section 1221) or as a Section 1231 asset, the liquidation of
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Figure 8.1
Tree Diagram

the corporation and distribution of the property might be treated as
full payment in exchange for the stock (Section 331). If so, because
the stock was held for more than six months, the gain would qualify
as a long-term capital gain. However, although the client originally
did not intend to use the corporation with a view to collapsing it
to convert ordinary income into capital gains, the IRS might at
tempt to invoke Section 341, which would convert the capital gain
on liquidation into ordinary income. The two possible tax results
can be computed as follows.
Personal Tax
If Sec. 341 is
not invoked
$ 20,000
150,000

Collapsibility
Status

If Sec. 341
is invoked

(75,000)
$ 95,000

Ordinary taxable income
$ 20,000
Surrender of stock
150,000
(FMV $450,000 - cost
$200,000 — improvements
$100,000)
Long-term capital gain deduction
—
Total taxable income
$170,000

$ 42,180

Tax liability

$ 90,380

Under this alternative, the subsequent sale of the lots would not
create any additional tax liability because the client’s new basis in
the lots would be $450,000 (assuming the fair market value re
mained firm at $450,000). Also, under Section 336 the corporation
would not recognize gain as a result of the liquidation.
Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property hut Before Sale of Lots—Option A(l)(b)
If the liquidation is executed under Section 333, no gain will
be recognized at the time of the liquidation and, according to Sec
tion 3 3 4 (c ), the basis in the developed land d istributed w ould be

$300,000, the same as the basis of the stock surrendered. (This
again assumes that the client contributed the additional $100,000 to
NNH to make the land improvements.) The character of the land
to the taxpayer would be the same as that to the corporation before
liquidation; that is, it would be neither a capital asset nor a Section
1231 asset. No gain would be recognized to the corporation upon
liquidation (Section 336). Thus the tax liability would be as follows.
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Personal Tax

Ordinary taxable income
Sale of lots (FMV $450,000 - cost $200,000
— improvements $100,000)
Taxable income

$ 20,000
150,000
$170,000

Tax liability

$ 90,380

L iquidation U nder Section 331, A fte r D eveloping the
Property and A fte r Sale of Lots—O ption A(2)(a)

In the event the corporation sells the developed property before a
liquidation is effected under Section 331, it will be required to re
port the income from the sale of the lots. Undoubtedly the income
would be treated as ordinary income since the property was con
siderably improved and Section 1237, which potentially allows cap
ital gain treatment on the sale of developed land, is not applicable
to corporations. Subsequently, the distribution of the cash in liqui
dation to the sole shareholder would be treated as in full payment
in exchange for the stock, and the client would thus realize capital
gain treatment (Section 331). The tax consequence would be de
termined as follows.
Corporate Tax

Sale of improved land
Basis of land (cost $90,000 + improvements
$100,000)
Ordinary corporate income

$450,000
190,000
$260,000

Corporate tax liability

$118,300

Personal Tax

Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $118,300)
Basis in stock (cost $200,000 + improvements
$100,000 )
Capital gain on liquidation
Ordinary taxable income
Long-term capital gain deduction

$331,700
300,000
$ 31,700
20,000
(15,850)

Total taxable income

$ 35,850

Individual tax liability

$ 10,277
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Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property and After Sale of Lots—Option A(2)(b)
Because this alternative assumes a sale of all the property by the
corporation prior to liquidation, the corporate tax liability will
amount to $118,300 as in the previous option, leaving an after-tax
cash distribution of $331,700.
Under the provisions of Section 333(e)(1), the amount of the
gain that is not in excess of the taxpayer’s ratable share of earnings
and profits will be recognized, and treated, as a dividend. Thus,
since the client in our example is a 100 percent shareholder, his
ratable share of earnings and profits will be $141,700 ($450,000
minus $190,000 (basis) minus $118,300 (corporate tax)) and his
recognizable gain on the Section 333 distribution will be $31,700
($331,700 (cash received) minus $300,000 (basis)), all of which will
be treated as a dividend. Thus, in addition to a corporate tax of
$118,300, the client will be liable for the following personal income
tax.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Dividend income
Taxable income

$ 20,000
31,700
$ 51,700

Tax liability

$ 17,910

Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
in a New Corporation—Option B(1)(a)(i)
Liquidating the corporation before land improvements have be
gun would increase the basis of the property to $300,000. Under a
Section 331 liquidation, the client would be treated as having ex
changed his stock (a capital asset) for the property distributed
to him.
FMV of land received
Basis of stock surrendered
Gain recognized
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$300,000
200,000
$100,000

Because the stock surrendered constitutes a Section 1221 capital
asset, the client would report a capital gain. Thus, the total per
sonal income tax due on the transaction would be computed as
follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on surrender of stock
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
100,000
(50,000)
$ 70,000

Individual tax liability

$ 27,720

A subsequent tax-free transfer, under Section 351, to a new cor
poration, plus investment of an additional $100,000 for the land
development, would increase the basis of the property to $400,000.
The new corporation would then incur a corporate tax liability upon
sale of the land for $450,000.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land
Basis of land ($300,000 + $100,000 investment)
Ordinary corporate taxable income

$450,000
400,000
$ 50,000

Corporate tax Lability

$ 17,500

This alternative offers two major problems, however. First, once
the corporation has disposed of the land, a second corporate liqui
dation must occur, creating an additional tax.
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $17,500)
Basis in stock (basis from Section 351 transfer
$300,000 + improvements $100,000 )
Gain on corporate liquidation

$432,500
400,000
$ 32,500

Therefore, according to this alternative, if all transactions occur in
the same tax year, the personal tax Lability would increase, as
follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on first corporate liquidation
Capital gain on second corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
100,000
32,500
(66,250)
$ 86,250

Individual tax liability

$ 36,965

The second and more serious problem associated with this al
ternative is the risk associated with the liquidation-reincorporation
process. It appears highly likely that the IRS could invoke the ju
dicial doctrines of "business purpose” or “step transaction” and
thereby ignore the first liquidation entirely. That action would cre
ate the same tax result as is described in Option A(2)(a).
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
as a Sole Proprietor—Option B(1)(a)(ii)
The tax consequences as a result of the liquidation will, of course,
produce the same result as in the previous alternative: the prop
erty basis will increase to $300,000 and the client will recognize a
$100,000 long-term capital gain. The subsequent development costs
will add an additional $100,000 to the $300,000 basis. The sale of
the land for $450,000 will thus create a $50,000 recognizable gain
that would probably constitute ordinary income. The client’s tax
liability would be as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Ordinary gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$400,000 )
Gain on corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

50,000
100,000
(50,000)
$120,000

Individual tax liability

$ 55,620*

*Utilizing “alternative” long-term capital gain tax
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$ 20,000

Although this alternative appears to have a desirable tax result,
it exposes the client to a substantial financial risk in that the land
development would take place outside of a corporate entity. If a
major, unforeseen liability should arise during the development
process, all of the client’s assets would be available to settle credi
tors’ claims. This financial risk, and the cost of possible insurance
to cover the risk, would have to be assessed carefully in making a
selection. Because the illustration is already sufficiently complicated,
and because the added complication would add little if anything
to the point of the illustration, we have simply ignored this factor
in the remainder of the illustration. Unfortunately, the practitioner
cannot dispose of problems so easily.
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing
the Property and Then Accomplishing Development and
Sale Through a Broker—Option B(1)(b)
The tax consequences here are similar to those in the previous
alternative. However, the critical question to be decided is whether
development and sale by an independent real estate broker would
cause the final gain on the sale of the property to be treated as a
capital gain, rather than as ordinary income. In addition, the broker’s
fees would be likely to reduce the anticipated return from the de
velopment. In order to simplify the solution, we have ignored this
probable additional cost for the purposes of the illustration. Accord
ingly, the tax computation could be made as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Gain on liquidation of corporation
Gain on sale of improved land
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
100,000
50,000
(75,000)
$ 95,000

Individual tax liability

$ 42,180

Whether the client would be able to sustain his claim for capital
gain treatment on the sale of the property through an independent
broker is questionable. There is some judicial authority to support
such a position; however, the consensus of available judicial au
thority does not. Adoption of this course of action would appear to
invite litigation. In addition, this alternative might once again in227

clude a substantial financial risk because it requires development
of the land outside the corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
Through a N ew Corporation—Option B(2)(a)(i)
Under a Section 333 liquidation, no gain would be recognized
either to the corporation or to the client. The land distributed in
the liquidation would assume the basis of the stock surrendered, in
this instance $200,000. Subsequent transfer of the land to a new
corporation for purposes of development would be tax free under
Section 351. The basis of $200,000 plus $100,000 of additional in
vestment to accomplish the development would increase the cor
porate basis in the property to $300,000. The sale of the land by
the corporation would result in ordinary income as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sales price of land
Corporation’s basis in land
Ordinary corporate taxable income

$450,000
300,000
$150,000

Corporate tax liability

$ 65,500

The subsequent liquidation of the new corporation would create
the following gain.
Cash distributed (sales price $450,000 —
corporate tax $65,500)
Basis of stock surrendered
Gain on corporate liquidation

$384,500
300,000
$ 84,500

Thus, the client’s total personal tax liability would be computed as
follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Gain on corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
84,500
(42,250)
$ 62,250

Individual tax liability

$ 23,493
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As was true in Option B (1)(a)(i), an adviser would again have
to question how the IRS would view a liquidation followed by an
immediate reincorporation and a subsequent liquidation and hav
ing no obvious business purpose other than converting ordinary in
come into capital gain. This alternative, therefore, appears to be
highly questionable and full of litigation potential.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development as a
Sole Proprietor—Option B(2)(a)(ii)
As mentioned in the explanation of the previous option, no
taxable gain would occur with a Section 333 liquidation. The
client would surrender his stock and transfer his basis of $200,000
from the stock to the land received in distribution. The subsequent
land improvements would increase the basis of the land to $300,000.
The sale of the land would undoubtedly result in ordinary income
in the amount of $150,000 ($450,000 - $300,000). Thus the client’s
tax liability would be determined as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Ordinary income from sale of lots
Taxable income

$ 20,000
150,000
$170,000

Individual tax liability

$ 90,380

This alternative also involves the extra financial risk of developing
the land outside the safety of a corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development Through
an Independent Broker—Option B(2)(b)
As in the two previous alternatives, this option transfers the land
from the corporation to the client through liquidation and transfers
the $200,000 basis in the stock to the land. The additional develop
ment costs of $100,000 can again be added to the basis of the land.
The same critical questions encountered under Option B(l)(b) are
crucial to the tax result in this alternative. If, as a result of sale
through a broker, capital gain treatment can be justified, the follow
ing tax cost would be incurred.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$300,000)
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
150,000
(75,000)
$ 95,000

Individual tax liability

$ 42,180

Summary

By adding the results of the foregoing computations to figure 8.2,
opposite, we can readily observe some very interesting results. Three
alternatives—A (1) (a) (ii), B (1)( b ), and B (2 )( b )—each produce
an equally low tax liability ($42,180). However, each of these al
ternatives involves a rather high risk. If the alternatives are carried
out as proposed, they are likely to be challenged by the IRS and, in
at least two instances, may result in rather sizable deficiency as
sessments. That is, both Option A (1) ( a )( ii) and B (2 )(b ), if chal
lenged during an audit, could result in a deficiency assessment of
$48,200. For instance, if Option A (1)(a )( ii) were found to involve
a collapsible corporation, the tax liability would amount to $90,380,
not including possible penalties. Similarly, if capital gain treatment
were to be denied on Option B (2) (b ), the revised tax liability would
be $90,380, not including any penalties. Although Option B (1)(b)
appears to be much more appealing taxwise, it involves the added
financial risk common to all noncorporate operations. In the latter
alternative, even if challenged successfully, the deficiency assess
ment would amount to only $13,440 (excluding penalties).
Another highly uncertain result is implicit in Option B ( 1) ( a ) ( i) .
If a revenue agent proposes to collapse the two liquidations into one
and if we consider only the second liquidation as a valid one, the
tax result would involve a liquidation after corporate development
of the land with a potential tax liability of $128,577, or a deficiency
assessment of $74,112, without penalties.
Taking into consideration only the tax factors, alternatives
B ( 1) (b ) and B ( 1) ( a ) (ii) appear to be the most attractive options.
Option B (1 )(b ), as already noted, projects a possible tax liability
of $42,180, with a potential deficiency assessment of $13,400, for
a likely tax cost of $55,620. Option B ( 1) (a ) (ii), which requires
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Figure 8.2
Tree Diagram
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immediate liquidation of the corporation and assumes the develop
ment and sale of the land by your client as a sole proprietor, offers
the least litigation risk. The total tax would amount to $55,620, the
same as the maximum projected under B (1) (b). Nevertheless, both
of these alternatives include the financial risk of operating without
the liability protection of a corporation, and the latter option prob
ably involves additional costs for the broker’s services. As noted
earlier, in an actual planning engagement, both of these costs would
have to be estimated and added to our illustration before a recom
mendation could be made to the client.8
Once all of the reasonable alternatives have been researched and
their tax results determined, a tax adviser should recommend a
course of action to his client. In some circumstances, the client may
elect to ignore tax results and base his decision on other considera
tions. In the final analysis, only the client can determine which al
ternative is best for him. The qualified tax adviser will, however,
give his client all of the information needed to make an intelligent
decision; in most instances, the adviser’s recommendation will be
accepted by the client.
This example demonstrates a systematic approach to the research
of alternative courses of action available to a taxpayer. This tax
planning process represents a serial rearrangement of facts over
which a client can still exercise control. Such a systematic creation
and evaluation of alternative strategies is the key to profitable tax
planning.
Tax-Planning Communications
Practitioners should recognize distinct differences between com
municating research conclusions in a tax compliance problem and
making recommendations in a tax-planning engagement. In tax
compliance work, the facts and the law pertinent to the solution are
generally fixed. Therefore, once the appropriate statute and all re
lated authorities have been identified and evaluated, the researcher
8 In such an engagement, much of the computational work could be adapted
to a computer program, which would include calculations for income aver
aging, the maximum tax on earned income, and so forth. Obviously com
puters can eliminate many hours of labor in planning engagements, often at
minimal cost through time-sharing arrangements.
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generally can offer his conclusion to the client with reasonable cer
tainty that it is “correct.”
Reaching an optimal conclusion in a tax-planning engagement is
much less certain. The “facts” are merely preliminary proposals
based on many estimates and assumptions. Furthermore, the enact
ment of a proposed plan is not fixed in time. It may occur next week,
next month, or two years hence. Consequently, at the time the plan
is finally executed, even the tax statutes upon which it is based may
have changed and the tax alternative originally recommended may
no longer be the preferred one. Because of these uncertainties, the
tax adviser should prepare for his client a written memorandum
containing a statement of the assumptions and the recommended
plan of action, qualified as follows:
1. A statement should be included emphasizing the fact that un
less the plan is actually implemented as originally assumed,
the tax results may be substantially altered.
2. It should be stressed that the recommendations are based on
current tax authority and that possible delays in implementa
tion may change the result because of changes in the law dur
ing the interim period.
The foregoing recommendations generally concur with the opin
ion expressed in the AICPA’s Statement of Responsibilities in Tax
Practice No. 8, as quoted on page 168. Although the AICPA com
mittee did not recommend routine use of such precautionary lan
guage, tax advisers should seriously consider the adoption of such
standard “disclaimer” statements in most tax-planning engagements.
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continuing education for, 216217
creativity of, 214
determining client’s objectives,
20, 213, 217-218
determining congressional intent,
139
(and) gathering facts, 140-142
giving guidance to taxpayer, 6,
144, 211-212
(and) interpretation of statute,
144-146
interview of client, 19-29
meeting client’s goals, 34
obligation to investigate facts, 15
relationship to taxpayer (client),
16, 19, 213-214
resolving questions for clients, 6,
61
role of, in anticipating tax prob
lems, 34
role of, in tax questions, 13-15, 61
(and) tax communications to
client, see Tax communica
tions
technical competence of, 58-62,
83-84
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Tax communications
drafting of, 6
external, 165-177
client letters, 165-169, 233
disclaimer statements, 168-169
internal, 162
memos for file, 162-164
research recorded in file, 164165
subject file, 165
see also Research, “closedfact” client file
oral, 161, 163
privileged, 167
protest letters, 169-174
recommendations to client, 232233
requests for rulings and determi
nation letters, 174-177
writing of, to client, 161-162
Tax disputes
settlement out of court, 18-19
Tax laws
applicability, 3
general objective, 7
Tax liability, 16, 212
Tax opportunities, 8
Tax planning
aids in, see Publications
before the facts, 19
considerations, 212-214
statutory options, 213
client constraints, 16, 213-214
courses of study in, 216-217
creativity in, 214
documentation of facts for, 210
example of, 218-232
methodology, 214
procedures, example of, 218-232
recommending to client, 232-233
role of CPA firm in, 211
(to) obtain objectives, 15-16
Tax questions
determination of, 4-5
errors in, 58

identification of, 57
nature of, example, 65-86
relationship to facts and law, 57
example, 65-86
resolution of, 6, 65, 81-83
statements of, 64-65
dangers in, 64-65
Tax result, 13
Tax services
Bureau of National Affairs, tax
service, 128
Callaghan & Co., tax service,
125-127
Commerce Clearing House, tax
service, 124, 126-128
Matthew Bender, Inc., tax ser
vice, 125-128
Prentice-Hall, tax service, 124,
125-128
Research Institute of America,
tax service, 128

Tax statements
preparation of, 6
questions in, 64
Tax valuation, see Fair market
value
Taxpayer
compliance, 15, 211-212
after-the-facts, 16
relationship with tax adviser, see
Tax adviser
Technical information releases, 99
Testimony of impartial witnesses
importance of, 54
Treasury regulations, 94-98, 139
age of, 145-146
publication of, 96
Tree diagrams
examples of, 221, 231
preparation of, 20, 217-218
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